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I. INTRODUCTION
Regarded as fundamental to the integrity of society, the family--and, more
specifically, its preservation-has for a very long time been a priority of both
courts and legislatures. Hand in hand with this focus onfamilies, however, comes
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disagreement about the definition of the family.1 Decisions by the Supreme Court
are onlypartially illuminating. In Trimble v. Gordon2 and Stanley v. Illinois,3 an
unwed father and his children are a family; by contrast, inMichaelH.v. Gerald
.,4 a married woman, her lover, and their child are not. nMoore v. City ofEast
Cleveland,5 a grandmother and her two sets of grandchildren are a family; in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,6 unrelated adults sharing meals and living
quarters are not. These cases reveal that marriage and consanguineous
relationships are significant elements in the definition of a family! Other cases
suggest that these factors are not determinative. In Smith v. Organizationof
FosterFamiliesfor Equality andReform,' the Court asserted that "biological
relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family.' 9
In a similar vein, the Court in Stanley remarked that "the law [has not] refused to
recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.""
Taken as a whole, these cases imply that without either marriage or a biological
relationship, legal recognition of a family is unlikely." For example, in the
absence of aparent-child relationship, marriage is critical for the law to recognize
a family.' 2 Marriage alone may not be sufficient for recognition, however.13 For
* Copyright 2001 by Richard F. Storrow. Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan
University School of Law. B.A,, Miami University 1987; M.A., Columbia University
1989; J.D., Columbia Law School 1993. The Author is grateful to Carlos Ball and David
Meyer who provided valuable comments on previous drafts. The Author thanks Texas
Wesleyan University for providing the research support that made the preparation of this
Article possible.
1. See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Placefor Family Privacy?, 67 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1207, 1208 (1999).
2. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
3. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
4. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
5. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
6. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
7. See ELizABETHBARTHOLET, FAMILYBONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, ANDThE
NEW WoRLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 232 (1999) (describing the family as "defined and
confined by biology and marriage").
8. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
9. Id. at 843.
10. Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
11. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the
FamilyinAmericanLaw andSociety, 1993 UTAHL. REV. 387,388 [hereinafterFineman,
Our SacredInstitution]. "Historically only the nuclear family has been protected and
promoted by legal and cultural institutions." Id. "Intimate entities that do not conform
to the form designated as natural in most instances are not considered families at all." Id.
at 404.
12. Discrimination against the unmarried who wish to purchase contraceptives is
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a parent-child relationship to be legally recognized as a family, either biological
or legal consanguinity is required. 4 Nonetheless, such consanguinity by itself
does not appear to guarantee familial status. Consanguinity's legal significance
in defining who is and who is not a family may depend on whether the existence

of a marriage undermines this significance."
The foregoing synthesis of the constitutional law of family recognition is
deliberately vague. The lines drawn in the case law purporting to define the
family are blurry and incomplete.' 6 Nonetheless, recognition as a family matters.
As the cases mentioned above make clear, the family is a private realm that the
state cannot enter.' These cases also underscore the fact that groups of persons
not regarded as families have no shield of privacy against governmental
interference withtheirrelationships. The impact ofthis lack ofprivacyprotection
can be grave. For instance, where a group of persons does not constitute a family
in the eyes of the law, local ordinances can exclude them from living in certain

forbidden. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,447 (1972) (finding no rational basis
for denying unmarried persons access to contraceptives). Nevertheless, the activity for
whichthe contraceptives are purchased is vulnerable to proscription. See Doev.Duling,
782 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing prohibition of fornication and cohabitation
under Virginia law). Similarly, the mere ability of unmarried persons to live together as
a household is vulnerable to proscription. See, e.g., City ofLadue v.Horn, 720 S.W.2d
745, 752 (Mo. CL App. 1986) C'There is no doubt that there is a governmental interest
in marriage and in preserving the integrity of the biological or legal family. There is no
concomitant governmental interest in keeping together a group of unrelated persons, no
matter how closely they simulate a family.').
13. See BARIHOLET, supranote 7, at 169 ('[A] married couple are not really a
family until they produce the children who provide the blood link tying them all
together.').

14. See Katharine K. Baker, PropertyRules Meet FeministNeeds: Respecting
Autonomyby ValuingConnection,59 OHIo ST.L.J. 1523,1539 (1998) (commentingthat
where one cannot establish legal parentage, "one's substantive rights to a relationship
-with the child depend on whether the [parent-child] relationship is supported by a
[marital] relationship").
15. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989) (upholding the
statutory denial of standing of a genetic father to challenge marital-presumption
paternity); JANET L. DoLGIN, DUNG THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REPRODUCIONiNANUNEAsYAGE 99,117 (1997) (noting that outcomes inunwed-father
cases turn on the existence of a marital relationship); Baker, supranote 14, at 1539
(commenting that where it exists, the law is more deferential to marriage, a "horizontal
relationship," than to parent-child relationships, "vertical relationships").
16. See MarthaAlbertsonFineman, The FamiWy in CivilSociety, 75 CHL-KENTL.
REv. 531, 532 (2000) [hereinafter Fineman, Fanify in Society] ('[T]he teim 'family' is
susceptible to a variety of definitions.").
17. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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neighborhoods."8 Where a father cannot marry his child's mother because she is
married to someone else, the father has no standing to establish a legal tie to his
child. 9 Whereas a father who is married to his child's mother cannot be deprived
of custody short of a determination of his unfitness, 0 an unwed father can be
denied mere visitation with his child based solely on a finding that it is not in the
child's best interests.2 The decisions asserting these principles indicate that the
judiciary limits the definition of family, and, thus, limits the extension of privacy
protection to those groups with relational ties that are grounded in marriage and,
where there is no marriage, in consanguinity. This emphasis on relationships
associated with traditional nuclear family arrangements is anomalous. 2 As
individuals in record numbers reformulate the social arrangements in which they
choose to live, and social acceptance of alternative families increases," the

18. See, e.g., Village ofBelle Terre v.Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); City of Ladue
v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745,752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).

19. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124, 125, 127 (1989).
20. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (articulating the
presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children).
21. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251 (1978).
22. The term "nuclear family" denotes a marital couple and their dependent
children. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977). The Author
substitutes the tenn "marital family" when emphasizing the marital component of the
nuclear family.
23. See KEN BRYSON & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLD AD FAMILY CHARACTEUSTCS: MARCH 1997, at
1(1998) (reporting a drop in the percentage of married-couple households with children
under eighteen years of age from forty percent of all households in 1970 to twenty-five
percent of all households in
1997), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p20-509.pdf. This report also indicates a rise in
the number of families with their own children maintained by one parent, and a rise in the
number of single parents who have never been married. Id.Finally, this report states that
the majority of single mothers with children under six years of age have never been
mried, and, generally, that the number of families maintained by people with no spouse
is "increasing rapidly." Id.at 3, 5; see also Helene S. Shapo,MattersofLife andDeath:
InheritanceConsequencesof Reproductive Technologies, 25 HoFsTRAL. REv. 1091,
1101-02 (1997) (describing the traditional family as one that is not heavily represented
among families today and attributing changing demographics to increases in divorce, as
well as to greater social acceptance of cohabitation and single people raising children
alone); D'Vera Cohn, Census Shows Big Increase in Gay Households, WASH. POST,
June 20, 2001, at Al (describing census figures showing "huge increases in the number
of same-sex couples sharing households"); Michael A. Fletcher, ForBetter or Worse,
MarriageHits a Low, WASa POST, July 2, 1999, at Al (reporting that "the nation's
marriage rate has dipped by43 percent inthe past four decades,.. . leaving it at its lowest
pointinrecordedhistory"); Carey Goldberg, Single Dads Wage Revolution, One Bedtime
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divide between family privacy jurisprudence and the majority of families grows.
As this "gap between legal rules and life' continues to widen, it is critical to
consider the extent of the deprivation of privacy protection to nontraditional
families and the concomitant disappearance of what historically has been great
deference by the state in matters of family life.
This Article re-examines the landmark cases comprising the backbone of the
family privacy doctrine and discloses, within the folds of their rhetoric of
individual liberty, a policy of privacy promoting nuclear families. The reexamination ofthe landmark cases in Part II demonstrates thatthepolicy of family
privacy is to foster the creation and longevity oftraditional, nuclearfamilies. Part
I illustrates how this policy has become more clearly articulated over time
through the Court's restrictive interpretation of fundamental rights and its recent
decision in Troxel v. GraMille, the much-awaited ruling on grandparental
visitation rights.' In Part q1, this Article turns to another body of privacy cases,
namely, those vindicating the right to individual autonomy, and locates within
their treatment of individual sexual and procreative decisions a notable concern
for the well-being of nuclear families. This concern, in turn, influences the
contours of these individual freedoms." This fresh look at these cases indicates
that the quality of privacy vested in individuals depends upon the impact of

Story at a Time, N.Y. ThtEs, June 17, 2001, at 1 (reporting that the number of
households consisting of single fathers with primary custody of their children has risen
fifty percent since 1990); Betsy Hammond, The 2000 Census Aore Say '7Do" to
Cohabitation,PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June 6,2001, atAO1 (reporting that nine percent
of all couples declared themselves "unmarried partners'); Jon Jeter, 'Covenant
Marriages'Tiethe Knot Tightly,WAsIM PosT, Aug. 15,1997, at Al (reporting that"the
nation's divorce rate has soared more than 30 percent to the point that nearly half of all
man-iages now dissolve").
24. Scholars use the term "alternative families" or "nontraditional families" to
denote families whose basis is not a marital unit See, e.g., IRAMAEKEI2.tfANET AL.,
FAmILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 929 (1998) (Cnontraditional families"); D.
KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAmILY LAW: CASES AND

IARLS 397 (3d ed. 1998) ('alternative families"). Professor Martha Finemanhas
coined the tenm"intimate entities" to refer to "family-like groups that do not conform to
the traditional modeL" Fineman, Our SacredInstitution, supra note 11, at 389 n.8.
Societal acceptance of these families has increased in recent years. See Martha Irvine,

TraditionalTwo-parentFamilies
Continue to Decline,SureyFlndsAmericansAreAlso
MoreAccepting ofNontraditionalFamilies,ResearchersSay, PoRTLAIM OREGONIAN,
Nov. 24, 1999, at A05.
25. DOLGIN, supranote 15, at34; cf.Michael R v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 157
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When and ifthe Court awakes to reality, itwill find a
world very different from the one it expects.").
26. See infra notes 32-170 and accompanying text
27. See infranotes 171-407 and accompanying text
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individual autonomy on the integrity of nuclear families. If the impact is
beneficial, individual autonomy is recognized; if it is detrimental, individual
autonomy suffers.
Parts II and III also closely examine the evolution of the standard for
announcing fundamental rights (including privacy) under the Constitution to
disclose that this standard has become a tool in the perpetuation of bias in favor
of traditional, nuclear families.28 Because, under constitutional law, any
expansion of family privacy protection to other than nuclear families must begin
with expanding the definition of family at the policy level,29 Parts IV and V
explore whether policy reform will attenuate the nuclear family bias deployed
through the Supreme Court's privacyjurisprudence. To do this, Part IV takes up
the law of succession (specifically, intestacy and will construction, construction
of bequests containing restraints on marriage, and, finally, the law of undue
influence) to disclose, as a historical matter, explicit policies in favor of marital
families." This discussion will serve as a backdrop to Part V, which examines
reforms-some already established and others merely proposed-aimed, at least
in part, at expanding the law's definition of family. A close evaluation of these
reforms (specificallythe extension ofinheritancerightstononmarital children, the
movement toward openness in adoption, and trends in move-away custody
disputes) locates within them the identical policy in favor of nuclear families that
lies within constitutional family privacyjurisprudence. 3' This Article concludes
that the failure of present-day reforms to effect any meaningful change in family
recognition will have a stunting impact far into the future on efforts to expand
constitutional privacy protection to encompass newer forms of the family.
II. FAMELY PRIVACY
Justice Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren's seminal article advancing the
concept of an evolving common law right of privacy 2 was reportedly written in
33
response to the explosion of the mass media in late nineteenth-century America.
28. See infra notes 119-27, 137-42, 218-25, and accompanying text.
29. See infranotes 465-66 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 408-60 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 467-664 and accompanying text.

32. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARv. L.
REv. 193, 197 (1890) (querying whether the common law can serve as a basis for
protecting the privacy rights ofindividuals). Privacyhas varied meanings in the law. The
action in tort for invasion ofprivacy is beyond scope ofthis Article. See generally Brown
v. O'Bannon, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (D. Colo. 2000) (describing the various
common law claims for invasion of privacy).
33. See Ken Gormley, One HundredYears of Privacy, 1992 WIs. L. REv. 1335,
1350.
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The article was a rallying cry for a legal response to intrusions on privacy that
would vindicate one's right "to be let alone." Privacy, originally construed as
the right of an individual to be let alone,3 has evolved to include a set of principles
that protect not only individual privacy but also what has come to be termed
family privacy2 6 The body of rights bound within this latter type of privacy
includes diverse liberties. Said to have attainedjudicial recognition originallyin
the 1920s cases Meyer v. Nebraska' and Piercev. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names ofJesus &Mary," this body of rights awaited full recognition until
the 1960s and 1970s when its existence was discovered to be embedded in the
penumbras surrounding the Bill ofRights, ingeneral, and, more specifically, inthe
Fourteenth Amendment's extension of the Fifth Amendment's due process
guarantees to the states 9
Ever since the announcement of the constitutional right of family privacy,
scholars have struggled to locate and describe its source."' Some scholars trace
family privacy rights to individual liberties or personhood and, thus, see family
privacy as an extension ofthe rightto be let alone.41 Professor Kenneth Gormlcy,
for example, believes that family privacy, which he labels fundamental-decision
privacy,42 is a subset of the right of individual autonomy."3 Other scholars see
34. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 193.
35. See Berger v.New York, 388 U.S. 41,63 (1967); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruledin partbyKatzv. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
36. See DOLGIN, supranote 15, at 58-59.

37. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
38. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
39. See Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965).
40. See Mark E. Brandon, Family atthe Birth ofAmerican ConstitutionalOrder,
77 TEx.L. REv. 1195, 1196 (1999) (noting these attempts).
41. See, e.g., Gormley, supranote33, at 1405 n.334 (citing J.Braxton Craven, Jr.,
Personhood: The Right to Be LetAlone, 1976 D=ra L.J. 699,706-07; Joel Feinberg,
Autonomy, Sovereign% and Privacy: Moral Ideas in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE
DAMEL.REv. 445,455-56 (1983);TomGeretyRedefiningPrivacy,12HARV. C.R.-CI.
L. REV. 233, 280 (1977)).
42. See Gormley, supranote 33, at 1396.
43. See Gornley,supranote 33, at 1406,1420; accordMARYANNGLENf0NTHE
NEw FAnLY ,D Tim Nw PRoPERTY 42 (1981); Brandon, supranote 40, at 1197
("[A]s the Supreme Court has crafted the right to privacy the individualist rationale has
prevailed... .');Anne C. Dailey, ConstitutionalPrivacyand the JustFamiy, 67 TuL.
L. REv. 955, 977 (1993) ("Conventional doctrinal history interprets Eisenstadt and
subsequent decisions as confirming that the right ofprivacy, although historically rooted
in family relations, actually protects the individual right of personal liberty." (citing
LAURENCE I- TRBE, Am
cAN CONsrrrunONAL LAW §§ 15-20, at 1416-17 (2d ed.
1988) ('Such 'exercises of familial rights and responsibilities' as remain prova to be
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family privacy rights as distinct from individual liberties. For example, although
she recognizes Gormley's account of family privacy in judicial decisions,4
Professor Radhika Rao nonetheless has argued that the right of privacy is not the
right to be let alone but "the right to come together in close consensual
relationships."45 She theorizes that the role of privacy ends when conflicts arise
between the individuals in such relationships, and the state steps in to determine
their relative rights and responsibilities.46 Professor Janet Dolgin has articulated
a hybrid position, arguing that, whereas initially articulated as a right inhering in
nuclear families, family privacy has since shifted to inhere in individuals
regardless of their membership in a nuclear family.47 In her scholarship, Dolgin
individualpowersto resist governmental determination ofwho shall be born, with whom
one shall live, and whatvalues shall be transmitted." (emphasis added)))); Developments
in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1164 (1980);
Tiffany R. Jones & Larry Peterman, Whither the Family and FamilyPrivacy?, 4 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 193, 195 (1999) (citing June Aline Eichbaum, Towards an AutonomyBased Theory of ConstitutionalPrivacy: Beyond the Ideology ofFamilialPrivacy, 14
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 381-82 (1979)); Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual
Privacy: A New Theory ofFamilyRights, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 627,636 (1987); Jana B.
Singer, ThePrivatizationofFamilyLaw, 1992 Wis.L.REv. 1443,1510 C'[T]he Supreme
Court's modem privacy jurisprudence singles out the individual, rather than the family,
as the appropriate unit of insulation from publicly created norms." (citation omitted)).
Supreme Court jurisprudence comports with this account. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) CAt the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, ofmeaning, ofthe universe, and of the mystery of
humanlife. Beliefs aboutthesematters could not define the attributes ofpersonhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.").
44. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships andReproductive
Technology, 45 UCLAL. REV. 1077, 1011-12 (1998).
45. Id.at 1102-03 ("[T]he right ofprivacy should not attach to isolated individuals;
it belongs instead to close relationships, fostering intimate associations that mediate
between the individual and the state."); accordBaker, supranote 14, at 1524-25 ('The
family, as a boundaried entity, has been, and arguably needs to be, treated as a unit unto
itself, not a mere collection of individuals.'); Jones & Peterman, supranote 43, at 195
(lamenting loss of vision of the family in recent privacy jurisprudence).
46. See Rao, supranote 44, at 1106. Professor Rao has since modified this view.
See Radhika Rao, Propert, Privacy,and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 388
n. 108 (2000) (arguing in favor of"a more expansive understanding of privacy as a right
that shields both individuals and relationships').
47. See Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and
the Law, 23 VT. L. REV. 225, 232 (1998) [hereinafter Dolgin, Emerging Consensus];
Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentationof the
Ideology of the Family,32 CONN. L. REV. 523,560 (2000) (noting the shift in the locus
offamilyprivacy "from the familial community... to individuals, viewed as autonomous
agents ofmoral authority); see also Singer,supranote43, at 1509 (noting familyprivacy

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss3/1

8

Storrow: Storrow: Policy of Family Privacy:
2001)

TIHE POLTCY OFFAMIYPRIVACY

explains this evolution as the result of a culture struggling both to preserve
traditional understandings of family and to promote respect for individual
autonomy.' Despite these various views of what privacy is, what it should be, or
in whom it vests, it is certain that privacy is a fundamental right protected from
governmental interference without a compelling justification" Family privacy,
broadly defined, embodies the idea that families, once constituted, have the right
to be free from governmental interference.5
While the most recent family privacyjurisprudence appears to championthe
privacy rights of individuals, a careful analysis of these cases does not fully
support the promotion of individual autonomy theory. Instead, family privacy
cases show a definite tendency to reach results consistent with a policy not only
of promoting the formation of nuclear families but also of promoting harmony
within existing nuclear families. What appears in these cases to be the creation
of privacy rights to protect individual choice, then, stems not from a concern for
individual autonomy in the first instance but rather from a concern that the
exercise of individual choice in any given instance may disrupt the harmony of
nuclear families. This is not to say that individuals have no privacy rights of their
own when posed against the rights of nuclear families but simply that the quality
ofprivacyguaranteedto individuals inthis context depends uponthe gravityofthe
impact these individuals' choices have on nuclear families.
To illustrate this point, a mere survey of the landmark cases in the area of
familyprivacy willnot suffice. Instead, itis essentialto scrutinize thefoundation
used for most of these decisions-that being the prevailing standard for the
articulation of fundamental ights lying within the penumbras of the express
guarantees of the Constitution. Underlying this jurisprudence is a selectiveuse of
tradition and history more consistent with Dolgin's account of the evolution of
familyprivacythanwith Gormley's. Ultimately, however, even Dolgin's account
proves insufficient What lies behind these cases is a rigid notion of the family
thatrelies onthe Court's interpretation ofhistory and traditionin orderto preserve
the benefits of privacy protection for traditional families at all costs.

fights "were generallyascribedtothefamilyas a tunit,
milerthanto particularindividuals
within the family. .. .'). Professor Martha Fineman has described the common law
notion of family privacy as "attach[ing] to the entity of the family, not to the individuals
that compose it" Martha AlbertsonFineman, Intimacy Outsideofthe NaturaIFamily.
The Limits of Privacy,23 CoNN. L. REv. 955, 966 (1991).
48. See Dolgin, EmergingConsensus, supranote 47, at 272.

49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (declaring "a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy" to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
50. See Judith G. McMullen, Privacy,Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated
Child,75 MARQ. L. REv. 569, 570 (1992).
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A. The Origins ofFamilyPrivacy

The right to family privacy, protecting a "private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter,"5' owes its genesis to Meyer v. Nebraska" and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary." These two cases

indirectly vindicated the right of parents to make decisions regarding the
upbringing of their children without the intervention of the state. 4 Although
Meyer and Pierceserved as precedents in support of the privacy right of couples
to make decisions about procreation, they are not themselves procreative liberty
cases, nor do they explain, with any particularity, the right of parents to make
decisions regarding the upbringing of their children. In fact, these cases merely
refer to, but do not develop, the principle of parental autonomy. Nonetheless,
Meyer and Pierce, when viewed in the light of their progeny, Prince v.
Massachusetts," Wisconsin v. Yoder," and Troxel v. Granville,57 are cases that

establish the nuclear family as the locus of family privacy.
InMeyer, a teacher of German challenged a Nebraska statute outlawing the
teaching ofmodern foreign languages to certain children in school.5 The goal of
the statute was to promote the assimilation of children with foreign-born parents
into American society." Although the Court found this goal desirable, it declared
the means used to advance it-depriving teachers of their right to teach and
denying parents their right to engage them to teach their children-violative of
substantive due process.' The Court emphasized this point by suggesting that
failing to safeguard these rights would suppress individualism and to move society
closer to a parentless state.61
The recognition of the right of parents to make decisions regarding the
education of their children without state interference was even more oblique in
Pierce. In that case, the State of Oregon passed a law making public education
compulsory for children aged eight to sixteen.62 Private schools complained that

51. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
52. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
53. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
54. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-01 (1977).
55. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
56. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
57. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
58. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1923).
59. See id. at 401.
60. See id. at 400.
61. See id. at 402.
62. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 530 (1925).
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the statute deprived them ofproperty without due process oflawbecausethe effect
of the law was the virtual destruction of their livelihood.' The Supreme Court
agreed, noting that the state's destruction of the plaintifs' useful and meritorious
undertakings constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power." The
decision appears scarcely to have championed parental rights at all, save for an
aside criticizing Oregon's attempt to standardize the education of its children:
"The child is notthe mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations." ' Along withMeyer, this brief aside in the midst
of a property rights case inspired later opinions to announce a general right of
parental autonomy inmaldng child-rearing decisions.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Amish parents brought First and Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to their convictions forviolating alaw compelling children
to attend school until the age of sixteen." This provision conflicted with the
Amishbeliefthatformal education should terminate upon completion ofthe eighth
grade so that Amish children would not become subject to worldly influences.'
The vocational education Amish children received at home after the eighth grade
did not qualify for any of the exceptions to the state's compulsory school
attendance law' because it was not "substantially equivalent to instruction given
to children of like ages in the public or private schools where such children
reside." 9 In reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court referred to Pierce as
support for its pronouncement that parents have autonomy in the religious
upbringing and education oftheir children. 70 The Courtinvalidatedthe Wisconsin
statute as applied to the Amish
on the ground that it infringed the Amish
1
7
community's religious liberty.

Inreachingits conclusionthe Yoder Courtwentto greatpains to describethe
Amish as an intact society, existing within the larger American society, made up
of fervently religious people working family farms and valiantly resisting the
pressure to conform.'1 In the course of its encomium of the Amish idyll 4 the

63. Id.at 532-33.
64. See id.
at 536.
65. Id.at 535.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Wisconsinv. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,207 (1972).
See id.at210-11.
See id. at 207.
Id. at 207 n2.

70. See id.at 213-14.
71. Seeid.at235-36.
72. See id. at 229.
73. See id.at 216-17.
74. See id.at 222-23.
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Supreme Court distinguished its earlier decision, Prince v. Massachusetts." In
that case, Sarah Prince, a Jehovah's Witness and the custodian of a nine-year-old
child, brought her charge to help her distribute religious literature to people on the
street.76 The police, claiming Prince allowed the child to sell the literature,
arrested her for violating Massachusetts's child labor laws." Prince was
prosecuted and convicted, but she challenged her conviction on the basis of
religious and parental liberties.7" Despite the fact that the magazines were not
offered for sale in the true sense and that the child, in any event, did not sell any,
the Supreme Court was not sympathetic to Prince's claim. In fact, the Court
appeared somewhat chagrined athaving to resolve yet another dispute betweenthe
Witnesses and state officials.79
With this chagrin as its dominant tone, the Court in Princepainted the facts
of the case in a much less positive light than it did in Yoder. To the Court, Prince
involved a proselytizing unmarried female guardian exposing her child to
unsavory influences on the cold streets of Brockton; ° in Yoder, by contrast, the
Court described the parents as respectable members of a prosperous religious
community, in which parents protected their children from corrupting influences
and taughtthemmeaningfultrades."' The Yoder Court extolled the productive and
law-abiding Amish,' their high rate of employment," and, despite their
"idiosyncratic separateness,"' theirhighly self-sufficient community.' There was
more than a hint of adulation in Yoder of the pure motives of the Amish and of
their simple, laudable pursuits that in no way interfere with the rights of others. 6
In short, the Court crafted a vision of Amish life as a peaceful refuge from the
world outside, which is itself a striking metaphor for the privacy of the ideal
family. Such a tone of reverence is utterly missing from Prince. Indeed, the
Court's dismissive attitude in that case betrayed its disapproval ofthe Witnesses's
failure to be separate from society and to pursue their beliefs in a manner less
intrusive upon the privacy of others.'

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 162.
Id. at 160.
See id. at 164.
See id. at 161 & n.4 ("The story told by the evidence has become familiar.").
See id. at 168.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-13 (1972).
See id. at 222.
See id.
at 222 n. 11.
Id. at 226.
See id. at 225.
See id. at 224.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944).
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It is a challenge to reconcile the different results inthese cases, as both had
their origins in accusations by enforcement authorities that parents had directed
their childrento break the law. In Prince,this was likened to parental abuse and
neglect The Court characterized Prince's actions as forcing her charge into
martyrdom and as posing a threat to her "health and welfare." In Yoder, by
contrast, the Courtfound the parents' actions tobe ofno harmwhatsoeverbecause
they were the product of deeply held beliefs." One could conclude that the sharp
contrast between the two opinions was based on the religion of the parties. A
closer reading of the opinions, however, reveals that whatever religious bias they
evince is mixed with a marked deference to intact families. Even though Sarah
Prince was the child's aunt, in the opinion she is consistently described as a
"custodian 91 or "guardian." The word "family" is never used to define the
relationship between Prince and her niece, despite their consanguineous bond. In
Yoder, "family" appears in descriptions of the Amish lifestyle at least four times.
It is emphasized in particular to demonstrate that Amish children's agrarian
employment in contrastto the Prince child's urbantoil, is not exploitativeb ecanse
ittakes place on"family farms." Giventhe tenor ofthese opinions, it is arguable
that the Princes's resemblance of something less than the tightly knit families in
Yoder accounts, at least in part, for the difference inthe outcomes. Later cases in
the family privacy area provide substantial support for this position.
B. The Limits ofFamily Privacy
The constitutional right of privacy owes its existence to the notion that the
Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights of all citizens. In safeguarding
privacy as a fundamental right, the Court subjects state action that infringes on
privacy rights to strict scrutiny, an exacting standard under whichthe state action
"must be necessary to promote a compelling interest."9 Although this standard
certainly goes a long way toward protecting privacy rights from interference by
state actors, there continues to be disagreement on the Court aboutthe scope ofthe
right of privacy. As an aid in defining the specific contours of this right the
Supreme Court has announced criteria meant to define fundamental rights

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id.at 170.
Id. at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230.
Prince,321 U.S. at 159.
Id. at 167.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207,216,229.
Id. at 229.

95. JOHNE.NOWAK&RONALDD.ROTUNDA, CONsTrIoNALLAW § 10.6(a), at
348 (5thed. 1995).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

generally. Fundamental rights have been described variously as those rights that
' are "deeply
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"96
rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition," and reflect the "'traditions and (collective)
conscience of our people."'98 Early substantive due process cases in the family
context used these various criteria to develop an expansive view of fundamental
rights-one that was coextensive with the justices' evolving notions of what
constituted ajust society.9
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court sought to continue this
tradition. In this case, the Court prevented East Cleveland from exercising its
zoning powers to define "family" so as to prohibit a grandmother from living with
two sets of her grandchildren. 1" In so ruling, the Court asserted that it was
"acknowledg[ing] a 'private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.1'1 0 1
Despite its vindication of the privacy rights of a non-nuclear family, however, the
decision in Moore actually inhibited recognition of privacy protection for nonnuclear families. Although the Court in Moore went to great pains to articulate
that "the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition," it failed to define family beyond saying it is more than "the nuclear
family. '1 ° The Court's purpose in leaving the concept of the family so undefined
was to suggest that it should not be subject to enforced standardization.1"° It
invoked the notion that, because the traditions upon which American society was

96. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937), overruledby Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,794 (1969).
97. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (referring to the
Constitution's protection of "the sanctity of the family").
98. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), overruledinpartbyMalloyv.Hogan, 378 U.S.
1(1964)).
99. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal
Predilection, 54 U. CmU. L. REv. 648, 648 (1987) (characterizing the Warren Court as
"subscrib[ing] to the concept that the principles of the Constitution should not be frozen
in time, but should grow in meaning as the country itself evolves").
In the years immediately precedingMoore, the Court generally began to curtail the
scope of constitutional fundamental rights. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (determining government employment not to be a fundamental
right); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973)
(determining education not to be constitutionally guaranteed). This was a development
some jurists decried. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 319 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(lamenting the Court's loss of interest in recognizing fundamental rights).
100. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499,506 (1977).
101. Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1994)).
102. Id. at 503, 504.
103. See id. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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founded are living and evolving, the definition of the family is subject to change
over time.' °4 In the process of expounding this living Constitution, however, the
Court made the unfortunate decision not to overrule Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,1°5 a case making it very clear that more than two individuals not related
consanguineously or through adoption cannot constitute a family in the absence
ofmarriage.'" Compounding the lack ofprecision in the majority's opinion was
the concurrence, which, although striving to articulate the liberty at issue with
more particularity, °7 made the mistake of associating the non-nuclear family with
poverty and disadvantage," suggesting that non-traditional families should be
protected only when they are not a matter of choice.
Judicial reaction to Moore circumscribed judicial discretion to announce
"new" penumbral rights."0 9 The Court limited the scope of already decided
privacy cases to their facts,' 0 limited fundamental rights generally to those
consistent with majoritarian sentiments held at the time that the relevant express
constitutional guarantee was enacted,"' and began framing the issue in
findamental rights cases at an extremely high level of specificity. 12 The new
interpretive approach had a striking impact on family privacy cases.

104. See id. at502 (citing Pev. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
105. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
106. See id.at 2 (citing a local zoning ordinance).
107. SeeMoore, 431 U.S. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring) (articulating the issue
as "the freedom of personal choice of related members of a family to live together").
concurring).
108. See id.at 507-10 (Brennan, J.,
109. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,194 (1986) C'The Courtis most
vulnerable and comes nearest tollegitmaeywhenit deals withjudge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."
dissenting))).
(eitingMoore,431 U.S. at 544 (White, J.,
110. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 114 n.9 (1980) (Iarshall,
J., dissenting). But see Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 940
(1992) (Blackmun, J.,dissenting in part) (objecting to the "laundry list of particular
rights, rather than a principled account of how these particular rights are grounded ina
more general right of privacy"); Harper v.Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669
(1966) (noting that the Supreme Court has never "restricted due process to a "fixed
catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights").
111. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (deeming
fundamental only those rights sanctified by historic practice and tradition).
112. See David]D. Meyer, The ParadoxofFami yPrivacy,53 VAND.L.REV. 527,
564 (2000) [hereinafter Meyer, ParadoxofPrivacy] (opining that the unlikelihood of a
statute's surviving strict scrutiny leads the Court to describe the claimed right narrowly).
This manner of framing the issue is said to be required by the necessity of describing
traditions in the most specific terms possible. SeeMichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
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Perhaps no decision more reflects the notion that the Supreme Court's
privacy jurisprudence, at its root, strives to promote and maintain nuclear families
than does the Court's treatment of fundamental rights in Michael H. v. Gerald
D."' In that case, Carole, Gerald D.'s wife, gave birth to Victoria."' Victoria,
1
however, was fathered not by Gerald, but rather by Michael H., a neighbor. "
According to a controlling filiation statute, only Gerald or Carole could rebut the
presumption thatVictoriawas a child oftheirmarriage. 1 6 Becauseneither wished
to do this," 7 Michael, despite having had an ongoing relationship with Victoria for
eleven months during the first three years of her life,"1 had no avenue by which
to establish his paternity and obtain court-ordered visitation.
Michael challenged the statute on due process grounds, claiming a right to a
relationship with his biological child.119 The Supreme Court found this claimed
right to be grounded neither in history nor in tradition and, thus, not truly
fundamental when weighed against the "sanctity... traditionally accorded to..
. the unitary family." 2 Mimicking Bowers v. Hardwick,' the Court restyled
Michael's asserted liberty interest as the "right to legal parentage on the part of
an adulterous natural father"'" and denied the fundamentality of such a right"
due to "a societal tradition of enacting laws denying [such an] interest."'2 4 Filling
the gap left by Moore, and echoing Moore's dissent,1" the Michael H. Court

113. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
114. Id.
at 113.
115. See id. at 113-14.
116. See id.
at 113.
117. See id.
at 115.
118. See id.
at 124 n.3.
119. See id.
at 115-16. Michael also brought an equal protection challenge to the
statute. See id.
at 116. The Court declined to address it because Michael did not raise
it in the lower courts. See id. at 116-17.
120. Id.
at 123.
121. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a discussion of Hardwick,see infranotes 208-32
and accompanying text.
122. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 n.7.
123. See id.
at 124.
124. Id. at 123 n.2, 127 n.6.
125. In his dissent, Justice Stewart said:
The interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single

kitchen and a suite of contiguous rooms with some ofherrelatives simply does
not rise to that level. To equate this interest with the fundamental decisions

to marry and to bear and raise children is to extend the limited substantive
contours of the Due Process Clause beyond recognition.

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 537 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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made it clear that the family was "typified, of course, by the marital family,"' 6
and concluded that; althoughtheunitaryfamilymightinclude nonmarital families,
itmost certainlydidnotinclude families such as the one to which Michael claimed
to belong. 12
In his dissent Justice Brennan complained at length that the plurality had
simply exchanged one malleable concept (liberty) for another (tradition). m He
then charged the plurality with appealing to tradition but ignoring Supreme Court
precedent onfamilyrelationships'" and withforging a"pinched conception of 'the
family"' in the process." Finally, he objected to the plurality's excessively
narrow statement of the issue as a "novel[ ] interpretive method," which would
have resulted in vastly different decisions in some of the Court's most important
substantive due process cases."' By focusing relentlessly on marriage as "the
critical facf' depriving Michael of standing to assert his parental rights,' the
plurality, in Brennan's opinion, had turned the Constitution into "a stagnant;
archaic, hidebound document steepedintheprejudices and superstitions ofatime
long past."'
As if responding to this blistering denunciation,' M California
amended its law to allow persons in Michael's position to rebut the presumption
of paternity."5 Although California obviously felt its policy regarding this issue
126. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3.
127. See id. Victoria, through her attorney ad litem, petitioned to be named the
child of any "psychological or defacto father," and joined Mlichael in his constitutional
challenge ofthe California statutory scheme. See id.at 114-15. These claims, alongwith
her asserted right to continued visitation with Michael were rejected by the California
courts, and Victoria joined in Michael's appeal to the Supreme Court. See id. at 116.
The Court determined that Victoria's asserted interests were even "weaker than
Michael's" and, as such, rejected her due process challenge. Id. at 130. The Court
concluded that multiple fatherhood was not part of "the history or traditions of this
country." Id. at 131.
128. See id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id.at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf.Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91
(2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens said:
[1]he instinct against over-regularizing decisions about personal relations is
sustained onfirmer ground thanmere tradition. It flows inequalpartfromthe
premisethatpeople andtheirintimate associations are complexandparticular,
and imposing a rigid template upon them all risks severing bonds our society
would do well to preserve.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91.
131. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Id.at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. See DOLGIN, supranote 15, at 115 n.58.
135. See CAL. FAm. CODE § 7541(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 2001) ("The notice of
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had changed, the policy of privacy expounded in Supreme Courtjurisprudence has
not. The MichaelH. Court's holding-that a man who fathers a child born to a
woman during her marriage to another man has no constitutional right to
paternity 3 6-- remains the law today.
The scope of fundamental rights and the criteria used to define that scope
continue to be sources of controversy. Despite the desire of adherents to the new
approach to appear to "anchor [their] decisions in timeless concepts, like justice
or natural law,"' the restrictive approach is simply one of many possible
approaches to constitutional interpretation.13 The Court's claim that it is bound
by this interpretive approach as a way of curbing judicial bias, avoiding resultsdriven decisionmaking, or even eschewing the role of "super-legislature,"' 3 9 is
unconvincing on several grounds, not the least of these being that the Court's
current interpretive approach rests on the shaky ground of "limited evidence,
social change, and the inherent ambiguity of past beliefs and intentions."'14 This,
coupled with the fact that the Court is not particularly faithful to this approach, 4 '
strongly suggests that its adherence to it is largely a matter of choice.' 42 By

motion for blood tests under this section may be filed not later than two years from the

child's date of birth by the husband, or for the purposes of establishing paternity by the
presumed father or the child through the child's guardian ad litem.").
136. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 126.
137. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy,andPersonalityin German and
American ConstitutionalLaw, 1997 UTAHL. REV. 963, 971.
138. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The PriceofAsking the Wrong Question: An Essay
on ConstitutionalScholarship and JudicialReview, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1207, 1234-36

(1984) (outlining six major theories of constitutional interpretation).
139. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965).
140. Frank Goodman, Mark Tushnet on Liberal ConstitutionalTheory: Mission

Impossible, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2259, 2262 (1989) (book review).
141. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The VanishingConstitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43,
51 (1989) ("[T]he conservative majority of the Rehnquist Court at times adopts and at
times rejects originalism, process theory, and tradition as the basis for constitutional
interpretation.'). The Warren Court was criticized for making activist rulings based on
the personal values ofthejustices onthe bench. See MORTONJ. HoRWITz, THE WARREN
COURT AND TBEPURS=r OF JUSTCE 112 (1998); Anthony Lewis,Abroad atHome; The
Supreme Power,N.Y. TIMEs, June29,1999, atAl9. Likewise, the Rehnquist Court has
the predilection to select carefully traditions and practices, or, when faced with a
multiplicity of them, to selectthe one most in line with the results it seeks. See, e.g., City
of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 n.20 (1999) (declaring anti-loitering laws
unconstitutional where tradition was clearly to ban loitering); see also Stoddard, supra
note 99, at 656.
142. See Meyer, ParadoxofPrivacy,supranote 112, at 563 C'[T]he Court retains
considerable roomto maneuver in defining the scope offundamentalrights."). Otherhigh
courts with similar concerns regarding judicial activism have rejected this approach as
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choosing this approach, the Court has selected a formidable tool with which to
forge a legacy for family privacy, leaving little doubt that its aims are to promote
and maintain the integrity of nuclear families.

C. The Legacy ofFamilyPrivacy
Forty-six years after Prince, the Court vindicated the right of parents to
exercise autonomy over the upbringing of their childrenin Troxelv. Granville,"3
the long-awaited decision evaluating grandparental visitationrights. The dispute
arose from Tommie Granville's decision to limit visits to her children by their
paternal grandparents Jenifer and Gary Troxel.'" Granville and the Troxels' son
Bradhadnevermarried, and theyparted company soon after the birth oftheir two
daughters.14 After Brad committed suicide, Granville decreased the Troxels'
visitation with their granddaughters from every weekend to once per month."'
The Troxels sued to expand their visitation, invoking a statute that allowed any
person to petition the court for visitation rights according to the best interests of
the child.1 7 The Troxels prevailed in the trial court, but Granville, having
subsequently remarried and her new husband having formally adopted her
daughters, successfully appealed the decision." The Washington Court of
Appeals decided that the statute was not intended to allow non-parents to seek
visitationinthe absence of apending custody action."1 The Washington Supreme
Court disagreed, viewing this analysis as contrary to the plain language of the
statute.' Nonetheless, the court affirmed the lower court, ruling that, as a matter
of federal constitutional law, the statute infringed on the fundamental right of

unsuited to principled constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Pro-Choice Miss. v.
Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 651 (Miss. 1998) (declaring it "a mistake to suppose that a
constitution is to be interpreted only in the light of things as they existed at the time ofits
adoption" (quoting Stepp v. Stepp, 32 So. 2d 447, 447 (Miss. 1947))).
143. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 60.
See id.
See id.
See id.at 61 (citing WAsm REv. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997)).
See id.at 61, 62.

149. See In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698,700-01 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 530
U.S. 57 (2000) C'[We believe [the legislature] did intend that a custody proceeding be

in effect before third parties could petition for visitation.").
150. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 26 (Wash. 1998), aff'd sub nom.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (By its plain language, [the statute] gives
nonparents an avenue to obtain visitation rights with children outside of a custody
proceeding.").
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parents to rear their children.1 "I The state Supreme Court was of the opinion that
the United States Constitution forbids a grant of non-parental visitation contrary
to a parent's wishes without a showing of harm or potential harm to the child."'
The United States Supreme Court, in a fractured decision, affirmed.153 Apart
from validating the principle that parents have the right to raise their children
without governmental interference," 4 the Court did little to define what types of
families would qualify for this privacy protection. Invoking Meyer, Pierce,
Prince and another case, Parham v. J.R., 5 the Court determined that the
Washington statute disregarded the traditional presumption that parents act in the
best interests of their children." 6 The Court explained that this presumption
precludes a parent from being placed in the position of"disproving that visitation
'
would be in the best interest of her daughters."157
Instead, the Court required
some level of deference to a parent's determination of her child's best interests.
The Court declined to define what level of deference would be required and did
not explain whether this presumption applied equally to all parents. But the Court
strongly implied that such deference would control inthe absence of a finding that
a parent was unfit.15 Appearing to consider the changing demographics of the

151. See id. at 30 ('For the state to delegate to the parents the authority to raise the
child as the parents see fit, except when the state thinks another choice would be better,
is to give the parents no authority at all.").
152. See id. at 29 ('It is clear from Supreme Court precedent that some harm
threatens the child's welfare before the state may constitutionally interfere with a parent's
right to rear his or her child.').
153. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
154. See id. at 66 ('[Ult cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.').
155. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). In Parham, children whose parents or guardians
committed them to a state mental hospital challenged their admission on due process
grounds. See id. at 590. Inrejecting the claim that a formalized, fact-finding hearing was
needed in such cases, the Supreme Court reasoned that parents, not children, possess the
maturity required to make difficult decisions and that "the traditional presumption that
the parents act in the best interests of their child should apply." Id. at 602, 604.
156. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66, 67, 69-70.
157. Id. at 69 (emphasis in original).
158. See id. at 70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('[If a fit parent's decision of the kind
at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some
specialweighttothe parent's own detennination." (emphasis added)). Parentalunfitness
can lead to the removal of a child from the home and the commencement of a termination
proceeding. See HOMERH. CLARY, 2 THE LAW OF DOMESTIcRELAnTONS iNT-EUNiTED
STATEs § 21.6, at 624, § 21.7, at 631 (2d ed. 1987). In such proceedings, the Supreme
Courthas mandatedthat the minimum standard ofproof is clear and convincing evidence,
citing the need for error-reducing procedures in the interest of avoiding erroneous
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American family,'5 9 the Court was nonetheless careful to characterize
grandparents as third parties who, having often assumed responsibilities of a
.parental nature, 6 should be considered for visitation privileges if child welfare
is thereby promoted."" Ultimately, though, the Court declined to define "the
precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context'

termination. See Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-61 (1982).
Justice Stevens, misreading the Troxel majority's opinion to require a showing of

"actual or potential 'harm' to the child before a court may order visitation continued over
a parent's objections," objected strenuously to what he characterized as treating "a
biological parent's liberty interest in the care and supervision of her child as an isolated
right thatmay be exercised arbitrarily." Troxel, 530 U.S. at70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. See id.at 63 ('The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult

to speak of an average American family.").
Although appearing to think in an expansive way about the family and calling for

greater recognition of children's liberty interests in preserving intimate relationships,
Justice Stevens, in dissent, presented an argument on the scope ofparental autonomy that
is difficult to distinguish from the majority's. See id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(theorizing that parental rights are not dictated by biology but are dependent on "some
embodiment offamily'). RecallingMoore, Stevens failed to define the family in anyway
that would call into question the holdings in MichaelH. v. GeraldD., 491 U.S. 110
(1989), and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). Moreover, both Stevens and the
majority characterized parental rights as deserving special consideration when weighing
them against the best interests of the child. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 89-90 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that all best interests determinations must begin with the
presumption that parents act in their child's best interests).
160. See id. at 64.
161. See id.
162. Id.at 73. Justice Kennedy, dissenting, expressed concern that the majority's
decision swept too broadly in establishing harm to the child as the controlling standard
ineveryvisitationproceeding. Id.at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Commentingthat"the
conventional nuclear family ought [not] establish the visitation standard for every
domestic relations case," Justice Kennedy pointed out that in many families caregiving
roles are assumed by persons other than biological or adoptive parents. Id. at 98-99
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
Although he sounded support for nontraditional families, Justice Kennedy's argument
was actually quite narrow. He did not argue that the best interests standard should be the
standard used in all third-party visitation cases, but rather that the standard should not be
ruled outin all cases. Id.(Kennedy, J., dissenting). His argument could support a double
standard for third parties seeking visitation-a higher standard for those seeking
visitationwith childrenwithintraditional, nuclear families, and a lower standard for those
seeking visitation with children within nontraditional, alternative or fractured families.

Cf MRTHAAIERTSONFIAN, TBENEnMED MO ERT E EXUALFAMILY AND
OTmERTWENTiETHCENTURYTRAGEDIES 122 (1995) [hereinaflterFNMAN, NENTERED
MonmR] ('[S]inglemothers arepresumed to be abusive.');Fineman,Fami.yinSociety,
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Priorto the Troxel decision, commentators forecast that the case would have
a significant impact on the recognition of nonmarital families if the Troxels'
claims were validated.163 Although this did not occur, it bears noting that the
standing granted by the statute invalidated in Troxel was "breathtakingly
broad.""6 It granted standing to virtually any person who wished to petition for
visitation. The decision, thus, appears to have little impact on grandparental
visitation statutes that restrict standing to grandparents alone or to a relatively
narrowly defined set of individuals. 6 In addition, the decision offers little
incentive for states to repeal or rewrite statutes that permit courts to grant
visitation in a child's best interests where the child's parent has never been
married or where the parents' marriage is somehow "fractured" by death or by
divorce.'" Why the Court was not more definitive inproviding the states direction
supranote 16, at 541-42 (remarking that the law treats "unmarried motherhood [as] a
proxy for poor organizational skills and individual immorality'). This regime is already
established by many grandparental visitation statutes, cited with approval by Justice
Kennedy, and is not called into question by the majority opinion in Troxel. Under many

of these statutes, given that Granville had remarried and provided her daughters a
traditional nuclear family, it would have been contrary to both the majority's and Justice
Kennedy's reasoning not to afford her the highest level of deference possible. See, e.g.,
TEx. FAM. CODEANN. § 153.434 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001) (providing grandparents
no standing to seek visitation until the marital unit is "fractured"); O'Brien v. O'Brien,
684 k2d 1352, 1354 (N.H. 1996) (providing grandparent standing only where there is
an "absence of nuclear family," which may include the parents' unwed status).

163. See, e.g., David Jackson, JusticesHearDebate on Grandparents'Rights,
DALLAS Mom1NNGNEWS, Jan. 13, 2000, at lA.

164. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
165. See, e.g., Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100, 103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)
(distinguishing a statute permitting an order of visitation even where the new spouse has
adopted the grandchildren as "much more narrowly drawn" than the statute at issue in
Troxet); State v. Paillet, 16 P.3d 962, 971 (Kan. 2001) (declining to declare a
grandparental visitation statute unconstitutional on its face because the Troxel ruling did
not applyto "specific nonparental visitation statutes" (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73)).
But see Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (declaring a
grandparental visitation statute unconstitutional on its face because "Troxel was not
decided on the fact that 'any person' could petition" but, rather, on the fact that the
grandparents did petition).
166. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.1 (Supp. 2000); AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25409(F) (West 2000); ARV. CODEANN. § 9-13-103 (lvlichie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. §
19-1-117 (2000); DEL. CoDEANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01
(West 1997 & Supp. 2001); GA. CODEANN. § 19-7-3 (1999); 7501LL. CoMP. STAT.ANN.
5/607 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001); IND. CODEANN. § 31-17-5-1 Qvlichie 1997); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1998);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 125C.050 (2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992 & Supp.
1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 5 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); TEX. FAM. CODEANN.
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concerning the constitutionality of these statutes is not entirely clear,"6
particularly given that the previously discussed precedents do not explicitly
elevate the rights ofmarried parents over those ofunmarried parents. In fact, the
marital status of the parents inMeyer, Pierce,and Yoder, and of the guardian in
Princeis never mentioned in those opinions. Hence, it appears that Troxel adds
to these cases a new criterion for the exercise of parental autonomy; the decision
suggests that the quality of parental autonomy guaranteed in any given case
depends on the parents' marital status." 6 Although the Troxel Court gave a nod
to nontraditional families, it remains an open question whether a nontraditional
family, under the current standard for articulating fundamental rights," could be
deemed a locus of privacy protection, despite the potential equal protection issues
that would be raised by such differential treatment...0 Whether Granville's
§ 153.433 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001); Wis. STAT. Am. § 767.245 (West 1981 &
Supp. 2000); Fisher v. Gaydon, 477 S.E.2d 251,252-53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
167. The problem lies partly in the failure of the Court to articulate the relevant
standard ofreviewto be applied in such cases. ProfessorDavid Meyerhas theorized that
the reason the Court was not more explicit in articulating one in Troxel is that it is
gradually resurrecting the reasonableness standard of review from Lochner-erafamily
privacy precedents. See David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Fail PrivacyAfter
Troxel andCarhart, 48 UCLAL. REv. 1125,1183-84 (2001). The Court's lack ofclarity
in this regard has resulted in widely varying decisions in the state courts. Compare
Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100, 103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (declaring a statute
constitutional under rational basis scrutiny), with Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 534
(1L 2000) (declaring a statute unconstitutional, as applied, under strict scrutiny).
168. An Ohio court has beenmore explicit about the importance of the surviving

spouse's marital status in the grandparental visitation context See Foor v. Foor, 727
N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (deciding that the Ohio grandparent visitation
statute permitted grandparents to petition for visitation after the remarriage ofa surviving
spouse but not after stepparent adoption ofthe children by the new spouse). Other states
disagree with this stance, permitting visitation even after the adoption of the
grandchildren by the former spouse's new husband or wife. See, e.g.,ALA. CODE § 261OA-30 (1992); Arm. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409(F) (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
752.07 (West 1997); GA. CODEANN. § 19-7-3 (1999); IOWACODEANN. § 598.35 (West
2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021(1) (Michie
1999);M cir COMNI. LAWsANN. § 722.27b(l) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001); MUar. STAT.
ANN. § 257.022(3a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); Miss. CoDEANN. § 93-16-7 (1994);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402(1)-(4) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102(5) (1999);

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2(E)(1) (Michie 1978 & Replacement Pamphlet 1999); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(bl) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2001); OKA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (B) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); TEM. CoDE ANN. § 36-6-306 (Supp.
1997); UTAHCoDEANN. § 30-5-2(4)(b) (Supp. 2001); W.VA. CODEAWN. § 48-2B-9(b)
(Miehie 1999).
169. See supranotes 119-27, infra notes 218-25, and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 557-61 and accompanying text. State court decisions
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parental autonomy would have been granted as much deference had she never
married, or had she married Brad Troxel, divorced him, and had never remarried
is unknown, and will have to await a future Supreme Court decision.
In the sixty years since the right of family privacy was first spotted on the
constitutional law landscape, its contours have seen little change. What has
changed is the number of social arrangements, popularly known as families, that
do not align with the type of families that the Court has graced with privacy
protection. As a result, these unrecognized social arrangements do not qualify for
privacy protection. While aware of these changing demographics, the Court,
nonetheless, has become adamant in its defense of nuclear families, to the point
that it risks treading on equal protection principles raised in other privacy cases
that mandate equal treatment of the married and the unmarried. As Part Il
reveals, however, this understanding ofwhatequalprotectionmeans in the context
of family privacy may be overstated. Despite the many landmark privacy cases
that have been decided since Meyer and Pierce-casesthat revolutionized the
concept of family privacy by recognizing individual autonomy rights-the law of
family privacy remains focused squarely on the defense and promotion of nuclear
families.
HI. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY
Although none of the family privacy cases described in Part II dealt with
sexual or procreative liberty, they served as precedents for Griswold v.
Connecticut' and Eisenstadt v. Baird,"2 which do. These cases have been
described as cases that redefined the source of family privacy as located not in
familiespersebutin individual familymembers. Are-examination of these cases
and their successors, nonetheless, demonstrates that individual privacy rights are
influenced by concern for promoting the interests of nuclear families.

considering the scope of unwed parents' parental autonomy suggest that family privacy
protection may be deprived in such cases. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 684 A.2d 1352,
1354 (N.H. 1996) (providing grandparent standing only where there is an "absence of
nuclear family," which may include the parents' unwed status); Roberts v. Ward, 493
A.2d 478, 481 (N.H. 1985) C'Parental autonomy is grounded in the assumption that
natural parents raise their own children innuclear families, consisting ofa married couple
and their children.'); In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 38 (Wash. 1998) (Talmadge,
J., dissenting) (citing above language from Roberts).
171. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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A. From Griswold to Hardwick

Beginning in 1879 and continuing until the early 1960s, the use of
contraceptives was a criminal offense in Connecticut" In Griswold,physicians,
who counseled married persons in the use of contraceptives and who, as a result,
were convicted of being accessories to the commission of a crime, challenged the
Connecticut statute on constitutional grounds."' In striking down the statute, the
Supreme Court referred to Meyer and Pierce as examples of cases recognizing
zones of privacy emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.s
The Court emphasized that the facts of the case involved married persons, 76 and
that marital intimacy should not be interfered withAdultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
State forbids ...
but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an
institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and
in every age it has fostered and protected. Itis one thing when the State
exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality... or to say
who may marry, but it is quite another when, having ackmowledged a
marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by
means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy.1"
Reasoning from the premise that nothing is as private as marriage,"' the Court
disapproved of a statute it felt encouraged state authorities to invade marital
bedrooms in the search for signs of contraceptive seY'
Despite the Court's valorization ofmarital privacy, it was not long before it
declared that, as a matter of equal protection, where married persons have the

173. See Poev. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961).
174. See Griswold,381 U.S. at 480. Aprior challenge, Poe v. Uiman, had been
dismissed'due to the statute's lack of enforcement See Poe, 367 U.S. at 508 CThe fact
that Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this statute depries these
controversies of the immediacy which is an indispensable condition of constitutional

adjudication.').
175. See Griswold,381 U.S. at 484; see also id.at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring);

id. at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. See id.at480.
177. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Hadan,

J., dissenting)).
178. See id.at486; see also id. at495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quotingPoe,367

U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
179. See id. at 485.
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right to obtain contraceptives, unmarried persons also musthave the right."' 0 This
was in the case of Eisenstadt,wherein William Baird, a lecturer on contraceptive
techniques, challenged his conviction for distributing contraceptive foam at the
conclusion of his talk." Baird asserted the rights of unmarried persons who,
under the relevant Massachusetts statute, were forbidden from obtaining
contraceptives for the purpose of preventing pregnancy." z The Supreme Court
declared the statute unconstitutional because Massachusetts could show no
rational relationship between its goal of preventing premarital sex and its denial
to the unmarried of access to contraceptives." s So "riddled with exceptions" 1
was the statute at issue in Eisenstadtthat, on the one hand, the conclusion drawn
by the court appears to have been quite easy to reach. On the other hand,
however, the logic of the case is questionable."s Although Eisenstadtrelied on
Griswold for its holding, in Griswold the right of married persons to use
contraceptives was a natural outgrowth of the veil of privacy surrounding the
maritalbedroom. Nonetheless, the EisenstadtCourt reconceived Griswoldinthe
following form:
[Tihe marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual,married or single, to be free
fromunwarrantedgovennental intrusioninto matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.186
The odd ring of this characterization is due largely to the fact that the Court in
Griswoldnever mentioned the role of procreation in the marital relationship.
Griswoldwas, then, of little support to Eisenstadt,where no analogous locus of
privacy existed. Pointing out that Massachusetts unquestionably had the right to
criminalize fornication and adultery,"8 which is presumably what an unmarried
person has in mind when she procures contraceptives, the Eisenstadt Court

180. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("[W]hatever the rights of
the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the
unmarried and the married alike.").
181. See id. at 440.
182. See id. at 442.
183. See id. at 448.
184. Id. at 449.
185. See ELLMANET AL., supranote 24, at 1003 ('Most commentators have agreed
that the logic of the Equal Protection argument [inEisenstadt]simply does not hold up.").
186. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453.
187. See id. (conceding the prerogative of the state to proscribe fornication).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss3/1

26

Storrow: Storrow: Policy of Family Privacy:

2001]

THE POLICY OFFAMYPRIVACY

emphasizedthat Mass achusetts's interestindeteringpremaritalsexwasnotitself
illegitimate; rather, the means chosen to advance it were notrationally related to
it.188 Thus, although Griswoldprotects intimate acts between the members of a
married couple, Eisenstadt does not protect intimate acts between unmarried
persons; instead, it onlyprotects arightto decidewhethertohave children." The
opinion avoids contradicting itself only if the point it makes is that where
unmarried persons intend to engage in conduct potentially leading to
pregnancy-even where the conduct is illegal-they, nonetheless, should be free
to obtain contraceptives.
Despite the important role scholars claim Eisenstadthas played in shifting
the source of family privacy from the family to the individuals comprising it and,
m the right the Eisenstadt Court
thus, in ushering in an era of sexual autonomy9'
announced is actually quite narrow. The reasoning ofEisenstadtdoes not support
thepropositionthatthere is aright to engagein sexualrelations that donotinvolve
procreative decisions."Y AlthoughEisenstadt's equalprotection analysis suggests
that the unmarried are similarly situated to the married, legislatures are free to
criminalize sexual acts between the unmarried, even acts that are potentially

188. See id. at 448-50.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g.,NANCYF. Cor, PUBLIC Vows: AHIImoRYoFMARR AEAnm
NArIoN 199 (2000); Sylvia A. Law,Homosexuality and the SocialMeaningof Gender,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 187, 225-29 (theorizing that the capability to engage in sexual
relations and the ability to controlwhetherto bear orbegeta child are ultimatelygrounded
in individual privacy rights); Stoddard, supranote 99, at 653 (describing Eisenstadtas
"extend[ing] the privacy right enunciated in Griswold to the unmarried"); Karin E.
Wilinski, Note, Involuntary Contraceptive Measures: Controlling Women at the

Expense ofHuman Rights, 10 B.U. INT'LL.J. 351,355 (1992) (claiming that Griswold
and Eisenstadtprotect "'the right to have sex free of governmental control and to do so
with or without contraceptives.' (quoting Note, ConstitutionalBarriersto Civil and
CriminalRestrictions on Pre- and ExtramaritalSex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1664
(1991))).
191. See David B. Cruz, The SexualFreedom Cases: Contraception,Abortion,
Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 318-28 (2000)
(challenging and reconfiguring the argument that "the sexual freedom cases" guarantee
a right to sex); Robert Randal Adler, Note & Comment, Estate of C.W.: A Pragmatic
Approach to the Involuntary Sterilizationof the Mentally Disabled,20 NOVAL. REV.
1323, 1352 (1996) (arguing that Bowers v. Hardwick called into question whether

Eisenstadt"stood for the right to associational intimacy"); Traci Shallbetter Stratton,
Notes & Comments, No More MessingAround: Substantive Due ProcessChallenges
to State Laws ProhibitingFornication,73 WAsEL L. REV. 767,775 (1998) (explaining,
in a sub-part with the same title, that "The Abortion and Contraception Cases Do Not
Establish a Generalized Right to Engage in Sex').
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procreative. " Even the most inherently nonprocreative of all sexual acts, mutual
masturbation, conceivably could be criminalized for the unmarried but not the
married." None of this means, of course, that the Supreme Court would be
unwilling to announce a general right of unmarried persons to engage insexual
relations in a future case, just that, to date, it has gone out of its way not to do
SO. 194

The Court heard more on the contraception debate in Carey v. Population

Services,International.5 Jnthat case, a company selling contraceptives through
the mail challenged a statute outlawing distribution of contraceptives to persons
younger than sixteen and requiring a pharmacist to distribute them to persons

sixteen or older.196 A federal district court declared the statute unconstitutional."'
The Supreme Court, affirming the lower court, invoked Eisenstadt'sdescription
of an individual's decision to cause or to prevent procreation as "among the most
private and sensitive.""98 The appellants challenged Eisenstadt'sapplicability to

the case, noting that it had dealt with equal access to contraceptives by both the
married and the unmarried but that the statute at issue made no distinctions

192. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing
prohibition ofcohabitation and fornicationunder Virginia law); Oliversonv. West Valley
City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1479 (D. Utah 1995) (holding that the right of privacy does not
shield adultery against sanction by the state); City ofSheman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464,
471-72 (Tex. 1996) (same); see also Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,718
n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("While we have not ruled on every conceivable
regulation affecting such conduct the facial constitutional validity of criminal statutes
prohibiting certain consensual acts has been 'definitively' established." (citing Doe v.
Commonwealth's Att'y, 425 U.S. 901 (1976))).
193. Larry CatA Backer, RapingSodomy andSodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale
About the TransformationofModern Sodomy Jurisprudence,21 AM. J. CIuM. L. 37, 58
n.83 (1993) (noting past proscription of masturbation). A case pending in the United
States District Court for the District of Alabama bears on this question. See Williams v.
Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 954, 955-56 (1lth Cir. 2001) (declaring a statute proscribing the
sale or distribution of devices for the stimulation of the human genital organs not facially
unconstitutional but remanding the case to the district court for the determination of the
statute's constitutionality as applied).
194. See Careyv. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977) (declining
to answer whether there is any constitutional right to engage in private, consensual,
sexual behavior); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ('[I]t is not clear to us that the
claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one
pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the
Court's decision.").
195. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
196. See id. at 681.
197. See id. at 681-82.
198. Id. at 685 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-54 (1972)).
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between married and unmarried persons."s In response, the Court restyled
Griswoldin order to underscore that the "underlying foundation' of its holding
was not "sexual freedom" but the right to make childbearing decisions:
Griswoldmay no longer be read as holding only that a State may not
prohibit a married couple's use of contraceptives. Read in light of its
progeny, the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects
individual decisions inmatters of childbearing fromunjustifiedintrusion
by the State. °0
By de-emphasizing Griswold's use of marriage in defining the contours of
privacy, the Court concluded that across-the-board restrictions on contraceptive
distribution, whether oneis married or unmarried, or anminor or an adult, 3 1 violate
the Constitution because such restrictions impede decisions in matters of
childbearing. 2°
Although the rereading of Griswoldby Eisenstadt and Carey appeared to
recognize constitutional protection for childbearing decisions made between
unmarried persons, it unfortunately came too late to effect this protection. First,
Griswold never called into question whether individuals have privacy rights
outside of marriage. Furthermore, Griswold cannot be reread as merely a
procreative liberty case. It asserts the much broader proposition that married
couples cannot be prevented from engaging in intimate acts in the bedroom,
whether those acts are potentially procreative or not. Inclumsilytrying to remake
Griswoldinto a procreative decisions case, Eisenstadtunwittingly exposed the
law's contemplation of a zone of privacy for unmarried persons that was
significantly less secure than that of married couples. In his concurrence, Justice
White remarked that the decision was correct in part because the record failed to
disclose the marital status of the recipient of the vaginal foam., - In short,
Eisenstadtrevealed that married persons have the right of sexual privacy but that
unmarried persons have merely the right of procreative privacy-that is,
procreative privacy insofar as the acquisition of contraceptives is concerned. The
concurring justices in Carey exhibited a similar understanding of the different
199. See id. at 686-87.
200. Id.at 687, 688 & n.5, 689.
201. See id. at 694.
202. See id. 687-88. The Court inHardwickapprovedof Carey's characterization
of GriswoldandEisenstadt. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) C'The
latter three cases [Griswold,Eisenstadt,andRoe] were interpreted as construing theDue
Process Clause ofthe FourteenthAmendment to confer a fundamental individual right to
decide whether or not to beget or bear a child.").
203. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 439, 462 (1972) (White, J., concurring)
("No proof was offered as to the marital status of the recipient').
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privacyrights held by married and unmarried persons. Justice Powell implied that
married couples have the constitutional right to engage in nonprocreative sex," 4
and Justice Stevens rejected the argumentthat "aminor has the constitutional right
to put contraceptives to their intended use... ."2' Even the more recent opinion
of Washington v. Glucksberg" characterized Griswold as vindicating "marital
privacy" and Eisenstadt as protecting decisions regarding contraception. 20' The
two are not coterminous, a fact that was to play an important role in delimiting the
right of procreative autonomy in the abortion jurisprudence that the Court began
developing soon thereafter.
Nine years after Carey, the Supreme Court made a much more definitive
statement regarding the privacy expectations of the married versus the unmarried
in Bowers v. Hardwick. °3 Michael Hardwick, a gay man living in Atlanta, was
arrested when a police officer discovered him in his home engaged in a consensual
act that violated Georgia's sodomy statute.2" Although Hardwick was not
prosecuted, 210 he sued, claiming that the statute, which barred both homosexual
and heterosexual sodomy, was unconstitutional. 1 This claim was rejected by the
2 12
federal district court, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
concluding thatthe state impermissiblyinfringedupon Hardwick's right ofprivacy
by refusing to allow him to engage in private activity that served "the same
purpose as the intimacy of marriage." 3 The court then remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether the statute could survive strict scrutiny.214 On
appeal, the Supreme Court, hearing only that portion ofHardwick's claim related

204. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring). Given Justice Stevens's position in
Hardwick, it would appear that he had in mind the criminalizing of sexual intimacy
betweenminors. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 216 (commenting that Griswold's
protection of intimate choices between married persons, "even when not intended to
produce offspring," extends to the unmarried).
206. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
207. Id.at720.
208. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
209. See generallyPoTERIRONS,TII CouRA OFTHEmCoNvIcnoNs: SIXEEN
AMERICANS WHO FOUGHT THEI WAY TO THE SUPREME COURT 381 (1988).

210. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188.
211. See id. Joining Hardwick in his lawsuit were John and Mary Doe, a married
couple who claimed the exercise of their marital privacy rights was chilled by the

existence of the statute. Id. at 188 n.2. The Does' claim was dismissed for lack of
standing. Id.
212. See id. at 188; see also Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212-13 (11th
Cir.), rev'd, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
213. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1212.

214. See id. at 1211.
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to consensualhomosexual sodomy,"' rejectedthe Eleventh Circuit's analysis and
upheld the statute.26 Attempting to answer the question left open by Eisenstadt

and Carey, the Court denied that sexual intimacy conducted in private by
consenting adults is always constitutionally insulated from interference by state
actors.21 In assessing Hardwick's claim, the Court appliedthe test for evaluating
constitutional fundamental rights described above. Anticipating Michael H. v.
Gerald D.,21 the Court articulated an exhaustive and narrow list of the
fundamental privacyrights recognized under the Constitution-child rearing and
education (Meyer andPierce),familyrelationships (Prince),procreation(S.7anner
v. Oklahoman,marriage (Lovingv. Virginia2'),contraception (Griswold and
Eisenstadt),and abortion (Roe v. Wade'). " The Court found no evidence of
"thefindamentarights ofhomosexuals"inanyoftheseprecedents. m Indeedthe
Court went so far as to assert that "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated." 4 Moreover, the Court deemed it ludicrous, given the general
proscription of homosexual sodomy at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's
enactment, that homosexual activity could be characterized as a fundamental

right

5

Justice Blackmun, dissenting, tookthe Courtto task on several grounds, not
the least of which was its insistence on reviewing only that part of the Georgia
statute proscribing homosexual sodomy. 6 He remarked that allowing Georgia
to defend its statute based solely on its interest in prosecuting homosexuals not
only raised serious equal protection questions but also articulated a new
understanding of the Griswold,Eisenstadt,and Careytriad. Instead of rereading

215. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
216. Id. at 189.
217. See id. at 191 C'[The proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct
between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
unsupportable").
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

491 U.S. 110 (1989).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Bowers v.Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
Id.at 189.
Id. at 191.

225. See id.at 192-94. Pointing to MichaelH.andHardWcik,Justice Blackmun,
dissenfinginPannedParenthoodofSoutheastemPennsyaniav.
Casey,predictedthat

this "exclusive reliance ontradition" would support a ban on the use of contraceptives.
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 941 (1992) (Blachnun, J.,
dissenting).
226. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200-01 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Griswold through the lens of Eisenstadt, as the Carey Court had, Justice
Blackmun reread Eisenstadt and Carey through the lens of Griswold. The
common link between all three cases was, according to Justice Blackmun, not
simply procreative decisionmaking but the freedom to control the nature of one's
intimate associations with others.'
Nonetheless, the Hardwick majority was not ready to expand Griswoldto
encompass the unmarried as Eisenstadtsuggested. By allowing consensual, samesex sexual activity to be criminalized and refusing to comment on those aspects
of the Georgia statute that would have forced it to make a definitive statement
regarding the contours of the rights announced in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and
Carey,the HardwickCourt left Carey'srereading of Griswoldunchallenged and,
thus, left married individuals with greater privacy protection than unmarried
individuals.' Supporting its decision with questionable statements about history
and "legal homophobia," the Hardwick Court generated a firestorm of
controversy, leading to extensive documentation in the academic literature of the
decision's many procedural and substantive shortcomings. 2 0 The precedential
value of Hardwickhas been called into question by the Court's later decision in
Romer v. Evans, 1 and the Georgia Supreme Court has invalidated Georgia's
sodomy statute as a violation of the right of privacy as guaranteed by the Georgia

227. See id. at 202 n.2, 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); accord id. at 216-18
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that Griswold's protection of nonreproductive
sexual conduct between married persons extends to the unmarried).
228. Professor Marc Spindelman has read Hardwick as lacking a definitive ruling
on whether the Constitution protects sexual privacy in a broad sense. See Marc S.
Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REv. 359, 416-28 (2001)
(focusing specifically on Justice Powell's concurrence).

229. See WLIAM W. ESKRiDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHmD
OF THE CLOSET 150, 156-61 (1999) (finding Hardwick "beclouded with white lies,
ahistorical generalizations, and contestable value choices masquerading as historical
analysis").

230. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's
Rightness, 95 MIcE L. REV. 203,231 (1996) (stating that the Court's refusal to address

equal protection issues "renders Bowers highly dubious'); Donald A. Dripps, Bowers v.
Hardwick and the Law of Standing: Noncases Make Bad Law, 44 EMORY L.J. 1417,
1418 (1995) (stating that the Supreme Court "flouted the constitutional standing
requirement by hearing Bowers"); Stoddard, supra note 99, at 649 (arguing that
Hardwickis"devoid of logic'); Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History,Homosexuality,

andPoliticalValues: Searchingfor the Hidden Determinantsof Bowers v. Hardwick,
97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1081-91 (1988) (demonstrating how the Hardwick majority
mischaracterized history and misunderstood homosexuality).
231. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See ESKIDGE, supra note 229, at 150-52, 210-11
(commenting that the precedential value ofHardwick,although not mentioned in Evans,
has been called into question by it).
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Constitutiom 2 Nonetheless, Hardwick's promotion of the rights of married
couples in the guise of vindicating individual constitutional liberties remains the
law today.
B. Abortion and Glucksberg
The Supreme Court's abortion cases reflectthe tension evidentinEisenstadt
and Carey-between vindicating individual's procreative autonomy and
safeguarding nuclear family harmony. Although the right to an abortion is
essentially a right inhering in a woman who wishes to terminate her pregnancy 3
the contours of this right shift in response to the capacity of her choice to foster
harmony within nuclear families. Thus, what appears to be aright withreference
to individual choice alone is dependent on its capacity to further the policy aims
offamily privacy. This understanding of the rightto obtain an abortion is broadly
reflected in abortion jurisprudence. That jurisprudence, which began withRoe's
grant to women of full authority over the abortion decision has since shifted to
issues relating to the state's power to limit that authority when the integrity of
nuclear families is at stake. While apparently based exclusively on a woman's
right to exercise individual autonomy in abortion matters, the fact that husbands
have no right to withhold consent to the abortion or even to receive notification
that one is taking place is, in fact, influenced by the Court's concern that the
harmony ofmarried couples not be undermined by disagreements about abortion.
Similarly, the existence of readily available judicial approval of abortions for
minors in states that require minors to notify their parents or to obtain parental
consent before obtaining an abortion has been fashioned to conform with family
privacy's overriding concern of promoting harmony within nuclear families.
1. Roe and Its Progeny
Only ten months after Eisenstadt,the Court decided Roe v. Wade, in which
a pregnant woman, a married couple (the Does), and a physician challenged
Texas's anti-abortion statute. In striking down the statute, the Court declared
that "the right of privacy... encompass[es] a woman's decision whether or not

232. See Powellv. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
233. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
C'Roe's essential holding... is a recognition of the right ofthe woman to chooseto have
an abortion before viability.").
234. Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1973). The Supreme Court dismissed
thephysician's and the Does' claims for lack of standing, andproceededwithRoe's. See
id.at 125, 127, 129.
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to terminate her pregnancy." ' 5 That same day, the Court decided Doe v.
Bolton,"d in which a married woman challenged Georgia's restrictions on
abortion. Those restrictions required state residency, hospital accreditation, and
approval by two physicians. The Court struck down both Texas's statute and
Georgia's regulations, asserting that "the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision." ' 7 Establishing what is now the familiar trimester framework
for evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion, the Court made
clear that a woman's right to decide to have an abortion is not absolute." The
trimester framework forbade regulation of abortion through the first trimester of
pregnancy and during the second trimester except "to the extent that the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." 40
Referring to the point after fetal viability, the Court declared it the prerogative of
the state to proscribe abortion altogether, except as it was "necessary to preserve
the life or health ofthe mother." 41 This articulation of a woman's right to obtain
an abortion within the first trimester of her pregnancy without unjustified state
intervention was reaffirmed by the Court's subsequent decision in Webster v.
ReproductiveHealth Services,24 but it was qualified in PlannedParenthoodof
SoutheasternPennsylvaniav.Casey.43 Afterreflecting at length on the necessity
for consistency injudicial decisionmaking,244 the Court in CaseyreaffirmedRoe's
"central premise" but rejected Roe's overly restrictive trimester framework2 4s in
order to allow states to express more "respect for the life of the unborn.2 46 Casey

235. Id. at 153.
236. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
237. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
238. See id.at 163-65.
239. See id. at 153.
240. Id. at 163. Justice Scalia, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvaniav. Casey, remarked that, under Roe, "virtually all regulation of abortion
before the third trimester was invalid." Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 985 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement
on abortion dealt with restrictions on late-term abortions. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914, 929 (2000) (striking down a "partial-birth" abortion ban containing no
exception for preserving the pregnant woman's health).
242. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In this case, the Supreme Court upheld Missouri
legislation making it unlawful for public facilities or employees to be used for the
performance or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions. See id. at 510 ("Nothing in the

Constitutionrequires States to enter or remain in the business ofperforming abortions.").
243. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
244. See id. at 854-69.
245. Id. at 873.

246. Id. at 877.
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noted that fetal viability was subject to circumscription through advances in
technology 7 and held that, before thatpoint, the woman's interest in terminating
her pregnancy overrides all interests to the contrary," save for instances inwhich
the state validly can express its respect for the fetus and can guide the woman
toward making aninforned choice. 49 After thepoint ofviability, accordingto the
Casey Court, "the woman has consented to the State's intervention."
The decisions in Doe andRoe have been applauded by some commentators
fortheirrecognitionof aprivacyrightvestedineachwomantomake a procreative
decision binding as against all others."s This focus on the individual in abortion
jurisprudence was reflected in Casey, where the Court described Roe as
announcing a "rule... of personal autonomy and bodily integrity,"
and
reiterated that the right to elect an abortion is located in the woman herself "
BothRoe andDoe were certainlycases that extolled this individualrightto decide
as against the state.' The question remained whether a woman's right to elect
an abortion could be overridden by the contrary desires of members of her
family.'5
Among the governmental restrictions on abortion that the Court was asked
to review inthe years betweenRoe and Webster (including restrictions on federal

247. See id.at 860.
248. See id. at871 ("Thewoman's rightto terninateherpregnancybefore viability
is the most central principle ofRoe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty
we cannot renounce.").
249. See id. at 877 ("Regulations which do no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial
obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose.").
250. Id. at 870.
251. See Brandon, supranote 40, at 1197 (noting the "individualistic rationale"
of Roe). It has been urged that this right grew directly out of the marital privacy
recognized in Griswold. See David J. GarrowAborfionBefore andAflerRoe v. Wade:
AnHistoricalPerspective,62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 835 (1999) ('mhe early origins ofRoe
grew very directly out of the constitutional precedent of Griswold.).
252. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
253. See id. at 869.
254. Some scholars have noted an ambiguity concerning whether a woman's
physician shares her decisional autonomy in matters of abortion. See, e.g., Brandon,
supra note 40, at 1197. Nonetheless, this concept has never been taken too seriously.
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777-79 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the physician's role in the abortion decision is merely to
perform the abortion).
255. Roe andDoe expresslyreservedthese questions. SeeRov. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 165 n.67 (1973).
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funding of abortion, 6 informed consent requirements,z' and even blanket
proscriptions of second-trimester abortions"), the ones most relevant to this
question were those allowing husbands and parents to override a wife's or a minor
daughter's decision to obtain an abortion. Disputes over those restrictions arose
in the mid-1970s and continue to the present day.
a. Spousal Notification and Consent
Although Roe has been thought to be a vindication of individual privacy
rights, it is significant that Roe did not involve a marital family. Norma
McCorvey was not married at the time she challenged the Texas abortion
statute, 9 and it appeared that Sandra Cano's marriage had been dissolved.2"
Thus, there was no occasion for the Court in eitherRoe orDoeto explore the right
of a husband to participate in the abortion decision261
It would not be long, however, before the Court had to assess the
constitutionality of spousal notification and consent regulations. Spousal
notification and consent regulations affected only marital families: they required
a married woman to notify her husband or to obtain the consent of her husband
before she could proceed with an abortion, unless her husband was not the father

256. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 465-66 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 440 (1977).
257. See Thomburgh v.Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,

760 (1986), overruledbyPlanned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
see also Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983)
[hereinafter Akron 1]. As to informed consent, the Court decided that a state must not
take steps "to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or childbirth," or
to place obstacles in the path of a woman's relationship with her physician. See Akron
I, 462 U.S. at 444, 445 (disapproving of the "recitation of a lengthy and inflexible list of
information"). Nevertheless, the Court has held that requiring a woman's informed
consent is not unconstitutional. See Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 760.
258. See Akron I, 462 U.S. at 434.
259. McCorvey has written about the impact of the ease on her life. See NoIMA
MCCORVEY WITHANDYMEISLER, IAMROE: MYLIFEROE V.WADE, AND FREEDOMOF
CHOICE (1994).
260. The state of Mary Doe's marriage is unclear from the opinion. The opinion
states both that she and her husband had reconciled and that she objected to bringing a
child into a fatherless family. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 185, 190 (1973). The
Does, who were married, lacked standing. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
261. See Planned Parenthood of Cent Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,69 (1976) ('In
Roe andDoe,we specificallyreserved decision onthe questionwhether a requirement for
consent by the father of the fetus, by the spouse, or by the parents, or a parent, of an
unmarried minor, may be constitutionally imposed." (citation omitted)).
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ofher child.2 Suchregulations did notrequire anunmarriedwomanto obtainthe
consent of or to notify anyone, even the man suspected of being the father ofher
child. The lawsuits broughtto challenge these regulations highlighted the tension
between recognizing married couples' right to sexual privacy and procreational
liberty and granting married women the right to abort
The issue of whether the woman seeking an abortion had a right to make her
decision autonomously-and, thereby, to trump whatever contrary interests her
husband might hold-arose in Planned Parenthoodof CentralMissouri v.
Danforth." In that case, a Missouri statute required a husband's consent to his
wife's abortion." The Court terselyinvalidatedthe statute,"' emphasizingRoe's
and Doe's focus onindividualrights, and "the obvious fact... that when the wife
and the husband disagree... the view of only one of the two marriage partners
can prevail" 2 66 Given the pregnancy's greater physical impact on the wife, the
Danforth Court concluded that "the balance weighs in [the wife's] favor.'
With these considerations as its backdrop, the Court reasoned that the statute was
unconstitutional because "the State cannot delegate to a spouse a veto power
which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising." '
Wthile Danforthinvolved a statutory consent requirement, PlannedParenthood

262. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 972 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist
explained the regulation in Casey as follows:
Section.3209 oftheAct contains the spousalnotificationprovision. Itrequires
that, before a physician may perform an abortion on a married woman, the
woman must sign a statement indicating that she has notified herhusband of
herplanned abortion. Awomanis notrequired to notifyherhusband if(l) her
husband is not the father, (2) her husband, after diligent effort, cannot be
located, (3)the pregnancy is the result of a spousal sexual assault that has
been reported to the authorities, or (4) the woman has reason to believe that
notifying her husband is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon
her by him or by another individual. In addition, a woman is exempted from
the notification requirement in the case of a medical emergency.
Id.(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing 18PA.CONS. STAT.Am.§ 3209 (West 2000));see
also Danforth,428 U.S. at 67-68 C'Section 3(3) requires the prior written consent ofthe
spouse ofthe woman seeking an abortion during the first 12 weeks ofpregancy, unless
'the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the
life of the mother."' (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.020(3) (repealed 1979))).
263. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
264. See Mo. REV. STAT.§ 188.020(3) (repealed 1979).
265. TheDanforthdissent complainedthatthemajoritydispensedwiththe consent
questionvirtually summarily. See Danforth,428 U.S. at 92 (White, J.,
dissenting inpart)
('The Court strikes down this statute in one sentence.").
266. Id. at7l.
267. Id.
268. Id.at 69 (citation omitted).
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey dealt with a spousal notification
requirement.2 69 The regulation at issue required a married woman to provide her
physician with a statement that she had notified her spouse of her impending
abortion, unless her case fell within certain exceptionsY ° The Court, applying an
"undue burden" standard, propounded by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in
Akron v. Akron CenterforReproductive Health,Inc. ("Akron I'),"'found this
regulation to be unconstitutional because it likely would "prevent a significant
number of women from obtaining an abortion.m Casey generally echoed
Danforth in expressing concern that statutes mandating spousal involvement
attempt to delegate power the state does not possess.' Casey, however, went
farther than Danforthto frame the right as an individual one, asserting that not to
decide the case as it did would be to subsume a woman's legal existence within
that of her husband-a view of women "no longer consistent with our
understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution." 4 The Court
went on to say that the state has no right to enact legislation that curtails a
woman's right to end her pregnancy, even if that legislation is for the benefit of
her husband. 5
In additionto considering amarried woman's decisional autonomy, Danforth
and Casey considered the stability and harmony of the marital relationship. The
Casey Court acknowledged that "in well-fimctioning marriages, spouses discuss
important intimate decisions such as whether to bear a child. ' 6 In this way, the

269. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
270. Id. at 887. The exceptions included:

[T]he option of providing an alternative signed statement certifying that her
husband is not the man who impregnated her, that her husband could not be
located; that the pregnancy is the result of spousal sexual assault which she
has reported; or that the woman believes that notifying herhusband will cause
him or someone else to inflict bodily injury upon her.

Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (West 2000)).
271. 462 U.S. 416,453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (announcing apreference
for strict scrutiny review only for "unduly burdensome" abortion restrictions). The
standard has been attacked for being as "doubtful in application as it is unprincipled in
origin." Casey, 505 U.S. at 985 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 893. In effect, the regulation arguably affected less than one percent of
women who seek abortions. See id. at 894.
273. See id. at 897.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 896.
276. Id. at 892-93. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, claimed the notification
requirement did not constitute an undue burden because "the vast majority of wives
seeking abortions notify and consult with their husbands." Id.at 973 n.2 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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Court suggested that the marriage in Casey was not a well-functioning one;
otherwise, the wife would have discussed her pregnancy with her husband. Such
a discussion-especially when a wife wants an abortion that her husband does
not-very likely would place a considerable strain on an already poorly
functioning marriage. To compel such a discussion, the Court opined, would
compromise privacy in two ways: "The effect of state regulation on a woman's
protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in such a case, as the State has
touched not only upon theprivate sphere of thefamily but upon the very bodily
integrity ofthepregnantwoman." This language, borrowed without attribution
from Justice Marshall's dissent in HL.v. Matheson.' highlighted the idea that,
in trying to compel communication between family members about abortion, the
state may compromise the integrity of the family it purports to protect because
"self-disclosure canresult inless marital satisfaction and... secrecy... actually
can foster marital stability." ' By allowing a woman to obtain an abortion
without notifying her husband, the Court, in effect, can extend the life of the
couple's marriage. Additionally, in insisting that a contrary decision would be
repugnant to modem views of the role of women in marriage and would grant
husbands too much sovereignty over the lives oftheirwivesp the Courtreassured
women considering marriage that in choosing to be married, they would not
relinquishrights to personal privacythey would continue to possess ifthey elected
to remain unmarried. Wile the reasoning inDanforthand Casey suggested that
the Court was only valuing a woman's right to make an autonomous choice, in a
less obvious way, the two cases also endeavored to promote the stability and
longevity of the marital unit
b. ParentalNotification andConsent
Spousal notification and consent cases wrestle with the tension between the
ability of the married couple to make a decision as a unit and the right of a wife
to terminate her pregnancy as anmatter ofindividual liberty. Parentalnotification
and consent cases struggle to strike a balance between the right of parents to
exercise their parental autonomy and the right of their daughter to individual
autonomy. In deciding that a husband must not be given control over his wife's
decisionto obtain an abortion, the Casey Courtmade thepointthat"[a] Statemay

277. Id. at 896 (emphasis added).
278. See ILL.v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 448 (1981) (Iarshall, J., dissenting)
("Through its notice requirement, the State in fact enters the private realm of the family
rather than leaving unaltered the pattern of interactions chosen by the family.").
279. Barbara Ryan & Eric Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions:
SpousalNotification and SpousalInteraction,51 J.MARIAGE &FAM. 41,47 (1989).
280. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 898.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

39

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 1

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over
their children." ' Just as a husband may disagree with his wife's decision to
terminate her pregnancy, a minor's parents may disapprove of her similar choice.
In any such case, the issue is who should prevail when a daughter wishes to make
a procreative decision that her parents, exercising their right to make child-rearing
decisions, wish to override. The outcomes of the various decisions on both the
spousal and parental notification and consent betray the law's concern for
maintaining the stability of nuclear families.
Parental autonomy is basic to the structure of our society because the family
is "the institution by which we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, morals and culture." '
From the parental autonomy cases
analyzed in Part II, a clear picture of the marital family as impervious to
governmental intervention and of the married couple as the final arbiter of intrafamily disputes emerges.' But despite the mandates of Meyer and Pierce,and
the presumption that "'parents act in the best interests of their child,"' the issue
of minors and abortion has tested the limits of parental authority in many Supreme
Court cases. The importance of the issue is exemplified by the sheer number of
cases the Court has accepted for review in this area of the law. The cases that
deal with this question are: Danforth and Bellotti v. Baird ("Bellotti T")2
(1976); Bellotti v. Baird("BellottiII'") 2 (1979);Matheson(198 1);Akron land
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri v. Ashcroft
("Ashcroft'")2 (1983); Ohio v. Akron CenterforReproductiveHealth ("Akron
ff") andHodgson v. Minnesota ("Hodgson')'9 (1990); and Casey (1992).
Early cases exploring the right of minors to choose abortion involved

parental consent statutes. The Missouri statute inDanforth,for example, required
the consent of a parent or someone standing in locoparentisbefore a minor could
obtain an abortion during the first twelve weeks ofpregnancy." ° The state argued

281. Id.

282. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) [hereinafter Bellotti II] (quoting
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 451 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1997)).
283. See supranotes 51-94, 143-68, and accompanying text.
284. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 523 (1990) [hereinafter
Akron I] (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1979));
see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 ("[C]hildren will oftennotrealize thattheirparents have
their best interests at heart.").
285. 428 U.S. 132 (1976) [hereinafterBellottil].
286. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
287. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
288. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
289. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
290. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976).
Note that ifa minor is married, she is emancipated for the purposes ofmaking procreative
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that the purpose of the statute was to safeguard both the welfare of minors and
parental autonomy."' While expressing respect for parental autonomy, the Court
asserted that minors have constitutional rights, a point previously noted in the
Yoder dissent As a result, the Court found the blanket consent requirement in
Danforthuconstitutional,reasoning that it, like the spousal consent requirement,
essentiallygave athird-partyveto power over even aminor's decisiom 3 Inorder
to justify its decision in light of the state's special concern for the welfare of
minors and the integrity ofthe family z the Court reasoned that where a minor is
mature enoughto become pregnant, her parents have no greater interest inparental
autonomy than their minor daughter has in her right of privacy. Further, the
Court felt the consent requirement was not the most effective way to "strengthen
the family unit' where "the very existence of the pregnancy has already fractured
the family structure.'* 6
In Bellotti , both mature and immature minors brought suit to enjoin
Massachusetts's two-parent consentrequirement. Therequirementmandatedthat
every minor, "no matter how mature and capable of informed decisionmakdng,"
obtain her parents' or ajudge's consent to her abortion.' Under the statute, even
ifthe judge hearing the matter deemed the minormature enoughto make important
decisions, the judge could withhold consent if doing so was in the minor's best

decisions. See id.at73 CItis notedthat, invlvissourd, a woman underthe age of 18 who
marries with parental consent does not require parental consent to abort, and yet her
contemporary who has chosen not to many must obtain parental approval."); see also
BellottiI, 428 U.S. at 134 ("Ifthe mother is less than eighteenyears of age and has not
married, the consent of both the mother and her parents is required." (citing MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (West 1995))).

291. See Danforth,428 U.S. at 72-73 (citingMeyer, Pierce,Prince,and Yoder).
292. See id.at74; see also Bellottiff, 443 U.S. at633; Careyv. Population Servs.,
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977). But see ILL. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 436 n.19
(1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Carey, 431 U.S. at705 (Powell, J., concurring) (CThe
principle is well settled that 'a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some
precisely delineated areas, a child... is not possessed of that full capacity forindividual
choice which is essential to the exercise of various constitutionally protected interests."
(citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968))).
293. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
294. See id. at 72, 75.
295. See id. at 75; cf.Matheson,450 U.S. at 448 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
fact that a minor became pregnant and sought an abortion contrary to the parents' wishes
indicates that whatever control the parent once had over the minorhas diminished, ifnot
evaporated entirely."' (quoting Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787,793-94 (5th Cir. 1975),
aft'd,428 U.S. 901 (1976))).
296. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
297. Bellottiff, 443 U.S. at 653 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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interests; moreover, no judicial consent could be granted unless the minor firsthad
attempted to obtain her parents' consent. 8 The Supreme Court agreed with the
state court that the statute was unconstitutional due to overbreadth, due process,
and equal protection problems.'
As in Danforth, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the specialposition ofminors in society,"' the centralityofparental
autonomy to the integrity of society,30 1 and the unique character of the abortion
decision.3 Balancing these considerations, the Court concluded that a state may
not permit a parental veto of a minor's choice to have an abortion 3° but may
require the consent of one or both parents if the minor is afforded the opportunity
to bypass this requirement by demonstrating her maturity or that the abortion
would serve her best interests." ° By permitting a judge to override a mature
minor's decision and requiring parental consultation in every instance,
Massachusetts's statute did not conform to these parameters."O In striking down
the statute, the Court admonished states to legislate with "particular sensitivity"
in this delicate area."°
In Akron 1,3° the Court invalidated yet another statute requiring a minor
under the age of fifteen to acquire either the consent of one of her parents or a
court order before she could submit to an abortion."0 The Court deemed the Ohio
statute unconstitutional because it failed to provide a mechanism through which
the minor could demonstrate her maturity or show the abortion would be in her
best interests.: 9 Finally, inAshcroft and, later, in Casey, the Court scrutinized
Missouri and Pennsylvania statutes requiring the consent of one parent and

298. See id. at 630.
299. See id.at 633, 645.
300. See id. at 635-37.
301. See id. at 638 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)
(holding it constitutionally permissible for a state to forbid the sale of sexually-oriented
magazines to minors)).
302. See id.at 642.
303. See id. at 643 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1976)).
304. SeeBellottiff, 443 U.S. at 643-44, 647-48. InLambertv. Wicklund, the Court
made clear that a finding of best interests maybe based onthe fact that it is in the minor's
best interests to obtain the abortion or that it is not in the minor's best interests to notify
her parents. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297 (1997), rev'g Wicklund v.
Salvagni, 93 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 1996).
305. See Bellotti11, 443 U.S. at 651.
306. Id. at 643-44.
307. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
308. See id. at 439.
309. See id. at 440.
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containing judicial bypass procedures?" In these cases, the Court affirmed the
validity of the requirements because they conformed with the Court's ruling in
Bellotti H.3n
As states began to realize the difficulty of drafting a parental consent statute
that would withstand constitutional attack, they began to enact parental
notification statutes. Cases scrutinizing the constitutionality of these statutes have
followed a similar, albeit different, trajectory to the ones evaluating the validity
of parental consent statutes. Ever since these cases first reached the judicial
system, courts have struggledto determine whethernotification statutes are similar
enough to consent statutes that they require a bypass procedure to withstand
constitutional scrutiny 2 or whether notification statutes are sufficiently less
burdensome on a minor's procreative decisions that a bypass procedure is
unnecessary.3
Early challenges to notification provisions resulted in decisions of limited
scope. In Bellotti H and Akron I, the notification requirements in the abortion
statutes at issue were notin dispute.314 InMatheson,aminor brought a challenge
to a Utah statute that required physicians to notify the minor's parents before
performing an abortion onher.1 The minor alleged thather desire for an abortion
and the willingness of her physician to perform it were the only constitutionally
permissible requirements that had to be satisfied prior to her obtaining an
abortion.316 The Utah Supreme Court upheld the statute, reasoning that it
promoted "the important role of parents in child-rearing" and that it did not
operate as a "veto power over the minor's decision. ' " The Supreme Court
affirmed, noting that it is often a good idea for a minor to consult her parents on
important decisionsP" and, moreover, that the plaintiff had never attempted to

310. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). Casey
abandoned Roe's trimester framework, but it retained Roe's central holding that "[t]he
woman [has a] right to terminate her pregnancy before viability." Id. at 871.
311. Id. at 899 C'[A] State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the
consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass
procedure."); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v.Ashcrof, 462 U.S. 476,
494 (1983) (reading the statute to avoid any constitutional infirmity).
312. See, e.g., Bellotti 1H, 443 U.S. 622, 657 (1979) (White, J., dissenting)
(equating consent with notice).
313. See id.at654 C'NeitherDanforthnorthis case determines the constitutionality
of a statute which does no more than require notice to the parents .....
314. See id.; Akron l, 462 U.S. 416, 439 n.29 (1983).
315. ILL. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 399-400 (1981).
316. See id. at 403-04.
317. Id. at 405.
318. See id.at 409, 410.
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make a showing ofmaturity.3 The Court made clear, however, that "[t]his case
does not require us to decide in what circumstances a state must provide
alternatives toparentalnotification.r3 2 Justice Marshall, dissenting inMatheson,
questioned the function of notice statutes,32 and commented that "an adolescent
old enough to make the decision to be sexually active... , and who is then
responsible enough to seek professional assistance for his or her problem, is ipso
facto mature enough to consent to his own health care."3
Later notification cases dealt more with the question of what circumstances
required a state to provide alternatives to parental notification. This issue has
become complicated by the disagreement among the Justices over whether
notification statutes pose burdens equivalent to those posed by consent statutes.
For example, although the majority in Matheson "expressly declined to equate
notice requirements witheonsentrequirements, ' *' Justice Powell, in a concurring
opinion, expressed his view that the same requirements applicable to parental
consent statutes should apply to parental notification statutes.324 InAkron H,the
Courtupheld Ohio's revised statute requiring notice to one of the minor's parents
or a substituted relative, or, in the alternative, a court order of approval." The
Court ultimately did not resolve the question of whether judicial bypass
mechanisms were required in parental notification statutes because the judicial
bypass mechanism in the statute at issue met Bellotti Y/'s criteria for consent
statutejudicial bypass procedures. 26 TheAkronlHCourt,however, did permit the

319. Seeid. at406.
320. Id. at 412 n.22.
321. See id.at 454 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (commentingthatUtah's notice statute
does not advance asserted state interests).
322. Id. at 453 n.51 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Hofinann, Consent and

Confidentiality and Their Legal andEthicalImplicationsfor Adolescent Medicine, in
J. Roswa.L GALLAGHER ET AL., MEDICAL CARE OF TiE ADoLEscENT 42, 51 (3d ed.
1976)). But see id. at 408 C'There is no logical relationship between the capacity to
become pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an
abortion.'). Concurring, Justice Stevens opined that there was no constitutional infirmity
in requiring parental notification in cases of mature minors. See id. at 425 n.2 (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("Almost by definition... a womanintellectually and emotionally capable
of making important decisions without parental assistance also should be capable of
ignoring any parental disapproval.").
323. Id. at411 n.17.
324. See id. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring); cf.Akron II,497 U.S. 502,526 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (concluding a notice statute is tantamount to a consent statute).
325. Akron II, 497 U.S. at 507-08.
326. See id.at 510.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss3/1

44

Storrow: Storrow: Policy of Family Privacy:

2001]

THE POLICY OFFAMIL YP1VA CY

state to require the minor
to prove her eligibility for ajudicial bypass by clear and
3 7

convincing evidence.

2

Hodgson did little to clarify the murky waters surrounding the
constitutionality of notification provisions. 328 InHodgson, to further its interest
"'in protecting pregnant minors [and] assuring family integrity," 3 Minnesota
'
enacted "the most stringent notification statute in the country, "W
The statute
required notification of both parents without ajudicial bypass procedure unless a
court should enjoin enforcement ofthe statute. 33' Inreviewing its constitutionality,
a remarkably fractured Court made three alternative statements regarding the
notification statute. Six justices concluded that a one-parent notification
requirement is constitutional with a bypass procedure,33 four justices held that a
two-parent notification requirement is constitutional with or without a bypass
procedure,33 3 and Justice O'Connor decided that a two-parent notification
requirementis unconstitutionalwithout abypass procedurebut constitutional with
one.3" Althoughuncertainfromthe opinion, ithas beenpredicted that sixjustices
would agree that a one-parent notification provision is constitutional without a
bypass provision. 35 Nevertheless, the rationales supporting these varying
positions were remarkably similar. All focused on limiting governmental
interference in internal family operations. The justices who supported a oneparent notification provision with bypass asserted:

327. See id. at 516 ("We find the clear and convincing standard used in H.B. 319
acceptable.").
328. See J. William Goodwine, Jr., Abortion ParentalNotification Statutes:
Hodgson v. Mfinnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) and Ohio v. Akron Cir. for Reprod.
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990), 14 HARv.J.L. &PUB. PoL'Y 237,239 (1991) (arguing
that Hodgsonis constitutionally suspect, since its result was due to political division on
the court).
329. Hodgson v. Mefinnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 443 (1990) (quoting Hodgson v.
Mnnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756,775 (D. Mln. 1986)).
330. Id. at 459 (O'Connor, J., concurring inpart and concurring in thejudgment).

331. See id.at 422-23.
332. Id. at 480 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part).
333. See id. at 489 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring inpart and dissenting in part) C'The
two-parent notification law enacted by Minnesota is, in my view, valid without the
judicial bypass provision....').

334. See id. at 461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).

335. See PlannedParenthood ofBlue Ridgev. Camblos, 116 F.3d707,715-16 (4th
Cir. 1997), cert denied,525 U.S. 1140 (1999); cf.Planned Parenthood ofBlue Ridge v.
Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 366 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.denied, 525 U.S. 1140 (1999).
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In the ideal family setting, of course, notice to either parent would
normally constitute notice to both. A statute requiring two-parent
notification would not further any state interest in those instances. In
many families, however, the parent notified by the child would not
notify the other parent. In those cases, the State has no legitimate
interest in questioning one parent's judgment that notice to the other

parent would not assist the minor or in presuming that the parent who
has assumed parental duties is incompetent to make decisions regarding
the health and welfare of the child.336
The justices in favor of the two-parent notification provision, even absent the
bypass, remarked thatparentalnotice solidifies family ties33 andthat "parents can
best fulfill their roles if they have the same information about their own child's
medical condition and medical choices as the child's doctor does."338 Finally,
Justice O'Connor's rationale for her position was that "interference with the
internal operation of the family ... simply does not exist where the minor can
avoid notifying one or both parents by use of the bypass procedure. '39 Other
notable comments came from Justice Stevens, who deemed a two-parent
notifLicationrequirementmore burdensome than a one-parent consentrequirement,
particularly given the almostuniform requirement of only oie parent's consent for
other activities affecting a minor's health, safety or welfare. 4 Justice Marshall,
dissenting in part, analogized notification requirements to consent requirements,
characterizing a parent's ability to obstruct a minor's decision after notification
similar to the parental veto that could be brought to bear under a consent statute.341
Lower courts have experienced difficulty attempting to apply these muddled
precedents to disputes involving parental notification provisions and, thus, have
issued conflictingrulings. InPlannedParenthood,
Sioux FallsClinicv.Miller,4
the district court ruled a notification-of-one-parent provision34 3 unconstitutional

336. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 450.
337. See id.at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgnent in part and dissenting
mpart).
338. Id. at 486 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
339. Id. at 461.
340. See id. at 456; cf.id. at 496 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
341. See id. at 472 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
342. 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub noih. Janidow v. Planned
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996).
343. See id. at 1456 n.2, 1458 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 34-23A-7 (Michic
1994)).
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given the absence of a bypass mechanism?." The statute at issue required a
physicianto inform aminor's parent at leastforty-eighthours before the physician
performed an abortion on the minor, with exceptions for medical emergencies and
abused orneglectedminors. 5 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit invoking BellottiH
and Hodgson, discussed both consent statutes and notification statutes and
concluded that "the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a mature or 'best
interest[s]' minor is undulyburdened when a Staterequires herphysicianto notify
one of her parents before performing the abortion." ' Recognizing the clear
potential for both notice provisions and consent provisions to burden a minor's
choice, ' 7 the Eighth Circuit held that the Constitutionis not abridged when a state
compels an immature minor or "non-best-interests" minor to notify her parent or

obtainherparents' consentbeforeundergoing an abortion?' butthatthe statemust
provide a"Bellotti-type"bypassforbothmature andbest-interests minors." Not
to do so, according to the court, would compromise the constitutional rights of
mature and best-interests minors.35
The Fourth Circuit in PlannedParenthoodof Blue Ridge v. Camblos,"1
reached a contrary decision based on its assessment that notification statutes are
fundamentally different from consent statutes.3 52 The statute at issue was a oneparentnotification statute containing ajudicialbypass mechanism." Becausethe
statute provided that a trial court "may"--and not "shall"--grant a mature
minor's request for ajudicial bypass where she has satisfied her burden ofproot
the district court concluded that the statute unconstitutionally vested discretion in
judges hearing bypass petitions notto authorizematureminors to obtain abortions
without notifying a parent" As such, the district court enjoined enforcement of
the statute?'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit stayed the district court's

344. See id. at 1463.
345. See id. at 1458 (citing S.D. CODwmEDLAWS § 34-23A-7 (Mlchie 1994)).
346. Id. at 1459.
347. See id. (noting that notification statutes afford parents an opportunity to
obstruct the minor's choice and that consent statutes give them a tool with which to do
so).
348. See id.at 1459-60.
349. Id. at 1460.
350. See id.

351. 155 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,525 U.S. 1140 (1999).
352. See id. at 363, 371 (recognizing distinctions in degree and in kind between
consent and notification provisions).
353. See id. at 355-56 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(V) (Michie 1999 &
Supp. 2001)).
354. Id. at 356-57. The statute did use the word "shall" inthe context ofa cour's
authorizing aphysiciantoperformanabortionona"best-interests" minor. See id.at 356.

355. See id.
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injunction3 56 and, later, after a hearing on the merits, declared the statute
constitutional. 57 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit commented that one-parent
notification provisions may not require bypass procedures under Supreme Court
precedensS and that this would strike an appropriate balance between a parent's
interest in notification and a mature minor's right to choose." 9 The Fourth Circuit
ultimately decided that Virginia's provision was constitutional because it
contained exceptions in cases of abusive, neglectful, and absent parents."
As these cases indicate, it is difficult to reconcile the competing interests of
parental autonomy and individual choice in the context of minors who seek
abortions. In this area, there appears to be little consensus about the proper
balancing of these interests. On the one hand, Meyer,Pierce,and Troxelinstruct
that the right of family privacy is made up of the right of parental autonomy and,
under Parham, of the presumption that parents act in their children's best
interests.361 On the other hand, Roe and its progeny present an image of the family
as made up of individuals vested with the liberty to make important decisions
autonomously.362 These two visions ofthe family are not inconsistent 36 3 but they
present the potential for disharmony, the proper resolution of which continues to
be debated in the parental notification and consent cases.
The potential for conflict in the parental notification and consent cases does
not explain their outcomes. In virtually all of these cases, a minor's right to
choose to have an abortion invariably outstrips any countervailing interest on the
part of her parent to know about or to consent to the procedure. The Beolo 11
bypass criteria require this result under consent provisions when a minor can
demonstrate sufficient maturity to render her capable of an autonomous decision.
The mature minor and her parent are analogous to the pregnant wife and her
husband whose consent or notification, if required, would constitute an
unconstitutional veto power over the wife's decision.3 The focus on maturity in
the bypass proceeding removes parental autonomy from the scope of relevant
356. See PlannedParenthood ofBlue Ridge v. Camblos, 116 F.3d 707,709, motion
to vacate staydenied, 125 F.3d 884 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,525 U.S. 1140 (1999).
357. See Camblos, 155 F.3d at 372.
358. See id. at 366-67 (citing Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997);
Akron II, 497 U.S. 502, 510 (1990)).
359. See id. at 369.
360. See id. at 367, 371, 372.
361. See supra notes 58-65, 143-68, and accompanying text.
362. See supranotes 234-360 and accompanying text.

363. SeeBellotti I, 443 U.S. 622,638 (1979) ("[Tlhe tradition ofparental authority
is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty.').
364. See Planned Parenthood ofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992) (CA

State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over
their children.").
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interests byrecognizing that amature minor by definition can exercise individual
autonomy without interference.
The results in cases that use the other Bellotti H criterion-best
interests-aremoredifficultto explain?' Like a showing oftheminor's maturity,
a showing of the minor's best interests in such proceedings also removes parental
autonomy from the calculus, but according to what rationale is unclear. In bestinterests cases, the court is certainly not concluding that the minor is mature
enoughto ascertain her ownbestinterests-sha determinationwouldfallunder
BellottilTs first criterion. Instead, the determination is that the court itselt, as an
independent decisionmaker, adequately can ascertain the minor's best interests.
Although apparently consistent with the doctrine of parenspatriae," such a
determination, by itselt does not justify the court's effacement of parental
autonomy.3" This is because parens patriaeis not properly invoked "except
when necessary for the protection of the child.
The law does not permit the
question of a minor's best interests to be determined by anyone other than the
minor's parent unless the presumption that a parent acts in his child's best
interests has been rebutted or called into question? 69 Thus, behind a court's
decisionthat an abortion without parental notification or consent is inthe minor's
best interests lies the notion that the parent's judgment about or participation in
the abortiondecisionwouldnotbe inthe child's bestinterests. Inother words, the
court in these cases is making an advance judgment that the parent of a "best
interests" minor is unfit to participate.
The procedural due process problems with any such implicit finding are
remarkable. 7 ° As noted above, the Supreme Court in Troxel recently declared it

365. To satisfythe best-interests criterion, theminorneedsto showthatthe abortion
without notification is in her best interests or that notification of her parent is notin her
bestinterests. SeeLambertv. Wicldund, 520 U.S. 292,297 (1997) C'[A]judicialbypass
procedure requiring aminorto showthatparentalnotificationis not inher best interests
is equivalent to a judicial bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that abortion
without notificationis in her best interests." (emphasis in original)).
366. See Turnerv. Melton, 402 P.2d 126,128 (Kan. 1965) (definingprenspatriae
as a doctrine "recogniz[ing] the right and duty of the state to step in and act for what
appears to be the best interests of a child!).
367. See Planned Parenthood of Blue Ridge v. Camblos, 155 F.3d 352, 372 (4th
Cir. 1998), cert.denied, 525 U.S. 1140 (1999) (describing this as "an arrogation of the
parental role by judicial fiat").
368. Wilsonv. Wilson, 474 P.2d 789,792 (Colo. 1970).
369. See Parhamv. J.R, 442 U.S. 584,602-03 (1979) (holding thatparents retain
a substantial, ifnot a dominant, role in their children's upbringing, absent a finding of
neglect or abuse).
370. See Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional
a bald presumption that unwed fathers are unfit).
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unconstitutional for the State of Washington to ignore the presumptionthatparents
act in the best interests of their children?31 Fully apart from this concern,
however, is the fact that whichever criterion is used in a parental consent or
notification proceeding, such a proceeding is little more than a "rubber stamp" of
the minor's choice.3 72 The rate at which courts determine minors to be mature or
abortions to be in their best interests is nothing less than staggering.31 Indeed,
appellate courts appear quite willing to interpret bypass criteriain such a way that
trial judges have virtually no discretion to deny the petitions37 4 and to fashion

unusually deferential standards of review whereby appellate courts are constrained
to affirm. 3" Even though notification statutes are aimed at promoting
communication within the family, the courts are, nonetheless, sending a very

strong message that such communication is not the way "to recognize and promote
the primacy of the family." '76 Instead, in this special context, participation by
parents is not "important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity
that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. '
The overpowering sentiment in these cases that parents should not become
involved in a minor's choice to obtain an abortion supports no other reading.

371. See Troxelv. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,69-70 (2000) (disapproving ofajudge's
independent assessment of children's best interests inthe absence ofdeferencetoparental
assessment of their children's best interests).
372. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 477 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("[D]espite the substantial burdens imposed by these
proceedings, the bypass is, in effect, a 'rubber stamp."' (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota,
648 F. Supp. 756, 765, 766 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Gary B.
Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 79,80 (1987))); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN:
ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 242 (1996); Carol Sanger & Eleanor
Wfllemsen,Minor Changes: EmancipatingChildreninModernTimes, 25 U. MICH- J.L.
REFORM 239, 316 (1992).
373. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 436 n.21 ("'During the period for which statistics
have been compiled, 3,573 bypass petitions were filed inMinnesota courts. Sixpetitions
were withdrawn before decision. Nine petitions were denied and 3,558 were granted."'
(quoting Hodgson, 648 F. Supp. at 765)).
374. See, e.g., In re Jane Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 299 (Tex. 2000) (Hecht J.,
dissenting) ('It is fast becoming apparent... that this Court does not intend to allow trial
courts much discretion in denying applications under the Parental Notification Act.").
375. See id. at 289 (Owen, J., concurring) (objecting to the application of the abuse
of discretion standard to bypass proceeding review because the "trial court's findings
should be reviewed on appeal for legal and factual sufficiency").
376. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 501 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part).
377. BellottiII, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979).
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Although forty-three states have enacted parental notification and consent
statutes,37 more recent developments indicate that courts begin to declare these
statutes unconstitutional, nullifying parental autonomy in this context inthe same
way spousal consent and notification statutes have been eliminated. For example,
in invalidating Florida's recently enacted statute' as a matter of state
constitutional law, the trial court hearing North Florida Women's Health &
CounselingServices,Inc. v. Florida,- applied the same rationale used to nullify

spousal notification statutes and found it impermissible, as a matter of individual
privacy, to require a minor to consult even one of her parents before seeking an
abortion because, in this way, the minor may open herself up to abuse." Using
an equal protection rationale, rejected by the Florida trial court, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey invalidated that state's parental notification provision
because it failed to require, without a compelling justification, pregnantminors to
notify their parents when they choose not to obtain an abortion but instead to
Courts in Alaska23' Califomiap and
proceed with their pregnancies."
e
Montana s have issued similar rulings."

378. See Ctr. for Reprod. L. & Pol'y, Restrictionson Young Women'sAccess to
Abortion Services (July 2001), at http://www.crlp.org/pub_facestrictions.html.
379. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.01115 (West Supp. 2001) (requiring parental

notification or judicial bypass before an abortion may be performed on a minor).
380. No. 99-3202 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 12, 2000), rev'd, Nos. MD00-1983, IDOO2106,2001 WL 111037, at *6(Fla. Ct. App. Feb. 9,2001) (unpublished opinion subject
to revision or withdrawal) (finding a compelling state interest in the facilitation of
provision of appropriate medical care by parents to daughters). The Actwill not go into
effect until this dispute is resolved by the Florida Supreme Court. See Ctr. for Reprod.
L. & Pol'y, Florida Abortion Notification Law Delayed (Mar. 28, 2001), at
http://www.crlp.org/pr_01_0328flparentaLhtml.
381. See John Kennedy, Abortion Law Blocked, SUN-SENriNEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
May 13, 2000, at IA (reporting that a notification provision with a judicial bypass was
ruled a violation of the state constitution's guarantee of privacy).
382. See Planned Parenthood of Cent N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620,638-39 (N.J.
2000) (mvalidating a parental notification statute on equal protection grounds).
383. See DanJoling, AssociatedPressAbortionAdvocates,Foes,RallyatCapitol,
Jan. 22, 1999 (reporting on a superior court ruling that a parental consent provisionwas
unconstitutional), availableat WL, 1/22/99 Associated Press Newswires.
384. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 800 (Cal. 1997)
(declaring parental consent statute unconstitutional).
385. See Associated Press,Abortion La for Girls Under 18 Struck Doim, Feb.
12,1999 (striking down aparentalnotificationprovisionas aviolationofequalprotection
guaranteed by the state constitution because "[m]inors who choose to continue their
pregnancy are free to do so without any requirement of parental notification'), available
at WL, 2/12/99 Associated Press Newswires.
386. See Ctr. for Reprod. L. & Pol'y, FloridaCourtRecognizesYoung Women's
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As complicated and convoluted as the decisions in the area of parental
notification and consent are, one theme is salient: when it comes to the clash
between parental autonomy and a minor's right to choose, the minor's right to
choose prevails, regardless of the Court's empty insistence that states
constitutionally can encourage dialogue between parents and minors about
abortion." Such encouragement is merely precatory,3" and, in any event, courts
almost never find notification in a case involving an immature minor to be in that
child's best interests."z The minor prevails in these cases not because the
immature, non-best-interests minor does not existbutbecause the policy of family
privacy demands it. The trajectory of parental notification and consent
jurisprudence, as revealed by the state courts' application of the Beiottl II
framework, reveals that the vast majority have determined that, in contrast to
Casey's assertion that "minors will benefit from consultation with their parents"
but that adult women will not obtain similar benefits from consultation with their
husbands,3 society has little to gain from the potential strife that arises within
families when minors inform their parents that they wish to have an abortion. By
permitting courts, instead ofparents, to assess the best interests ofpregnant minors
in the volatile context of abortion, and by discouraging compelled discussion of
this topic, the courts can promote peace and stability within the family and thereby
effectively can foster the ideal of intact nuclear families. Although it is easy for
a court to declare this stance compelled by the view of abortion as an individual
right, this justification is inapplicable in the context of immature minors. By
making the advance assessment that a parent's participation in a minor's abortion
decision will not be in her best interests, a court goes a long way toward
protecting a certain idealized vision of the nuclear family.
Ever since Eisenstadt and Roe, the Supreme Court, although employing
language in its decisions suggesting that the right of privacy is vested in
individuals, consistentlyhas takenpositions that,inthefinal analysis, wouldfoster
nuclear family harmony. True, the Court has redrawn Roe's trimester system to
permit states to express respect and concern for a woman's unborn child, and
states certainly will continue to do so, but the Court has stopped short of involving

Right to Make Abortion Decisions Without Notifying Parents (May 12, 2000), at
http://www.crlp.org/pr_00_0512flverd.html. But see Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716
So. 2d 645, 660 (Miss. 1998) (finding a two-parent consent requirement with judicial
bypass valid under the privacy guarantee of the state constitution).
387. See ILL. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 436 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the ideal of a supportive family is often unrealistic).
388. See id. at 445-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (statingthere is no dispute that the
"State cannot legally or practically require such consultation").
389. See BellottiHf, 443 U.S. 622,656 n.4 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
the irony of this).
390. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
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family members in the decision. Husbands have no right to be involved in a
decisionregarding abortion, and minors freely can obtain the state's approval for
their abortions, their being strong evidence that the judicial bypass procedure is
little more than an automatic validation of the minor's decision in the vastmajority
of cases. These decisions recognize the right of an individual woman to choose
to have an abortion. Accompanying them, though, is a decided emphasis on
preventing the abortion decision from disturbing the harmony of the nuclear
family.
2. Glucksberg
Attempts to expand the scope of individual privacy beyond the cases
9 1
describedinPartII.B.l havebeenunsuccessful. In Washington v. Glucsberg,
the Court refused to recognize a fundamental right to die as encompassing both an
individual's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and his choice to
commit suicide with assistance. As in bothHardwickandMichaelH., the Court
deemed the claimed right to be incompatible with this nation's history, traditions,
and practices.3 In refusing to nullify Washington's ban on assisted suicide, the
Court defined the scope of the right recognized in Cnzan v. Director,Missouri
DepartmentofHealth" as merely "the right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition."394 This made Cruzan consistent with the Court's careful description?'
ofthe asserted fundamental lib erty interest in Glucksberg and its discovery inthat
case of an "almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right.

391. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).

392. See id.at 728 CThe history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this
country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it.
That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted 'right' to
assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interestprotected by the Due
Process Clause.').
393. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In this case, the Supreme Court held that a state may
require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes on the matter before
deferring to a surrogate decisionmaker's choice to remove life-sustaining treatment from
the incompetent See id.at 280.
394. Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 723 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279).
395. See id.at721 ("[W]ehaverequiredinsubstanti%e dueprocess cases a 'careful
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest" (citations omitted)).
396. Id. at 723. The application of this two-tiered analysis brought the Court's
analysis to a nearly summary conclusion. Five justices wrote concurring opinions.
Justice Stevens notedthat the failure ofthe facial challenge to the assisted suicide ban did
not foreclose future constitutional challenges to the statute as applied. See Id. at 739
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Breyer remarked that the Court might have defined the
liberty at stake in such a way that it properly would be labeled a fundamentalright See
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Beyond its use of a restrictive approach to fundamental rights, Glucksberg
is significant in the context of individual privacy jurisprdence because it further
confirms the unique quality of a woman's personal autonomy established by the
Court's abortion jurisprudence. Originally, the Ninth Circuit had nullified the
assisted suicide statute based on its assessment that the right to die was analogous
to the right to choose an abortion."9 Proponents of the right to die, seizing on
expansive language in Casey suggesting protection for the right to die based on
personal autonomy,39 cited Casey liberally in their submissions to the Court.3
Although the Glucksberg Court cited Casey with approval, it disaffirmed any
protection for a right to die. In response, scholars have expressed concern that
Glucksbergmight portend the end of constitutional protection for abortion,4" if

id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring) C'I would not reject the respondents' claim without
considering a different formulation, for which our legal tradition may provide greater
support.").
397. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
398. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 C'Ourprecedents have respected the private realm
offamilylifewhich the state cannot enter. These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected bythe FourteenthAmendment. Atthe heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
399. See, e.g., BriefofAmici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al.passim,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1996) (No. 96-110); Brief of Amioi Curiae
Americans for Death with Dignity & the Death with Dignity Education Center passim,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110); Brief ofAmici Curiae Bioethicists at 13-14, Glucksberg (No.
96-110); Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Reproductive Law & Policy passim,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110); Brief of Amici Curiae Council for Secular Humanism &
IntemationalAcademy oflumanism at 4, 6,7, 10 11, 12, 18, Glucksberg (No. 96-110);
Brief of Amici Curiae Gay Men's Health Crisis & Lambda Legal Defense & Education
Fund, On Behalf of Their Members with Terminal Illnesses, and Five Prominent
Americans with Disabilities at 10,14, Glucksberg(No. 96-110); BriefofAmicus Curiae
John Doe at 6, 16, 19, Glucksberg (No. 96-110); Brief of Amicus Curiae Julian M.
Whitaker, M.D. passim, Glucksberg (No. 96-110); Brief of Amicus Curiae Surviving
Family Members in Support of Physician-Assisted Dying at 6, 9, Glucksberg (No. 96110); Brief of the Coalition of Hospice Professionals at 13, Glucksberg (No. 96-110);
Brief for the National Women's Health Network & Northwest Women's Law Center
passim, Glucksberg (No. 96-110); Brief for Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert
Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thormsonpassim, Glucksberg
(No. 96-110); Brief of 36 Religious Organizations, Leaders and Scholars passim,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110). There was, not surprisingly, a lack of citations to Casey in
briefs submitted by opponents of physician-assisted suicide.
400. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Assisted Suicide and Reproductive

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss3/1

54

Storrow: Storrow: Policy of Family Privacy:

2001]

THE POLICY OFFAMILYPRIVACY

for no other reason than that the method of analysis in Glucksbergis inconsistent
with the results both of Roe and of Casey."' Glucksberg itself appeared to
disavow that any protections guaranteed by Casey had to do with an expansive,
general recognition of individual autonomy" and instead described the right
recognized therein as simply the rightto an abortion." By placing Casey within
its narrow list of protected choices, the Courtmade certain thatthe right ofprivacy
was no more than "the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in
and substance of a more abstract
specific behavior"4" 4 and not the sum
40 5
understanding of "'self-sovereignty.'m
Glucksberg, Hardwick, and Michael H. have had a remarkably
impoverishing impact on the scope of both individual liberty and familyprivacy.
WhileMichael. demonstrates the primacy ofthe marital family in the Supreme
Court's family privacy jurisprudence, Hardwvick and Glucksberg, at first blush,
appear to have little to do with families. When Harivckis read along with
Eisenstadt, though, what emerges is the powerful and encompassing legal
principle that freedom from governmental interference in sexual activitybetween
consenting adults is enjoyed only by married couples."' Glucksberg also has a
role to play in the impoverishment of both family privacy rights and individual
privacyrights. By solidifying the Court's reliance onaviewoffundamentalrights
as restricted by historical practices and traditions, Glucksbergplaces in doubt the
possibility that alternative families ever can achieve the level of deference paid to
traditional, nuclear families under family privacy doctrine. At the same time,
Glucksbergcabinsthe abortionright enjoyed bywomen, therebyproviding further
confirnationthatnotions ofself-sovereigntywillnotb eusefulpremises in seeking
expansion of individual privacy rights in the near future. As fewer and fewer

Freedom: ExploringSome Connections,76 WASH. U. L.Q. 15, 20 (1998).
401. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
CongressRemove thePrecedentialEffect ofRoe andCasey?, 109 YALEL.J. 1535,1558
(2000) C'[l]t is absolutely clear that Roe could not have resulted in 1973 from the
jurisprudence of substantive due promess announced in Glucksberg in 1997.'). But see
Lois Shepherd, DignityandAutonomyAfter Washingtonv. Glucksberg: An EssayAbout
Abortion, Death, andCrime, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 431, 466 (1998) (arguing
that Glucksberg is consistent with abortion rights).
402. See Glucksberg,521 U.S. at703 C'[Miany of the rights andliberties protected
by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy [but that] does not wanant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected-').
403. See id.at 720.
404. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
405. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724 (citing Respondents' Brief at 12, Glucksberg
(No. 96-110)).
406. See supranote 228 and accompanying text
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families resemble the marital model of Griswold, this impoverishment of
individual privacy rights promises to have a detrimental impact on the harmony
and stability of nontraditional families.
The constitutional rights of family and individual privacy comprise an
important portion of this nation's understanding of fundamental liberties. In the
abstract, family privacy purports to guarantee freedom from governmental
interference in matters of family life. To sketch the contours of this right is to
invoke many landmark cases that form the backbone of the Supreme Court's due
process jurisprudence-cases with such familiar names as Griswold,Eisenstadt,
and Roe-and to witness the evolution in the vocabulary and understanding of
these cases from arelational focus to an individual rights focus. Atthe same time,
to discuss constitutional privacy rights at all is to acknowledge this country's
venerable tradition of judicial vindication of fundamentally unassailable rights,
rights protected against the vagaries of policies that shift over time.
A closer look at these basic texts reveals that constitutional family privacy
lawis driven by its own, underlying poicy-a policy of vindicating privacy rights
most strenuously whentheintegrity oftraditional, nuclear families is at stake. The
Court recently has ruled that even where grandparental visitation could be shown
to be in the best interests of the grandchildren, there can be no such inquiry into
the best interests of the children where the children's parents are married, barring
a showing of parental unfitness.4" In the abortion context, a woman freely may
make her decision to obtain an abortion without consulting or notifying either her
husband, or, for a minor, in the vast majority of cases, her parents. These cases,
while reflecting the breadth of a woman's liberty to choose to have an abortion,
illustrate that the Court is influenced by its estimation of the impact of this liberty
on the stability of nuclear families.
Finally, cases limiting the extent of privacy protection betray a marked
interest inprotectingmaritalfamilies. In spite ofthe rising numbers ofnonmarital
families in this country, the Court systematically has developed a method of
analyzing fundamental rights claims that essentially forecloses the recognition of
novel rights. Because family privacy is, itself, a fundamental right, the Court's
analytical stance renders it highly unlikely that nontraditional families will be
granted privacy protection at any time in the near future. This is not to say that
such recognition will never be forthcoming. Under the Court's current perspective
on fundamental rights, privacy protection could be granted to families not
grounded in marriage or consanguinity if recognition of such families becomes
part of the fabric of this country's traditions and practices. Such a revolution
already may be occurring at the policy level.

407. See supranotes 153-68 and accompanying text.
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IV.FAMILY POLICY INTHE LAW OF SUCCESSION

Marriage between men and women has been extolled throughout history not
only as " 'the foundation ofthe family"' but also as essentialto the advancement
ofcivilization, 4 9to thepropagation of humanity, 410 and to economic prosperity.411

408. See Zablockiv. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,384 (1978) (quoting Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
409. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); ConT, supranote190, at 1718,26,46,77,116-18,121,219; CarlE. Schneider, The ChannellingFunctioninFamily
Law, 20 HoFsTRA L. REv. 495, 502 (1992) (quoting JAmES FnvAMES STEHEN,
LIBERTY, EQUAUTY, FRAT Y 156 (1967)).
410. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (CMarriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("[Marriage exists as a protected
legal institution primarily because of societal values associated with the propagation of
the human race.").
411. See Bashawv. State, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 177 (1829); Maddoxv. Maddox, 52Va.
(11 Graft.) 804 (1854) (describing marriage, and its concomitantprocreation, as essential
to nationalprosperity); see also CoTr,supranote 190, at 81-82, 121, 157, 179; Jane C.
Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of
MoralityinFamilyLaw,60U.Prrr.L.REV.1111, 1159 (1999) (quoting testimonyfrom
1996 House of Representatives's Defense of Marriage Act debates describing the
"traditional [marital] family as the foundation of prosperity and happiness'"; Katherine
Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of Children: Recapturingthe Aeaning ofMarriage,73
NOnREDAEmL. REV. 1547,1551 n.10 C'[T]he link... between a healthy family and a
robust economy... is clear and firm" (quoting Daniel Yankelovich, ForeignPolicy
After the Election, 71 FOREIGNAFF. 1, 3-4 (1992))).
Not all perspectives on maniage have been quite so sanguine. Marriage also has
been described as a tool for the political and economic subjugation of women, an
oppression of long duration in which the law has been complicit. See CoTr,supranote
190, at 62-67; Nancy D. Polikoff Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should ReadMartha
Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 167, 169-70 (1999) (cataloguing
inequities); Dianne Post, WhyMarriageShouldBeAbolished, 18 WOMEN's RTS.L.REP.
283, 289-306 (1997) (associating marriage with slavery and involuntary servitude);
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriageat the Millennium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 647, 649-50 (1999)
(cataloguing inequities).
Professor Martha Fineman has developed an intricate and compelling theory
positing that within this rhetoric about the function of marriage lies the privatization of
dependency on a grand scale. See Fineman, Our SacredInstitution,supranote 11, at
400. According to this theory, therhetoric ofthe importance ofmarriageto societymasks
the traditional nuclear family's true function in serving as a locus for inevitable and
derivative dependency. See Martha AlbertsonFineman, Thelnevitabli(yofDependency
and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 89, 92 (1998); Martha LA
Fineman,MaskingDependency: The PoliticalRoleofFami Rhetoric, 81 VA. L.REv.
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In response, the law has favored and continues to favor the institution of marriage.
In order to promote marriage,4 the law provides easy access to marriage by
opposite-sex couples, 413 fosters harmony within existing marriages,414 and, when

marriages end in divorce, encourages the parties to remarry. 15
Despite the law's emphasis on marriage, its bias in favor of marital families
is not always salient. Some areas of the law contain overarching policies
suggesting indifference to marriage. For example, in the law of succession, an
area of the law governed solely by policy (as opposed to constitutional)
41 1
concerns, 416 freedom of testation is said to be paramount to all other policies.

2181,2200,2205(1995). Withthe onslaught ofmarital breakdown, Fineman urges that
marriage is no longer capable of fulfilling this role and advocates its abolition as a legal
category. See Fm MAN,NEUTnREDMoE,supranote 162, at 164,228; Jeffrey Evans
Stake, Michael Grossberg, Martha Fineman, Akhil Reed Amar, Regina Austin, &
Thomas S. Ulen, Roundtable: Opportunitiesfor andLimitations of Private Ordering

in Family Law, 73 IND.L.J. 535, 542 (1998) C'Marriage is no longer able to serve its
historic role as the repository for dependency."). Toreplacemarriage, Fineman advocates
a re-envisioned family focusing on the mother-and-child caretaking relationship as the
core unit offamily intimacy. SeeFniNANNEunm MOTHER, supranote 162, at 228,
230-32.
412. See Stubbs v. Ortega, 977 S.W.2d 718,722 (Tex. App. 1998) ("[I]t is still the
public policy of this state to foster and protect marriage and to discourage divorce....").
413. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987) (holding a state may
notrefuse to allowprisoners to marry except for compelling reasons); Zablocki, 434 U.S.
at 389-90 (holding a state may not condition permission to many on compliance with a
child support order); Regan, supra note 411, at 652, 655 (describing the present
application of a more demanding level ofscrutiny to state regulation ofmarriage than was
applied forty years ago).
414. See Niemann v. Niemann, 317 S.E.2d 472, 474 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)
('[Piublic policy relating to marriage is to foster and protect it.').
415. See In re Wagner, 159 A.2d 495, 499 (Pa. 1960) (noting "the policy of
looking with favor upon remarriage"). To reconcile the policy favoring remarriage with

the policy disfavoring divorce, the law developed the nisi divorce decree, which delays
the divorce decree becoming absolute in order to provide both "a cooling-off period to
encourage reconciliation' and the prevention ofimmediate remarriage. Laddv. Ladd, 640
A-2d 29, 33 (Vt. 1994) (Morse, J., dissenting).
416. Descent and devise are not rights based in the Constitution but are creatures
of policy. This is generally accepted, despite the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), a case overturning Congress's abolition of
inheritance rights in fractionated Indian lands. Scholars and jurists agree that the
Constitution guarantees neither a right of decedents to bequeath property nor a right of
survivors to inherit property either by intestacy or by will. See, e.g., Hall v.
Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162,1164 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (ignoringHodeo;Inre Ford,
552 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Miss. 1989) ("[T]here is no natural law ofinheritance. Intestate

succession via descent and distribution is purely a function of the positive law of the
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At the same time, succession law is no exception to the favoritism of marriage.
When the policies in promotion of testatorial discretion and marital families
conflict, the courts struggle for answers, 418 but the latter inevitably holds sway,
albeit sometimes tacitly. This is especially evident in the law governing intestate
succession and the construction of wills. The law of intestate succession embodies
legislatures' estimation of how the majority of decedents would choose to dispose
oftheir property were they to die without a will.4 This law, with few exceptions,
establishes a decedent's surviving spouse and descendants as his sole heirs and,
in the absence of descendants, establishes his surviving spouse and his ancestral
and, perhaps, collateral blood relations as heirs.42 Implicit in this framework is
the idea that the "natural objects of one's bounty" are these members of one's
family.4 1 Although commentators onintestate successionhave argued forreforms

state."); Ronald Chester, Is the Right to Devise Property Constihutionaly
Protected?-TheStrange Case ofHodelv. Irving, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 1195, 1198,1201,

1213 (1995) (describing the lack of precedential value of Hodel's revival of a longdormantnatural law view of devise and inheritance); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries
ofPrivateProperty,108 YALEL.J., 1163, 1163 n.3 (1999) (describingHodelasnarroMwly
holding that the right of Native Americans to devise fractionated land allotments of little
value constitutesprivateproperty); AdamJ. Hirsch& William K. S. WangA Qualitative
Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 7 n.19 (1992) (describing Hodel as
ambiguous); Jeffiey G. Sherman, PosthumousMeddling: An InstrmentalistTheory of
TestamentaryRestraintson ConjugalandReligiousChoices, 1999 U. IL. L. REV. 1273,

1288-89 [hereinafter Sherman, Posthumous Aeddling]. Although the United States
Constitution does notprotectthe right ofdevise, some state constitutions do recognize this
right See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. 12, § 5 (providing forced heirship for children ages
twenty-three and younger or disabled); Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillie,
563 So. 2d 64, 69 (Fla. 1990) (striking down a mortmain statute); Inre Beale's Estate,
113 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Wis. 1962).
417. See Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998) ("Kentucky is
committed to the doctrine oftestatorial absolutism." internal quotationmarks omitted)).
418. See Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 666 (Mo. 1910) ("[C]ourts meet with
many perplexities in struggling to maintain the free right to testamentary disposition
while at one and the same time preserving the free right to many.").
419. See Trimblev. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,775-76 (1976) ('[L]egislators enacting
state intestate succession laws probably are influenced by the desire to reflect thenatural
affinities of decedents inthe allocation of estates among the categories ofheirs."); JESSE
DUKEMImnIE& STANLEYM. JOHANSONWILLS,TRUSTS, ANDESTAES74 (6thed. 2000).
420. See DuKEmNR & JOHANSON, supranote 419, at 75.
421. BLAcK'sLAWDIcIONARY 1027 (6thed. 1990) (The natural objects ofone's
bounty are nomally those "default" heirs provided forinthe law of intestate succession.);
see also Norris v. Bristow, 219 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Mo. 1949) ("[Ihe natural objects of
a testator's bounty are those who unless a will exists will inherit his property.'); Susan
N. Gary,Adapting Intestacy Laws to ChangingFamilies, 18 L. & INEQ. 1, 10 (2000)
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recognizing that, in nontraditional families, the natural objects of one's bounty
often are not related to the testator either through marriage or by blood, 4 these
proposals have met with little success. The uniformity of the vast majority of
descent and distribution schemes in this countryhas led many scholars to conclude,
in sum, that intestacy laws "promote and encourage the nuclear family." '
Despite the explicit policy of the law of succession to vindicate the freedom
of the individual testator, in reality this presumption is shot through with
exceptions born of devotion to marital families.42 4 To prevent application of the
law of intestate succession to her estate, an individual need only execute a will.4"
In so doing, the law of wills appears to grant a testator complete testamentary
freedom, no matter how eccentric or nonsensical her testamentary scheme might
appear.4 26 Nevertheless, avoiding the application of intestacy law is not as easy
as it sounds. This is because "the law favors construing a will to dispose of
property in the same manner in which the law would have disposed of it had the
deceased died intestate. '' 427 Hence, a testator must be very clear in expressing her
intention not to leave any part of her estate to the natural objects of her bounty if
such an intention is to be honored. 4" If she is not, she runs the risk, inthe absence

("For centuries succession laws in Anglo-American law have provided for family
members.').
422. See Mary L. Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An
Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1, 24-29 (1998) (discussing Professor Lawrence

Waggoner's proposed legislation); E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming:
ProtectingtheAbhorrentTestatorfromMajoritarianCulturalNormsThroughMinorityCultureArbitration,49 CAsEW. REs. L.REv. 275,276 (1999) (commentingthatthe law

prefers gifts to a testator's spouse and blood relations); see also Lawrence Waggoner,
MaritalPropertyRights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv. 21, 78-87 (1994) (proposing

legislation).
423. Shapo, supranote 23, at 1095 (citing Mary Louise Fellows, PublicAttitudes
About Property Distributionat Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United
States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J 319, 323-24); see also Gary, supra note 421, at 5
("[lintestacy laws still reflect the nuclear family norm.").
424. See infra notes 427-60 and accompanying text.
425. See Brooking v. McCutchen, 135 S.W.2d 197, 199 (rex. App. 1939) ("[A]
strong presumption exists that the testator did not intend to die intestate as to any part of
his estate, by the execution of the instrument .... '"); Gary, supra note 421, at 1-2.
426. See Inre Kirkendall, 642 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind.1994) ("Atestatormay devise
her property with attached terms or subject to conditions, regardless of how capricious or
unreasonable the terms or conditions may seem, unless they violate some statute or
established principle of law.').
427. Id. at 551; see also Brooking, 135 S.W.2d at 199 ('Courts apply a
presumption that absent specific provision to the contrary, the testator intended that his
property should pass in accordance with the intestacy laws.').
428. See Kirkendall, 642 N.E.2d at 551 ('[The presumption] cannot apply where
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of good evidence of her intention, that any ambiguity in the language she uses will
be resolved in favor of the natural objects of her bounty, a result potentially
consistent with an outright failure of the devise.'" The result is the passage of
property to family members the testator may well have wished not to benefit
Accompanying the danger that the use of ambiguous language may prevent
testators from disinheriting the natural objects of their bounty is the risk that the
testator's testamentary scheme will beundone by charges that it was procured by
undueinfluence. While courts have declared that a testator's bequest ofproperty
to a person who is not a natural object of his bounty raises no presumption of
mentalincapacity43 or of undue influence, 31 they often, and without muchinquiry,
deem a testator's disposition "unnatural" when it disproportionately benefits
' If exceedingly disproportionate, such a dispositionwill
"strangers ofthe blood."432
destroy the presumption of testamentary capacity 33 and, in some cases, will give
riseto apresumption ofundue influence.4 ' By contrast, ifa dispositionis deemed

the testator's will clearly and unambiguously expresses a contrary intent.").
429. See In re Carmody, 300 N.Y.S. 1299, 1306 (Sur. Ct. 1937) (noting the rule

that an invalid devise becomes part of the residuary estate unless the residuary devise is
itselfinvalid, in which case the property passes by intestacy); REsTAzmNr (1'HMD) OF
PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 11.3(c)(3) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995) (articulating a
"constructionalpreference" for "familymembers" in cases ofnambiguity); 95 C.J.S. Wills
§ 622 (1957 & Supp. 2001).
430. See In re Miller, 116 P.2d 526, 531 (Wash. 1941) C Mental incapacity on the
part ofatestatoris not presumed onthe theory that it was unnatural and unreasonable to
execute awill giving allpropertyto a stranger and cutting offone's kin.'); 94 C.J.S. Wills
§ 35 (1956 & Supp. 2001).
431. See In re Muller, 57 P.2d 994, 996 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) C'nnatural
provisions ofa will do not ofthemselves afford ground for setting it aside.'); Gayv. Gay,
215 S.W.2d 92,95 (Ky. 1948); 94 C.J.S. Wills §§ 231,242 (1956 & Supp. 2001). But
see Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Aleretricious
Relationships: UndueInfluence orNaturalBeneficence?,64NOTREDAMEL.REv. 200,
203 & n.17 (1989) (explaining the minority rule imposing a rebuttable presumption of
undue influence when a testator bequeaths his property to a meretricious partner rather
than to a natural object).
432. 94 C.JS. Wills § 242 (1956 & Supp. 2001); see also Melanie B. Leslie, The
Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 Amz. L. REv. 235, 250 n.70 (1996) (collecting
cases).
433. See 94 C.J.S. Wills § 35 (1956 & Supp. 2001).
434. See In re Lawrence, 132 A. 786, 789 (Pa. 1926) C'Such distribution may,
however, become of the utmost importance when considering the question of undue
influence to which it is more closely related.... [T]he presumption [does] not extend to
relatives of the blood.'); 94 C.J.S. Wills § 242 (1956 & Supp. 2001). Professor Leslie's
research revealed that courts were more likely to impose the presumption of undue
influence in unnatural bequest cases when the beneficiary was a non-relative. See Leslie,
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natural, it is quite difficult to show it was procured by undue influence435 because
more evidence is required to show that a natural object exerted undue influence
than to show that one who is unrelated to the testator exerted such influence.436
Thus, "the influence of a child or spouse in the making of a will.., does not
invalidate the will," ' but similar influence by another may invalidate it.43
Although the legal rules governing these disputes mandate that careful inquiry be
made into a testator's true intentions, too often the presumption that a testator
intended to benefit the natural objects of his bounty becomes the rule that the
49
testator should have done

so. 3

In the case law treating restraints on marriage in wills, courts are presented
more squarely with the clash between the freedom of testation and the policy in
favor of marriage.440 The resulting struggle has left the law in this area a tangle
of conflicting rules.441 Therefore, it is difficult to generalize, but certain salient

supra note 432, at 246, 252 n.80 ("'Where the provisions of a will are unjust,
unreasonable and unnatural, doing violence to the natural instinct of the heart, to the
dictates of parental affection, to natural justice, to solemn promises, and to moral duty,
such unexplained inequality is entitled to great influence in considering the question of
testamentary capacity and undue influence."' (quoting Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life
Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987))).
435. See RayD. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN.L.REv. 571,590
(1997).
436. See In re Kelly's Estate, 46 P.2d 84, 93 (Or. 1935) ("'lAin influence when
exercised by a wife might be lawful and legitimate, but ...if exercised by a woman
occupying merely an adulterous relation to the testator, might be undue and illegitimate."'
(quoting Kessinger v. Kessinger, 37 Ind. 341 (1871))); 94 C.J.S. Wills § 253 (1956 &
Supp.2001).
437. 94 C.J.S. Wills § 230 (1956 & Supp. 2001).
438. See Leslie, supranote 432, at 245; Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and
theHomosexual Testator,42 U.Prrr.L. REv. 225,230-31 (1981) (discussing the greater
freedom allowed wives and children to influence a testator).
439. See deFuria,supranote431, at 218 (recognizing an inherent tension between
application of the doctrine of undue influence and the principle of freedom of testation);
Leslie, supra note 432, at 243 (noting that courts protect testators' family members);
Madoff, supra note 435, at 576 ('[T]he undue influence doctrine denies freedom of
testation for people who deviate from judicially imposed testatmentary norms.").
440. Althoughthe constitutional rightto marry has beenraised inthese cases, ithas
been held that the court's enforcement of a testamentary restraint on marriage does not
prevent a beneficiary from marrying whom he chooses but merely carries out the terms
of the bequest See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827-28 (Ohio
C.P. Ct 1974).
441. See Lewis v. Searles, 452 S.W.2d 153,155 (Mo. 1970) ("It is obvious that the
cases on the subject are both conflicting and confusing.").
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themes emerge. Historically, general restraints" on marriage in a will were
largely forbidden due to the ascendancy of the view that marriage was the proper
way of life and had to be encouraged by all means.' More recently, the trend in
the courts has been to uphold rather than to invalidate restraints on marriage.
Still, many of the cases where this occurs do not involve restraints on marriage in
the true sense. A condition based on the married or unmarried status of the
beneficiary at the time of the testator's death is not considered a restraint on
marriagebecause, given the ambulatorycharacter ofwills, such a condition cannot
act as an inducement to remain unmarried or to divorce."' Freedom oftestation
is easyto vindicate in such cases because there is no clashbetween this policy and
provisions thatreasonably couldbe construed as permanentrestraints onmarriage.
True restraints on marriage-that is, provisions that induce a beneficiary's
decision to obtain a divorce 6 or not to many at some point after the testator's
death-do limit the freedom of testation. If a restraint on marriage is general,
meaning that it bars marriage entirely, it is less likely to be upheld than if a

442. A general restraint is one disallowing the beneficiary frommaaying anyone.
See Shapira,315 N.E.2d at 829.
443. See Searles, 452 S.W.2d at 155 ('There is no doubt that the older cases in
Missouri and elsewhere held that aprovisionin generalrestraint ofmarriage was void as
against public policy.').
444. See Lewis v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 652 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Colo. 1982) C[T.he
policy of the law favoring marriage is without sufficient vigor to overcome the policy in
support of effectuating a settlor's intention."); Sherman, PosthumousMeddling, supra
note 416, at 1317; Annotation, Conditions, ConditionalLimitations, or Contractsin
Restraint ofMarriage, 122 A.L.R1 7, 11-12 (1939) CThe preponderance of modem
opinion seems to be that the right of a donor to attach such conditions as he pleases to his
giftwill outweigh the maximthat marriage should be free, except where such conditions
are evidently attached through caprice rather than from a desire to carry out a reasonable
purpose.').
445. See nre Collura, 415 N.Y.S.2d 380,381 (Sur. Ct. 1979) C'[S]uchaprovision
is not contrary to public policy since it refers to a past act"). The ambulatory nature of
a will refers to its lack of legal effect until the death of the testator. See Timberlake v.
State-Planters Bank of Commerce &Trusts, 115 S.E.2d 39,44 (Va. 1960) ("Awill is an
ambulatory instrument not intended or allowed to take effect untilthe death of the maker.
It may be changed during life as often as the mind and purpose of the testator change.
While he lives his written will has no life or force, and is not operative or effective for any
purpose.'.
446. See In re Gerbing's Estate, 337 N.E.2d 29, 32 (I. 1975) C"[A] condition
annexed to a devise or bequest, the tendency of which is to encourage divorce or bring
about a separation of husband and wife is against public policy, and the condition is
void.'); Shapira,315 N.E.2d at 831 ("Most otherauthorities agree with Finemanv. Bank
that as a general proposition, a testamentary gift effective only on condition that the
recipient divorce orseparate fromhis orherspouseis againstpublio policyand invalid.").
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restraint is merely partial." 7 Furthermore, even if only a partial restraint, the
restraint must be reasonable in order to be upheld.448 For example, a partial
restraint forbidding a beneficiary from marrying a certain person or requiring a
beneficiary to marry someone of a certain religion is not void as against public
policy because the beneficiary's choice of a marital partner is not unduly
circumscribed." 9 A requirement that the beneficiary marry a certain person,
although perfectlyproper as a condition on a gift intervivos,45 ° probably would be
invalidated because it unreasonably restricts the choice of a marital partner.4"'
Restraints on a widow's or widower's remarriage, however, are valid" 2 and are

447. See Hall v. Eaton, 631 N.E.2d 805, 808 (111. Ct. App. 1994) C'[A]ttempts to
prevent unmarried children from marrying named individuals (partial restraints), or from
marrying before a certain age, or from marrying without consent, are valid.").
448. See In re Folsom, 155 N.Y.S.2d 140, 147 (Sur. Ct. 1956).
449. See, e.g., Taylor v. Rapp, 124 S.E.2d 271, 272 (Ga. 1962) ("'Prohibiting
marriage to a particular person or persons, or before a certain reasonable age, or other
prudential provisions looking only to the interest of the person to be benefited [sic], and
not in general restraint ofmarriage, will be allowed and held valid."' (quoting GA. CODE
ANN. § 53-107 (1933) (current version at GA. CoDE ANN.§ 19-3-6 (1999)))); Shapira,
315N.E.2d at 827. Note that conditions in a will forbidding a beneficiary from marrying
a person of a particular faith or race likewise have been upheld. See, e.g., In re
Silverstein, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (Sur.Ct. 1956).
450. See Leemon v. Wicke, 627 N.Y.S.2d 761,762 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("[A]
party may maintain an action to recover property transferred in contemplation of a
marriage which didnot occur." (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW§ 80-b (McKinney 1992))).
451. See Annotation, supranote 444, at 28 (noting that conditioning a testamentary
gift on marrying a particular individual has been held reasonable "unless the
circumstances are such as unduly restrict a freedom of choice" (citing Maddox v.
Maddox, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804 (1854))).
452. See, e.g., Wilburv. Campbell, 192 So. 2d 721,723 (Ala. 1966) ("There is no
controversy that a devise by a husband in total restraint of a second marriage by his wife
is valid and will be enforced according to its terms."); Hall v. Eaton, 631 N.E.2d 805, 808
(Ill. Ct App. 1994) ("Attempts to prevent the remarriage of spouses are valid.").
Historically, male testators could condition their wives' legacies on their remaining
unmarried, this being a right related to husbands' "'mournful property right... in the
viduity oftheir wives."' Lewis v. Searles, 452 S.W.2d 153, 155-56 (Mo. 1970) (quoting
Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 667 (Mo. 1910)); see also Hall, 631 N.E.2d at 808. No
similar rule permitted female testators to place restraints on the remarriage of their
husbands. See Knost, 129 S.W. at 667 C'It is a curiosity in the law that when the boot
is on the other foot and a wife makes a grant, which by condition subsequent is to be
defeated ontheremarriage ofherhusband, the general doctrine that conditions inrestraint
of marriage are void as contra bonos mores has been applied with vigor.'"). But see In re
Appleby, 111 N.W. 305, 309 (Minn. 1907) ("His... wife possessed the property, the
wealth; and no sound reason can be advanced to sustain the view that she was under legal
or moral obligation to provide him with an income with which to support in comfort and
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not thought of as general restraints."' In contrast, a generalrestraint on marriage
is invalid where the beneficiary previously has not been married, unless the

intention of the testator is to provide support for the beneficiary until such time as
the beneficiary does marry.45 The mirror image of this rule validates provisions
that are written with the motive to provide support in the event a beneficiary
divorces her spouse45 or with the motive to protect the beneficiary from
"misappropriation on the part of her husband." 57' Without evidence of the
intention to provide support, such conditions would be considered inducements to
divorce and, thus, violations of the public policy encouraging marriage. On the
other hand, inducements to marry58 or restraints on divorce' 9 in wills are
consistent with the policy in favor of marriage and will be upheld because there is
no public policyinfavor of discouraging marriage or favoring of divorce. " ° These
various rules show that the law generally disfavors restraints onmarriage but that
their prohibition depends upon the extent to which they actually impede marriage.
The foregoing sketch of succession law exposes several overarching
principles. The law ofintestacyis a statutory default will establishing inheritance
rights inmarital or consanguineous families for individuals who die without a will.
Testators who bequeathproperty topersons who are notthenatural objects of their
bounty do so at their peril. Despite the venerable, and supposedly overarching,

luxury a new wife."). In any event, under current law, such provisions are not in the
nature oftruerestraints, since thewidowis perfectlyfree to choosenotto be bound bythe
condition and to elect her share against the terms of the will. See DukemmE &
JOHANSON, supranote 419, at 254.
453. See 52A1%, JUR.2DMarriage § 114 (2000 & Supp. 2001). Butsee Sherman,
Posthumous Meddling, supra note 416, at 1317 (classifying restraints on widows'
remarriages as "general restraints on second marriages").
454. See Hall, 631 N.E.2d at 808; In re Heller's Estate, 159 N.W.2d 82,84 (Wis.
1968) CA condition rendering a gift contingent upon not marrying anyone is void...."
(citing REsTA mNT (FrST) OF PRoPERTY § 424 (1944))); 52 AM. JUR.2DMarriage
§ 114 (2000 & Supp.2001).
455. See In re Stone's Estate, 155 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (Sur.CL 1956) ("Where,as
here, the dominant motive of the testatrix is evidently to provide support for her
granddaughter until her marriage, no invalid general restraint of marriage is imposed.").
456. See Hall,631 N.E.2d at 807 Cuf the dominant motive of the testator is to
provide support inthe event of such separation or divorce, the conditionis valid." (citing
In re Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29, 32-33 (IIl. 1975))).
457. Id. at 808.
458. See In re Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658, 660 (N.Y. 1939).
459. See .Kraut & B.de RL O'Bryne, Annotation, Validity and Constructionof
Testamentary Gift Conditioned Upon Beneficiay's RemainingMarried,28 A.LYR3d
1325, 1327 (1969) (collecting cases).
460. See In re Clarke, 57 P.2d 5, 10 (Colo.1936) (noting that the state does not
favor divorce but merely permits it under certain circumstances).
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policy that testators have complete freedom of testation, basic principles of will
construction and presumptions in the law of undue influence render it easier for
natural objects of a testator's bounty to overturn his bequests than for unnatural
objects to do so. Furthermore, the law applicable to wills that restrain marriage
permits testatorial absolutism only to the extent that the will does not restrain
marriage. In short, the law of succession is rife with examples of bias in favor
of
marital families. This leaves those who consider the natural objects oftheir bounty
to lie outside the law's rigid definition of this kind of family with little assurance
that their testamentary goals can be achieved.
Many areas of the law embody a favored status for marriage and the married.
Not wanting to betray this favored status, the law of succession extols
testamentary freedom while systematically dismantling it in cases where the
married state is perceived to be at risk. In this way, succession law closely mirrors
the constitutional law cases discussed in Part I. Just as inheritance law cases
uphold freedom oftestation onlyifit does nothing to undercut marriage, individual
privacy cases defend individual autonomy more vigorously ifto do so is consistent
with the promotion of traditional, nuclear families. These illustrations of how an
overarching policy favoring marriage becomes embedded beneath individual
autonomy rhetoric raise the question whether policy reforms aimed at loosening
the grip of this bias, in an effort to recognize today's nontraditional families,
achieve their goal.
V. POLICY REFORM
Whenever substantive due process and equal protection claims are brought,
as in the family privacy cases discussed in Parts I and In above, courts must
assess "the adequacy of the 'fit' between the classification and the policy that the
'
classification serves."461
The fit must be tighter in some cases than in others,
depending on whether the legislation infringes on a fundamental right or creates
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications. For example, in MichaelH., the Court,
having found no fundamental right for an adulterous natural father to have a
relationship with his child, found an adequate fit between California's conclusive
presumption of paternity and its policy of "excluding inquiries into the child's
'
paternity which would be destructive of family integrity and privacy."462
In
contrast, the EisenstadtCourt, applying the rational basis test, found no adequate
fit between the proscription on access to contraceptives by the unmarried and

461. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121, 127 n.5 (1989). Public
policy "concerns what is right, just, and affects the citizenry of the State collectively."
McGrath v. CCC Info. Servs., Inc., 731 N.E.2d 384,391 (Ill. Ct App. 2000).
462. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 120.
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Massachusetts's goal of deterring premarital sex.40 The Court emphasized the
absurdity of a "scheme ofvalues" that would prescribe pregnancy and the birth of
an unwanted child as punishment for fornication.4"
Beyond having to balance asserted public policies against constitutional
liberty interests, the Court in these cases is required to interpret the
Constittion-an act itself influenced by public policy.' s By narrowly defining
"fundamentalrights and rejecting claims like those made inHardwck,MichaelH.,
and Glucksberg, the Court most recently has determined that it is important to
define the claimed right with great specificity and to be bound by historical
referents. This choice of interpretive position is not only a matter of discretion; its
very implementation requires reference to policy in order to function. By turning
to historical referents, the Court is required to look beyond the constitutional law
context to areas of the law driven by public policy concerns. In Hardqck and
Glucksberg,the area in question was the criminal law, and inMichaelH., the law
was that governing family relationships. In this way, the Court brings the

specificity of the statutory enactments and court decisions of the past to bear on
how the broad outline of the Constitution is interpreted today.
By electing to be constrained byhistorical traditions and practices, the Court
has decided it should play no role in effecting social reform via its interpretation
of the Constitution in fundamental rights cases. In light of this interpretive
attitude, it is left to legislative bodies to codify social policy more in keeping with
prevailing social norms. In fact, the Court, at times, has encouraged them to do
so."4 Legislatures have responded in various ways. They have, for example,
enacted legislation removing barriers to inheritance by nonmarital children.
Commentators also haverespondedby designingproposals to address deficiencies
in adoption law wrought by misplaced glorification of nuclear families. In
addition, courts themselves have dismantled misguided analytical frameworks in
move-away custody disputes in favor of a more general application of the best
interests of the child standard. As if responding to shifts in societal values and
practices, suchreforms would appear to question the primacy ofthe nuclear family
as the standard by which rights are distributed. As such, these reforms are ofgreat

463. The rational basis test is used when legislation neither impinges upon
fundamental rights nor creates suspect classifications. See Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S.
438,454-55 (1972).
464. Id.at448.
465. See Neal Devins, The Interactive Constitution. An Essay on Clothing
Emperors and Searchingfor ConstitutionalTiuth, 85 GEO.L.J. 691,699 (1997) (book
review) ('The politicization of constitutional decisionmakin dates back to the nation's
founding.").
466. See, e.g., Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,737 (1997) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (urgingthe"democratic process" to experimentwithbalancingthevarious
interests in right-to-die cases).
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historical importance. Nevertheless, upon unpacking these legislative, judicial,
and scholarly attempts to reform the law relating to families, what emerges is the
same bias toward fostering and protecting nuclear families that was uncovered in
the constitutional law in Parts II and III of this Article. What at first appear to be
departures from outdated policies that are unreflective of how life is lived today
are, in actuality, embodiments of the old policies beneath a new facade.

A. NonmaritalChildren andMaritalFamilies
Historically, inheritance by nonmarital children was forbidden because it
would legitimate illicit sexual relations.467 As a result, this type of inheritance
was deemed contraryto a decedent's presumed intentions."' The lawhas evolved
in the last twenty-five years to recognize that innocent children should not suffer
disinheritance as a result of their parents' indiscretions.4 69 This reform in the law
arose largely due to a mandate from the Supreme Court making clear that
classifications based on a child's nonmarital status that do not substantially relate
to important legislative goals violate the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment.47 Legislatures responded to this mandate by enacting statutory
frameworks that align the treatment accorded nonmarital children with that
accorded marital children.471 Despite this sea change in the inheritance rights of
nonmarital children, the law continues to favor marital relationships in this

467. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) ('The status
of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible
liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.").
468. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775 (1976) (rejecting the theory of
presumed intent as applied to exclude all nonmarital children from inheriting).
469. See Weber,406 U.S. at 175 ("[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child
is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well
as an unjust-way of deterring the parent Courts are powerless to prevent the social
opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does
enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where.., the
classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.').
470. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("Between these extremes of
rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which
generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or
illegitimacy.").
471. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 411, at 659 (stating that illegitimacy is not a

suspect constitutional classification, so that children of unmarried parents enjoy most of
the benefits available to those whose parents are married).
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context Only parents unwed at the time of their child's birth are deprived of the
opportunity to inherit from that child unless they recognize or support the child.'
Under the common law, a nonmarital child could inherit from neither her
mothernorherfather 4 ' In striving to keep up with "'the advancing enlightenment
and civilization of the race," 474most states havepassed laws allowing nonmarital
children to inherit from their mothers, but, by and large, nonmarital children still
face legal obstacles to inheriting from their fathers.' 5 This disparate treatment
was not ameliorated, as some courts claimed, 4 6 by the existence of the father's
power at any time to execute a will naming his nonmarital child a beneficiary.¢
Not only was the use of "children" in a will construed so as to exclude illegitimate
children,"7 but state statutes deprived anonmarital child of specificbequests from
479 or upon challenge by the testator's surviving
his parents eitherperse
spouse and
marital children.'
The Supreme Court, in Labine v. Vincent,' 1 rejected a

472. See infranote535 (citing statutes denying fathers' inheritance rights through
their nonmarital progeny unless they support or acknowledge them).

473. In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234,236 (III. 1975) ("Under the common
law an illegitimate vwas considered Filius nullius." (citing 1 WHILIM BLA
1sm,
CO mENTAFMS *456)); DUKEMIMNR & JOIANSON, supra note 419, at 106.
474. Karas,329 N.E.2d at 237 (quoting Smithv. Garber, 121 N.E. 173,175 (11.
1918)).
475. SeeDKEMINmR&JOHANSON, supranote 419, at 115. InTrimble,the Court
describedthese new laws as attempting to establish a system ofintestate inheritancemore
just to illegitimate children and, at the same time, protecting against spurious claims of
paternity. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,776 (1976).

476. See, e.g., Karas,329 N.E.2d at 240.
477. See In re Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151, 1153 Q(a. 1980), cert. deniedsub nom.
Brownv. Brown, 450 U.S. 998 (1981).

478. See Brisbinv. Huntington, 103 N.W. 144,147 (Iowa 1905) ("The decisions
are unanimous that, in the absence of statutory provisions modifying the common law
-withrespect to illegitimate children, the words 'issue,' 'child,' or 'children,' found in a
will or statute, whether qualified by the word 'lawful' or not, are to be construed as only
those who are legitimate, and, if others are intended, this must be deduced from the
language employed, without resort to extrinsic facts.").
479. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 n.13 (1971) (citing LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 1488 (1870) (repealed 1978) (alimentary limitation for adulterous or
incestuous children)).
480. See Gore v. Clarke, 16 S.E. 614, 616 (S.C. 1892) (citing a statute declaring
void any bequest of more than one-fourth of a testatoer's estate to that testators
illegitimate child "provided the wife or child alone can raise the question"); Bennett v.
Toler, 56 Va. (15 Gratt) 588 (1860) C'[I]a a great majority of cases the testator is
presumed to prefer, as objects of his bounty, legitimate childrento bastards.").
481. 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (holding that a state's interest inpromoting family life
rationally supports its disallowance of an intestate share for an unacknowledged
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constitutional challenge to these statutes, reasoning that it had no authority to
interfere with a state's intestate succession laws4" and that these laws were
rationally based on the desire of states to encourage family relationships. 4"
After deciding no fewer than nine disputes involving wrongful death and
public benefits statutes containing classifications based on illegitimacy,"' the
Supreme Court, in Thimble v. Gordon,"' reviewed an Illinois intestate succession
statute that disallowed illegitimate children from inheriting from their biological
fathers.486 The case was an appeal by a nonmarital child from the probate court's
rejection of her petition to be declared an heir of her father's estate.4" The
Supreme Court of Illinois, ruling orally from the bench immediately after oral
argument affirmed the decision."
While not overruling Labine, the Trimble Court indirectly disapproved of
4
it, stating that other decisions had made express that no "State may attempt to
influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children
born of their illegitimate relationships.""49 The Court also hinted that Labine may
have gone too far in approving, based on the state's asserted interest in the orderly
administration of estates, the complete exclusion of nonmarital children from
intestateinheritance.491 Likewise, the Court expressed its viewthatproofproblems
in inheritance claims bynonmarital children should notbe used to excuse invidious
discrimination againstthem 492 Finally, the Trimble Court deemed the factthat the
father could have made a will and the claim that the intestacy statute reflected his
"presumed intent" wholly irrelevant to the question at hand.4

illegitimate child).
482. See id. at 537 (finding nojustification in the Constitution for interference with
the state's choice of intestate succession laws).
483. See id. at 536 n.6.
484. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 n.11 (1976) (citing cases); Susan
E.Satava, DiscriminationAgainst the UnacknowledgedIllegitimate Child and the
WrongfulDeathStatute, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 933, 939-69.(1996) (summarizing cases and
contexts).
485. 430 U.S. 762 (1976).
486. See id. at 764-65 (citing 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1 (1992 & Supp.
2001) (original version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1975))).
487. See id.
488. See id. at 765.
489. Note, however, that four justices dissented in Trimble, deeming Labine
dispositive. See id. at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
490. Id. at769.
491. See id. at767n.12.
492. See id. at 772.
493. Id. at 774-75.
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As radical as Trimble seemed, it, nonetheless, did not stand for the
proposition that, to inherit from their intestate fathers, nonmarital children must
have precisely the same rights as marital children. The Court admitted that
difficulties in proving paternity "might justify a more demanding standard for
illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either
for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate
'
children generally."494
The Court, thus, left room for a veritable welter of new
litigationpresenting the question of whenthe different standard would become too
demanding to pass constitutional muster.495
BothNew York and Texas defended their particularly demanding standards
in cases reaching the Supreme Court. New York's statute provided that
nonmarital children could not inherit in intestacy from their fathers unless, during
the father's lifetime, a court issued an order of filiation initiated during the
mother's pregnancy or before the child's second birthday." This provision was
challenged in Lalli v. Lalli" by the son of an intestate who openly had
acknowledged his paternity." In declaring New York's statute constitutional,
albeit imperfect,V ° the Court noted that its purpose was not to steer people into
legitimate relationships"' but to promote the orderly administration of estates.5
The Court commented that, because the unexpected appearance of a nonmarital
child claiming a share of an estate could disrupt the stability of orderly
administration, 5 New York's restriction on the ability ofnonmarital children to
inherit was justified. Also compelling to the Court were the peculiar proof
problems that paternity posed. Whereas maternity is a foregone conclusion in
most cases, questions of paternity invite fraudulent claims and harassing
litigation °--especially where fathers and their nonmarital children do not
constitute "a formal family unit."5 5 The Court felt that these important concerns
were addressed appropriatelybyNew York's statutory scheme becauseitrequired
*494. Id. at770; cf Reedv. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852,855 (1986) (holding that"the
state['s] interestinthe orderly disposition of decedents' estates mayjustify the imposition
of special requirements upon an illegitimate child").
495. See, e.g., Lalliv. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259,266 (1978).
496. See id. at 261 n.2 (citing N.Y. EST. Povms & TRuss LAw § 4-1.2(2)
(McKinney 1998)).
497. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
498. See id. at 262-63.
499. See id. at 276.
500. See id. at 272-73.
501. See id. at 267 C'[Tlhe marital status of the parents is irrelevant.').
502. See id. at 267-68.
503. See id. at 270.
504. See id. at 271.
505. Id. at 269.
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the filiation order to be issued during the putative father's lifetime."1 This
circumscribed the time within which illegitimate children could present their
claims and allowed the putative father to defend himself against false claims of
paternity. 5" The LaIli Court did not address the constitutionality of the statute's
two-year limitation specifically,"' a choice Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence,
suggested would haunt the Court as legislatures questioned whether theirparticular
statutes were more like the one in Timble or the one in Laii.5 "
In dissent, four justices argued that the decision was an unjustified retreat
from Trimble in that it made it likely that nonmarital children would never inherit
from their fathers in intestacy."' As if responding to this dissent, later New York
cases specifically found the statute's two-year requirement unconstitutional.5 '
Since its amendment in 1981, New York's statutory scheme has allowed, in
addition to the court order of filiation,512 a nonmarital child to inherit from his
natural father if the father: (1) "has signed an instrument acknowledging
' (2) "paternity has been established by clear and convincing evidence
paternity,"513
and the father of the child has openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as
his own,1514 or (3) "a blood genetic marker test had been administered to the father
which together with other evidence establishes paternity by clear and convincing
evidence."515 These criteria incorporate some of the suggestions Justice Brennan
made in his dissent in LaIli and reflect the statutory scheme that many states,
including Texas, subsequently have adopted. 6
Texas was particularly recalcitrant in preventing nonmarital children from
claiming a paternal inheritance and has had a history of other draconian laws
disfavoring illegitimate childrerL5 7 In 1977, the year Trimble was decided, Texas

506. See id. at 271.
507. See id. at 271-72.
508. See id.at 267 n.5.
509. See id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
510. See id. at 277-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
511. See, e.g., In re McLeod, 430 N.Y.S.2d 782, 785 (Sur. Ct. 1980); In re Harris,
414 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (Sur. Ct 1979) C'[I]f a literal and stringent application ofthe two
year limitation ... were accepted, it would require a finding that this portion of the statute
is constitutionally offensive to the right of the infant to equal protection of the law."); In
re Angelis, 410 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524 (Sur. Ct. 1978).
512. See N.Y. EsT. POwERS & TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.2(a)(2)(A) (McKinney 1998).
513. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.2(a)(2)(B) (McKinney 1998).
514. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C) (McKinney 1998).
515. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.2(a)(2)(D) (McKinney 1998).
516. Many of these statutes track the language of the Uniform Parentage Act. See
UNri. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(2)-(3), 9B U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 2001); UNW. PARENTAGE
ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 17-18 (Supp. 2001).
517. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (striking down as an
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still had a statute depriving an illegitimate child of any claim to a paternal
inheritance unless her parents had married after her birth.5 18 In 1978, Delynda
Reed, born out-of-wedlock, claimed a share of the estate of her father Prince
Ricker, who had died four months before Trimble was decided.W The Texas
courts denied her claim, ruling that Trimble did not operate retroactively to
encompass claims to estates opened before the decisionin Trimblebut distributed
afterwards. 521 The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that; although the claim of a
nonmarital child to a share in her father's estate may impose upon the child
"specialrequirements,:"52 the timing of Reed's claim had no impact onthe state's
interest in the orderly administration of Ricker's estate.
In response to Trimble and later cases, the Texas legislature passed a series
of amendments to both the Texas Probate Code and the Texas Family Code. In
1977, the Texas legislature amended the Texas Probate Codeto allow anonmarital
child to claim a paternal inheritance only if the parents had married after the
child's birth or the father voluntarily had legitimated the child.'n In 1979, the
legislature again amended the Texas Probate Code to allow the child to be
legitimated by a court order ofpatemityprovided forbythe Texas Family Code.'
Despite this reform, Texas's statute of limitations for a nonmarital child's
paternity action required the child to bring the action before her first birthday, a
requirement characterized as "less than generous" in Mills v. Habluezel,524 a
Supreme Court case striking it down as a violation of equal protection. 5 While
Mills was pending before the Supreme Court, the Texas legislature increased the

unconstituionalviolationofequalprotectionTexas's rule disallowingiegitimates aright
ofsupportfromtheirbiological fathers). InMillsv.Habluetzel,456 U.S. 91,101 (1982),
the Supreme Court's follow-up to Gomez, the Court struck down, as a violation of equal
protection, a Texas statute of limitations requiring a nonmarital child to bring a suit for
support before reaching his first birthday. The Court held that the truncated limitations
period afforded nonmarital children no reasonable opportunity to assert their claims and
bore no substantial relationship to the state's interest in frustrating stale or fraudulent
claims of paternity. See id. at 100-01.
518. See Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 853 (1986) (citing TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN.§ 42 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2001)).
519. See id.
520. See id.at 853 n.3 (citing Reed v.Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697,700 (rex.App.
1984). Texas courts apparently had applied Trimble to claims pending as ofthe date of
the decision. See id.at 856 (citing Winnv. Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910 (rex. App. 1981);
Loveoyv. Lillie, 569 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1978)).
521. Id. at 855.
522. See Dickson v. Simpson, 807 S.W.2d 726,727 (Tex. 1991).
523. See id.
524. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
525. Id.at 94.
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limit to age four, and, in 1983, the legislature again increased the time frame to
two years after a child becomes an adult. 26 The Texas Probate Code was
amended in 1987 to provide for post-death determinations of paternity in the
probate court, and, finally, in 1989, the legislature again amended the Texas
Family Code to make the more liberal statute of limitations passed in 1983
applicable to "'children for whom a paternity action was brought but dismissed
because a statute of limitations of less than eighteen years was in effect.' 3' 28 The
present law reflecting this series of amendments allows nonmarital children to
bring a paternity suit within two years of their reaching the age of majority or,
"without regard to a paternity determination under the Family Code or voluntary
legitimization by the father,"" to establish paternity by clear and convincing
evidence in the probate court 30 either in the course of an existing probate531 or by
attacking ajudgment of heirship within four years. 32 These statutes of limitations
were, like the limitations imposed by the statute in Lalli, justified by Texas's
interest in "the orderly administration of estates and the validity of property
' 533
ownership.
These legislative reforms suggest that the contemporary view that there are
no illegitimate children, only illegitimate parents,5 34 has led to abolition of the
long-standing bias in favor of nuclear families that perpetuated the stigma of
illegitimacy. But instead of completely abolishing this bias, states have elected to
shift the stigma of illegitimacy from illegitimate children to their parents and, in
this way, have found anew means ofpromoting nuclear families. Prevented by the
Supreme Court on equal protection grounds from disfavoring nonmarital children,
several states have passed legislation denying fathers inheritance rights from or

526. See In re Sicko, 900 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex App. 1995).
527. See TEx. PROB. CODEANN. § 42(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001); Turnerv. Nesby,
848 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex App. 1993).
528. Sicko, 900 S.W.2dat 865 (citing TEx.FAM. CODEANN. § 160.002(b) (Vernon
1996 & Supp. 2001) (original version at TEX. FAM. CoDEANN. § 13.01(b))).
529. Id. at 866.
530. See TEx. PROB. CODEAN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2001).
531. See In re Chavana, 993 S.W.2d 311, 317 (Tex. App. 1999).
532. See Turner, 848 S.W.2d at 878.
533. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986) (announcing retroactive
application of Trimble to the Texas Probate Code).
534. See In re Cherkas, 506 A-2d 1029, 1031 (R.I. 1986) ('The sweep of the
various opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States in this area may be
summarized by a statement of principle widely accepted in the modem era. Although
there may be illegitimate parents, there is, in justice, no such person as an illegitimate
child. The very term 'bastard' is illustrative of the medieval notion that the sins of the

father would be visited upon his hapless offspring. If such a concept was ever accepted,
it is time, and past time, that it be wholly discredited and repudiated.").
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through their nonmarital progeny unless they supported or acknowledged such
children 3 s Determining that fathers who do not treat their nonmarital children as
their own have no entitlement to inherit from those children's estates, the Georgia

legislature enacted such a statute.536 The statute disallowed the father of a
nonmarital child from inheriting from or through that child if paternity had not
been established through presumption or court order, or if the father "failed or
refused openly to treat the child as his own or failed or refused to provide support
for the child."' The statute also expressly recognized the right of a nonmarital
child's mother to inherit fromthe child under any circumstances," and itmade no
mention of married parents who abandon their children.
The statute was invoked by the plaintiffinRaineyv. Chever.532 In that case,
RobertLee Chever's twenty-year-old nonmarital child was killedinan automobile
accident 40 Zenobia Hamilton Rainey, the child's mother, moved the courtto deny
the child's father heirship status eventhoughhis paternityhadbeen established."
Chever, who apparentlyneverhad supported his son or played anyrole inhis son's
life, 2 responded by challenging the statute on federal and state equal protection
grounds. 54 3 The trial court agreed with Chever, and the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed, noting that the statutory means chosen to advance the state's interest in
encouraging fathers to take responsibility for their nonmarital children were not

substantially related
to the classification that penalized fathers but not similarly
5
situated mothers. "

The Supreme Court denied certiorari over the strenuous dissent of Justice
Thomas, who, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, described a
host of social ills attributable to the high incidence of out-of-wedlock births. 4S
Claiming that the Georgia Supreme Court had failed to adhere to Supreme Court

535. See, e.g., ALa. CODE § 43-8-48(2) (1991); DEL. CoDEANN. tit 12, § 508(2)
(1995); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109(b) (Mchie 1979); KY. RaV. STAT. ANN. §
391.105(l)(c)(2) (Mlchie 1999); ME. RE'v. STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 2-109(2)(ih) (West
1998); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15()(d)(i) (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.060.2(2)
(2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309(2)(11) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109(2)(Cu)
(Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 2000); TENN. CODEANN. § 31-2-105(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1997);
VA. CODEANN. § 64.1-5.1.3.b (Michie Supp. 2001).
536. GA. CODEANN. § 53-2-4 (1997).
537. GA. CODEANN. § 53-2-4(b)(2) (1997).
538. GA. CODEANN. § 53-2-4(a) (1997).
539. 510 S.E.2d 823 (Ga.), cert. denied,527 U.S. 1044, 119 S. Ct. 2411 (1999).
540. See id. at 823.
541. See id.
542. See Raineyv. Chever, 119 S. Ct. 2411,2411 (1999) (rhomas, J., dissenting).
543. See Rainey, 510 S.E.2d at 823.
544. See id.at 824.
545. See Rainey, 119 S. Ct. at2411 (rhomas, J., dissenting).
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precedent,546 Justice Thomas declared that the court should have defined the issue
as whether a distinction between fathers who do and fathers who do not support
and acknowledge their nonmarital children had a rational basis. 41 Based on this
statement of the issue, Justice Thomas concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court
improperly had applied heightened scrutiny in its review of the statute's
constitutionality."
Although the opinion of the dissenting justices has no legal force, it is
remarkable that both it and the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion never fully
explored the distinction between classifications stigmatizing nonmarital children
and those stigmatizing their parents. This distinction was reflected, if not fully
appreciated, in two decisions the Supreme Court made early in its history of
invalidating legislation denying entitlements because of illegitimacy.
54 the Court struck down Louisiana's denial
In Levy v. Louisiana,
of standing
to nonmarital children who wished to sue for the wrongful death of their parent."'
The Court found no rational relationship between the prohibition and the lower
court's assertion that it discouraged "bringing children into the world out of
wedlock"5 ' In Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 52
recognized as the reverse of Levy,"5 3 the Court struck down a classification
disallowing a mother from suing for the wrongful death of her nonmarital child.35 4
As in Levy, the Court found the prohibition irrational, remarking: "It would,
indeed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so they can
be compensated in damages for their death." ' Oddly, many courts discussing

546. See id.at 2412 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming the state court decision to
be "inconsistent with this court's prior decisions").
547. See id.; cf Parhamv. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 356 n.7 (1979) ('[T]he Georgia
statute at issue here excludes only those fathers who have not legitimated their
children.'); Alvarez v. Dist. Dir. of U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 539 F.2d
1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1976) (asserting that strict scrutiny in the alien context is not
required when classifications are made within groups of aliens rather than between aliens

and citizens).
548. See Rainey, 119 S. Ct at 2412 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
549. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).

550. Id. at 68.
551. Id. at70.
552. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
553. See Burnett v. Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. 1970).
554. Glona, 391 U.S. at 76.
555. Id.
at 75; cf Hughes v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 867, 871 (Ga. 1978) (Hill, J.,
dissenting) ("The denial of a claim for a child's wrongful death does not promote the
family as an institution for rearing that child in a timely or rational manner regardless of
the level of scrutiny employed."), aff'd, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) ("It is thus neither
illogical nor unjust for society to express its 'condemnation of irresponsible liaisons
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Glona have described it as a decision striking down an illegitimacy
classification. 56 But because the nonmarital child in the case had died, the
classification was not based on illegitimacybut onthe plaintiff's marital status at
the time of her child's birth.5" Such classifications do notreceive the heightened
scrutinythatillegitimacy classifications do andmighthaveno difficulty surviving
rational basis review, the most limited scope of review. 5" Still, although the
rational basis standard is highly deferential, "[t]he Equal Protection Clause
prohibits arbitrary and irrational discrimination even if no suspect class or
fundamental right is implicated." 59 Accordingly, itis conceivable that the Court

beyond the bonds -of marriage' by not conferring upon a biological father the statutory
right to sue for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child.').
556. See, e.g., Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1404 (3d Cir. 1997)
(classifying Glonaasa case addressing a legislative classificationbased on "having been
born out of wedlock"'); Jeny Vogel Music Co. v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 425
F.2d 834,836 (2d Cir. 1969) (CInLevyand Glonathe Courthad no problem ofdefeating
reasonable expectations that any party had entertained inthe past. Itheld merely thatthe
illegitimacy of the plaintiff or the decedent was not a constitutionally adequate defense
to a wrongful death action.'); Peterson v. Norton, 395 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (D. Conn.
1975) (grouping Glonawithother Supreme Court decisions involving "classifications on
thebasis oflegitimacyof birth"); Pouplosv. McMahan, 297 S.E.2d451, 452 (Ga. 1982)
(characterizing Glona as "present[ing] the issue of whether a statutory discrimination
against illegitimate childrenis constitutional"); Bumettv. Camden, 254 N.E.2d 199,202
(Ind. 1970) (describing the classification in Glona by "the factthatthe child was born out
of wedlock').
557. See Parham,441 U.S. at 356 n.7 ('The invidious discriminationperceivedin
[Glona]was between married and unmarried mothers.!).
558. See F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)
(explaining that rational basis review defers to legislative judgment and demands no
evidence or empirical data in support oflegislation); Nordlingerv. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,15
(1992) (explaining that rational basis review merely requires that a "purpose may
conceivably or may reasonably have been the purpose and policy" of the legislature
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 948 (11th Cir.
2001) ("Only in an exceptional circumstance will a statute not be rationally related to a
legitimate government interest and be found unconstitutional under rational basis

scrutiny.'); Robert C. Farrell, SuccessfulRationalBasis Claims in the Supreme Court
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999)
(characterizing rational basis review as "extremely deferential"). Challenges based on
rational basis rarelysuceed. See Farrell,supra,at 357 ('Inthepasttwenty-fiveyears, the
Court has decided ten such cases, while during the same time period, it has rejected
rational basis arguments on one hundred occasions.").
559. Mullerv. Costello, 187 F.3d298,309 (2d Cir. 1999) (intemal quotationmarks
omitted); see also City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,446 (1985)
('The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational').
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would disapprove of a statute that establishes marriage as a proxy for the support
of marital children and that requires the unmarried to make an independent
showing of support for their children."6 Marriage is, after all, no guarantee that
parents will support their children. Even if an unwed father took steps to
legitimate his child, his failure to support his child would have to be addressed by
invoking the state's enforcement machinery. The same is true of married fathers
who fail to support their legitimate children. Denying one set of parents
inheritance rights for non-support of their children but not similarly depriving
married parents who do not support their children stigmatizes the unmarried and

runs counter to a broad reading of Eisenstadt and other Supreme Court
decisions.561 By failing to recognize the Georgia statute's marital status
discrimination in Rainey, the Georgia Supreme Court implied that the Georgia
legislature could cure the equal protection flaw inthe statute by imposing the same
deprivation of inheritance rights on women who bear children out-of-wedlock as
was imposed on men. By not granting certiorari in Rainey, the United States

Supreme Court left several indistinguishable statutes in other states untouched. In
so doing, the Court resurrected its former justification for not strildng down
statutes stigmatizing illegitimate children and thereby perpetuated the law's
continued promotion of marital families.

560. See Labinev. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 553-54 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
('It is also important not to obscure the fact that the formality of marriage primarily
signifies a relationship between husband and wife, not between parent and child.
Analysis of the rationality of any state effort to impose obligations based upon the fact of
marriage must, therefore, distinguish between those obligations that run between parties
to the marriage and those that run to others."); DOLGIN, supra note 15, at 99, 117
(suggesting the Court's position in unwed father cases is driven less by the concern that
fathers establish relationships with their children than that they establish a connection to
the mothers of their children); Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible"Reproduction, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 339, 342 (1996) ('Although reproduction within marriage serves as the
best proxy for responsible reproduction in this discourse, and nonmarital reproduction for
irresponsible reproduction, such models prove to be both over- and underinclusive.').
The Supreme Court has declined to analyze such claims. See, e.g., Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116-17 (1989) ('We do not reach Michael'i equal protection
claim, however, as itwas neitherraised nor passed upon below."); Cabanv. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 394 n.16 (1979) (declining to address an equal protection claim founded

on differential treatment ofmarried and unmarried fathers). But see Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (finding compelling distinctions between unmarried and
married fathers based on the latters' having "borne full responsibility for the rearing of
[their] children during the period of the marriage").
561. See, e.g., Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("[T]he law has [not]
refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony."
(citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (illegitimacy classification case))).
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B. Mimicking NuclearFamiliesin Adoption Policy
In her renowned study of adoption, Professor Elizabeth Bartholet explores
how society stigmatizes adoption."5 She explains how manyprospective parents
are encouraged to consider adoption only after many years ofexpensive, grueling,
and unsuccessful fertility treatments. 5" She, also finds a distressing bias in
theoretical and empirical work on adoption springing from the assumption "dat
adoptive relationships are somewhere on the spectrum between disastrously and
modestly inferior to biologic relationships." 5 In addition, Bartholet decries the

law's complicityinplacing insurmountablebarriers bet%eenprospective adoptive
parents and children who need homes. 5'
As ifto temper the stigma associated with adoption, the history of adoption

regulation inthis country is one of "biologism," abiologiobias holding "thatwhat
is 'natural' inthe context of the biologic family is what is normal and desirable in
the context of adoption." 5' As such, the law does its utmost to fashion adoption

562.
563.
564.
565.
566.

See BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 164-86.
See BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 205-07.
BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 181.
See BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at xix, 170.
BATHOLET, supra note 7, at 48 C'Our laws design adoptive families in
imitation of biology."); BARHoLET, supra note 7, at 93, 170 (noting that the law
structures adoption in imitation of biology); see also Jacksonv. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100,
105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. § 8-117 (West 1999 & Supp.
2000) (defining the relationship between anadoptive child and his adoptive parents as the
same as if "the child were born to the adoptive parent in lawful wedlock")); RK Alta
Charo,AndBabyMakes Three-orFour,orFive, orSix Redefining the Faro@Afier

the Reprotech Revolution, 15 Wis. Wo.NiEN's L.J. 231,237, 239 (2000); Joan Heifetz
Hollinger, Authenticity and Identity in ContemporaryAdoptive Families, J.GENDER
SPECIFIC MED., Nov. 2000, at 23, 24 ("[The asserted-equivalence model of adoption

attempt[s] toreinscribe the biogenetic family by creating alegal frameworkwithinwhich
the personal and emotional ties ofthe "'natural' Ibmily [are] to be replicated."); Radhika
Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the TraditionalFamiiy, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 951, 957 (1996) (remarking that adoptions are carried out by a "system
of legal regulations that reconstruct adoption in the image of the biological family");
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology andIntent-basedParenthood:An
OpportunityforGenderNeutrality,1990 Wis.L.REV. 297,320 ("[F]acts mustlbe-altered
and suppressed in order to make [adoption] mirror as closely as possible the standard
model of socially legitimated biology.").
Although racial bias in adoption placements is illegal, see 42 U.S.C. § 1996b
(Supp. V 1999), Bartholetfinds that adoptionprofessionals have contributedto biologism
bypromoting adoptionmatches between "biologic look-alikes," thus fashioning a vision
of the idealized marital and procreative family. See BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 111.
Professor Jane Maslow Cohen has argued that racial matching policies in the adoption
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in imitation of procreation by, above all, promoting secrecy in the process. 6 As
a result, adoption law has been complicit in valorizing the nuclear family.5'
Despite its ability to mimic the nuclear familymodel, however, adoption has never
shed its badge ofinferiority and remains inherently suspect. Unable to achieve the
privileged status ofprocreation,569 adoption is systematically discouraged as a way
to create a family, and persons who elect to pursue it must accept the attendant loss
of privacy and dignity reserved for nuclear families."'
The law seeks to shape the adoptive family according to the nuclear family
model. Historically, although the adopted child acquired the status of a lineal
descendant, 1 he did not acquire the status of an heir of the body with regard to
context raise the same equal protection concerns that led to the nullification of antimiscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and she has theorized
that racial matching is inappropriate in a society where the definition ofrace has become
increasingly ambiguous. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Race-BasedAdoption in a PostLoving Frame, 6 B.U. PUB.IN'r. L.J. 653, 665, 668-69 (1997).
567. In most states, adoption records are secret making it difficult for adopted
children to discover the identities of their natural parents. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 162.006(b), .018, .022 (Vernon 1996) (The identities of the biological parents
are kept confidential.). The open records movement has gained some inroads. See
ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2433 (1992) (open
records laws); see also Shultz, supranote 566, at 320 ('All records of the parties and the
circumstances are buried in secret files of a 'go between,' never to be revealed to any of
the parties.').
568. See BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at xxv ("Traditional understandings of the
meaning of family... help shape the institution of adoption in ways that reinforce the
notion that the ideal fonn of family is the idealized husband-wife nuclear family of the
past"); see also KATH WESTON, FAMmmS WE CHOOSE: LESBIANs, GAYS, KiNSHIP 38
(1991) ("[A]doptive relations ...pose no fundamental challenge to either procreative
interpretations of kinship or the culturally standardized image of a family assembled
around a core of parent(s) plus children."). Biologically unrelated adopted siblings are
even forbidden from marrying. See TEx. FAvL CODE ANN. § 2.004 (Vernon 1996). But
see Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1978) (ruling that a statute prohibiting
marriage of biologically unrelated adopted siblings violates an equal protection
guarantee).
569. See BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 76 (Whereas "[t]here is an absolute right to
produce a child,. . . there is no right to enter into a parenting relationship with a child
who is not linked by blood-no right to adopt').
570. See BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 33 (referring to the "highly regulated" world
of adoption and its corresponding lack of privacy rights); BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at
79 ("We would not dream of telling fertile people that they have no right whatsoever to
produce a child-that childbirth is a privilege to be allowed ornot at the entire discretion
of the government"); BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 167 ("Adoptive relationships are not
seen as entitled to the same kind of privacy.").
571. See 2 C.J.S.Adoption ofPersons § 146 (1972 & Supp. 2001).
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inheritance." Such a "child's right of inheritance fromthe adoptive parents [was]
strictly construed.'" Inheritance of an adopted child from his adoptive parents
was thought to be impermissibly "in derogation of succession by heritable
blood."'
Today, the majority of jurisdictions provide definitions of adopted
children that give such children the same rights as biological childrenY 5
Although an adopted child continues to inherit from his naturalparents inthe
absence of a contrary statute, 6 most states have promulgated legislation severing
this right of inheritance 5m because dual inheritance is contrary to public policyY3
Nevertheless, a minority of states allow adopted children to inherit from their
natural parents.'7 9 These states render the right illusory, however, by permitting
judges hearing adoption matters to sever this right in the adoption decree." This
severance ofinheritancerights is common, 81 and, once this occurs, anyinterestthe
child has in the estate of his natural parents vanishes. In this way, even in states
permitting adopted children to inherit from their biological parents, courts have
complete discretionto structure inheritance rights tomimicthose of the traditional
582

marital family.

In the era when adoption secrecy held sway, there appeared to be no need for
courts hearing adoptions to sever adopted children's right to inherit from their
biological parents. But even where adopted children have been able to discover

572.
573.
574.
575.
576.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., TEX FAM. CoDEANN. § 162.017(c) (Vernon 1996).
See 2 C.JS.Adoption ofPersons § 146 (1972 & Supp. 2001).

577. See id. For an example of such a statute see, for example, Auz REv. STT.
ANN. § 8-117 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).

578. See Wailes v. Curators of Cent Coll., 254 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Mo. 1953).
579. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODEANN. § 162.017(b) (Vernon 1996); TEX. PROB.
CODE § 40 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2001).
580. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODEANN. § 161.206(b) (Vernon 1996).

581. See Shapo, supranote 23, at 1118-19 (revealing that even in states where an
adopted child retains the right to inherit from hernaturalparents "only in one case... did
a court open sealed records to revealthe parents' names" (citing Spillmanv. Parker, 332
So. 2d 573, 575-76 (La. Ct App. 1976))).
582. SeeDonaldG. Cohen,Adoption Can Have UnexpectedEffectsonInheritance

andOverallEstatePlan,18 EsT. PLAN. 8,10 (1991) (findinginlaws severing ther ights
of adoptees to inherit from their natural parents a public policy favoring adoption as a
substitute for a blood relationship); Shapo, supranote 23, at 1098 (commenting that
adoption lawfurthers a policy ofintegrating adopted childreninto their adoptive families
(citing JanEilenReinRelatives by Blood,Adoption, andAssociation: Who Should Get
What andWhy (The Impact ofAdoptions, AdultAdoptions, andEquitableAdoptionson
Intestate Succession and ClassGifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 717 (1984))).
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the identity of their natural parents, inheritance rights have been denied for fear
thatthe exercise of such rights will disruptthe boundaries of established families.
This issue arose in Little v. Smith,5s a case illustrating that once family harmony
is threatened, the orderly administration of estates becomes the basis for overriding
statutory inheritance rights. After her adoptive mother's death, Katherine Smith,
needing information ab out her genetic historyin order to help her ailing son, began
a search for her natural parents."u A series of fortuitous events led to her
obtaining adoption records revealing that her mother was Thelma Little Hart.5'5
Through further research, Smith discovered that Hart had come from a wealthy
family but had predeceased her mother Lula Little, Smith's biological
grandmother.5" Little, however, had died and left a will naming Hart as a

beneficiary.5" As Hart's descendant under the anti-lapse statute, Smithpetitioned
for a share of Little's estate, which had been distributed and closed eight years
earlier. " In addition to her petition for a declaration of heirship, Smith charged
the executor of Little's estate, Hart's brother and, thus, Smith's biological uncle,
with fraud and breach of fiduciary duty"
In what can be described only as a formalistic and arbitrary decision, the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. 9° In so
doing, the court identified three competing interests in the case--"(1) the right of
adoptees to inherit from or through their natural parents, (2) the confidentiality of
the identities of birth parents and their families, and (3) the need for finality of
probate proceedings"-and determined that confidentiality and finality were the
paramount interests,591 in spite of(or, perhaps, because of) the difficulties adoptees
face in obtaining their birth records.

5

9

The reasoning of Little is puzzling because the case was not one in which an
adoptee sought to obtain her birth records. Smith already had obtained her
records, and, after discovering herrightto inheritfrom Little's estate, had asserted
those rights withintwo years." Moreover, Smithnot only asserted arightto share

583. 943 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1997).
584. Seeid. at415.
585. See id. at 415-16.
586. See id.at416.
587. See id.
588. See id.
589. See id.
590. See id.
591. Id. at417.
592. See id.at 418.
593. The statute of limitations for bringing an action for a determination ofheirship
in Texas is four years from the closing ofthe estate. See Smithv. Little, 903 S.W.2d780,
787-88 (Tex. App. 1995), rev'd on othergrounds, 943 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1997).
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in Little's estate but also asserted fraud on the part of the executor of the estate,"'
fact questions surrounding which inspired the intermediate appellate court to
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on that count.' The Texas
Supreme Court; however, made the curious ruling that "the discovery rule is
unavailable in suits to assert a right of inheritance by adoptees." 5" The court
based this newly-fashioned principle on the fact that the legislature had erected
barriers meant to fiustrate adoptees' discovering the identities of their biological
parents.597 This fact was not only wholly irrelevant to Smith's case, but it fully
ignored the legislature's mandate that birth records be produced ifgood cause is
show. 59s The court leapt to the startling conclusion that legislation protecting
confidentiality in adoption advanced a policy so overarching that the discovery
rue should be unavailable even to adoptees who successfully discover the
identities of their natural parents." 0 Not surprisingly, given the general tenor of
the opinion, the court did not inquire into whether Smith had shown good cause in
her petition to obtain her adoption records.
Though not exactly circular, the Little court's decision is, nonetheless,
baffling. The opinion conveys the unsettling impression that itis aligned withthe
sentiment behind old statutes of limitations, which made it impossible for
nonmaritalchildrento assertpatemalinheritancerights." 1 Thereis anundeniable
emphasis in this case that is reminiscent of Bartholet's findings that adoptive
families suffer a loss of dignity when they fail to live up to the model of the
traditionalnuclearfamily. Bydiscoveringthe identityofherbiologicalmother and
pursuing the inheritance promised her under Texas law, Katherine Smith found
herself in a class denied recourse to the discoveryrule-one of the most basic and
significant principles aiding civil litigants. The new rule propounded by the court
willhelp keep the secret of adoption safe and will be a useful toolinthepromotion
of biologism.
Given recent calls for the reform of adoption policy, it is hoped that cases
such as Little soon will be an anachronism. Some proposals, claiming itis timeto

594. See Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d at 416.
595. See Smith v. Little, 903 S.W.2d at 785.
596. Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d at 420.
597. See id.
598. See TYx FAM. CoDE ANN. § 162 (Vmon 1996 & Supp. 2001).
599. See TrinityRiverAuth. v.URS Consultants, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 259, 262 (rex.
1994) ("Acause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff mows ofthe facts giving rise
to the cause of action."); Bums v. Thomas, 786 S.W.2d 266, 267 (lex. 1990) ('Under
[the discovery] rules, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until claimant

discovers... facts establishing a cause of action.").
600. See Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d at 423.
601. See supranotes 524-26 and accompanying text.
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advocate
value differences between adoptive families and other families,
"openness" in adoption. "Openness"refers to open records and open adoption.'
Advocates of open records urge opening records to adult adoptees.1 Open
adoptionrefers to contactbetweenthe biologicalparents, the adoptive parents, and
the adopted child. Proposals to advance open adoption suggest various
arrangements running the gamut from meetings between biological and adoptive
parents prior to the child's birth 5 to "the creation of enforceable post-adoption
visitation rights for certain individuals, especially the birth parents of the adopted
child." 0 It is hoped that, through openness reforms, children's needs will be
better addressed,' that they will have greater opportunities for forming their

602. See General Values About Openness in Adoption, available at
http:/adoption.about.com/library/weekly/aaO508OOf.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2001)
[hereinafter General Values].
603. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive
Approach to the Determinationof Legal Parentage,113 -ARv.L. REv. 835, 890-91

(2000) C'[Slecrecy is increasingly replaced with open records and even open adoptions
604. See Naomi Calm & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution:
The CaseforOpeningClosedRecords,2 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 150,192 (1999) (proposing
that records be opened "at the election of an adult adoptee"). In the context of artificial
insemination, similar proposals have been brought to release the names of sperm donors
to the resulting children. See Naomi Calm, Children's Interests and Information
Disclosure: Who Providedthe Egg and Sperm? OrMommy, Where (andWhom) Do
I Come From?, GEO. J. GENDER&L. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that children deserve
access to information about undisclosed donors), available at
http://papers.ssr. com/sol3/delivery.efin/SSRNID271215_code010524630.pdftabstr
actid=271215; Peter Clough, Sperm Donor ChildrenSeek Rights: Vancouver Woman
Wants Access to Information, NAx'L POST, July 31, 2000, at A06; Laura Kendall, IVF
Children May Soon Trace Donors, AUSTRALASIAN BUSDNESS INTELLIGTNCE: THE
ADVERTISER, Aug. 10,2000, at2;No Kwai-YanIdentityofDonors "Unlocked", CHINA
MORNiNGPosT, Feb. 10, 2000, at 6; cf Garrison,supranote 603, at 899 (remarking that
technologically conceived children have the same informational needs as adopted

children).
605. See Garrison, supra note 603, at 890-91 (defining open adoption as an
arrangement "in whichthe adoptive child retains some form of contactwithher biological
family").
606. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and
Enforceabilityof Visitation Ordersfor FormerParents Under Uniform Adoption Act
§ 4-113,51 FLA. L. REv. 89,90 (1999) (citing UNiF. ADOPTIONACT art. 4 cmt., 9 UL.A.
68, 69 (Supp. 1998)). Seventeen states currentlyhave legislation in place to allow courts
to approve various kinds ofpost-adoption contact agreements. See JOANH. HOLUNGER,
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE Appendix 13-B (1999).
607. See BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 891.
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identities," andthatthe traditionalist notionthat adoptions mustmimiothenuclear
family, anotionthoughtto impede adoptive children's bonding with their adoptive
parents,6 9 will be dismantled.
Although openness sounds desirable in many contexts, it is not clear that it
can advance these praiseworthy objectives. First, the values said to promote
openness in adoption emphasize the indelibleness of blood bonds and the need to
forge connections between adopted children and their biological parents in order
that each may deal with his loss and experience the presence of the other.""
Second, they encourage blending of the adoptive and biological families in the
name of"famyintimacy,sln-languagereminisentofGriswold--topromote an
understanding on the part of the child that he has "two sets of parents." ' Third,
"no matter how adequate" adoptive parents are as parents, the focus in this set
of values is on what adoptive parents cannotgive a child--"genes, ancestors, or
birth"6 4-- and how they can harm a child by keeping secrets that make him feel
something is wrong with him.6"' In sum, the policy of open adoption focuses
squarely on finding a role for biological parents in the life of the adopted child.
Whether any of these values promotes the well-being of children is unkmown
because currently there is a lack of definitive empirical evidence that openness in
adoption is in a child's best interests." 6 If these reforms arein the best interests

608. See Calm& Singer, supranote 604, at 191.
609. See BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 58 (noting the argument of adoption
traditionalists that confidentiality is required for a birth mother to move on with her life
and to protect the privacy ofthe adoptive family); DavidD. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving
the ConstitutionalDilemma of the FaultlessFather,41 ARIZ. L. REv. 753, 829 (1999)

[hereinafter Meyer, FamilyTies] (canvassing modemrjustifications for the termination of
biological parents' rights in adoption cases).
610. See GeneralValues, supranote 602.
611. See GeneralValues, supranote 602.
612. See GeneralValues, supranote 602.
613. See GeneralValues, supranote 602.
614. See GeneralValues, supranote 602.
615. See GeneralValues, supranote 602.
616. See MarianneBeny, Risks andBenefits ofOpenAdoptionADOPTION Spring

1993, at 125, 134 ('Given the present state of knowledge, decisionmaking around open
adoption remains a risky business, with substantial need for caution, assessment, and
planning."); Hollinger, supra note 566, at 26 (noting that the answers that have led to
open adoption policies do not have "research-based answers'); Meyer, Family Ties,
supranote 609, at 832 ("None of these studies purports to prove squarely that children
either benefit from or are harmed by ongoing contact with non-custodial biological
parents."). There is some extant evidence. See, e.g., RUTH G.MCROY & HAROLD D.
GROTEVANT,OPENNESS INADOPTION: EXPLoRIGFAMILYCONNECTIONS 196-97(1998)
(reporting findings that openness in adoption does not lead to confusion on the part of
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of children, they should be implemented. As a practical matter, however,
publicizing the message that adoptive families are in important ways not nuclear
seems ill-suited to elevating the status of these families under a legal regime that
prizes and reveres the nuclear family model.6 17 Focusing energy on fostering
relationships between biological and adoptive families in order to create a new
form of blended family instead creates ambiguity in the boundaries between them,
and the Supreme Court has insisted that such boundaries be present for the
bestowal of privacy protection. While it may seem sensible to shift the gears of
adoption policy to strive to avoid the evils resulting from decisions like Little, the
new policy of openness in adoption in the name of validating the essential value
of biological ties may provide support, albeit unintentionally, for the law's
emphasis on reserving governmental deference for traditional nuclear families.618
In short, the answer to adoption law's shortcomings may not lie in outright
denigration or rejection of adoption that mimics the marital model. Although
perhaps in the best interest of children, these efforts will do little to refine the
definition of the family on a constitutional level.
At bottom, nothing about openness addresses the fundamental problem that
adoptive families are considered an "inferior family form."619 Instead, these
proposals widen the gap between traditional nuclear families and nontraditional
families. Even Bartholet cautions that, although some aspects of openness help
remove the stigma of adoption,62 "it remains unclear... whether the seachange
adopted children or present greater challenges to the parenting role of adoptive parents
and even may lead to better resolution of birth mothers' grief).
617. See BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 60 (commenting on the movement to open
sealed adoption records and stating that "a move to embrace openness might further
denigrate rather than affirm adoption'); BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 176 (noting that
literature in support of the openness movement does little more than suggest "that
opening the system would at best alleviate the pain and suffering caused by separating
children from their birth parents").
618. See Fineman, OurSacredInstitution,supranote 11. at 394 ("The persistence
of the nuclear family as the model of intimate organization reveals the difficulty ofchange
in this area and helps to explainhow evenpotentially radical challenges are absorbed and
transformative impulses are tamed.").
619. BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 59; see BARTHOLET, supranote7,at 170 ("[IThe
law has reflected and reinforced the degraded status of the adoptive family.");
BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at 181 (commenting that the"working assumption ofvirtually
all theoretical and empirical work is that adoptive relationships are somewhere on the
spectrum between disastrously and modestly inferiorto biologic relationships"); Fineman,
Our SacredInstitution,supranote 11, at 404 ("Intimate entities that do not conform to
the form designated as natural in most instances are not considered families at all.").
620. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Taking Adoption Seriously: RadicalRevolution or
Modest Revisionism?, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 77, 84 (1999) (reporting the view of some
commentators that changes in adoption law have helped adoption shed its stigma).
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is more apparent than real.
Upon studying the rhetoric surrounding the
openness movement, one finds a great deal of discussion of openmess as a cure-all
for adoption's ills. The remedy, however, to years of the detrimental effects of
misguided adoptionpolicyis not to swing the pendulum to the opposite extreme.622
Although it is too soonto be overly pessimistic about the direction open adoption
will take, openness reforms likely will not be capable of tempering adoption's
stigma by elevating adoption to the status of a viable alternative to nuclear
families.' Until they do, any movement in the direction of openness is likely to
result in decreased privacy for adoptive and biological families alike.
C. Relocating the MaritalFamily
Hand in hand with the divorce revolution of the early 1970s came a rise in
custody modification cases involving relocation by the custodial parent. The
increasing mobility of society and incidence of women working outside the home
contributed to this trend. 4 In the typical case, the parent with physical custody
wishes to relocate with the child to another area in order to pursue improved job
opportunities or a new marriage. Noncustodial parents frequently claim that the
relocation will interfere unduly with their visitation rights' or that the relocation
is requested expressly for this purpose." 6 As a remedy, the noncustodial parent
sometimes requests the court to transfer custody.' Custodialparents sometimes

respond thatnotto grantthe relocation either would contravene their constitutional
right to travel

or would be contrary to the best interests of the child.

621. Id. at 85.

622. See Jana Singer, Closing Remarks at the Dave Thomas Center for Adoption
Law Symposium at Capital University Law School (May 3-4,2000) (cautioning against
repeating past mistakes by moving to the opposite extreme and proclaiming one type of
open adoption as the new "perfect solution"), available at
http:lladoptionabout.comlibrary/weekly/aaO5O8Og~ltm.
623. See BARTHOLET, supranote 7, at xxv (calling for adoption to be understood
"as a positive alternative to the blood based family form"); BARTmoLET, supranote 7,
at 181.
624. See In re Burgess, 913 P.2d 472, 480 (Cal. 1996) CEconomic necessity and
remarriage account for the bulk of relocations.").
625. See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 146, 148 (N.Y. 1996).
626. See Burgess, 913 P.2d at 481 n.6 C'An obvious exception is a custodial
parent's decisionto relocate simplyto frustrate the noncustodialparent's contactwiththe
minor children.'); Cassady v. Signorelli, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 545, 548 (Ct. App. 1996).
627. See, e.g.,In re Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 674 (Ct. App. 1998); Tropea,
665 N.E.2d at 146.
628. See Seltzer v. Seltzer, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 826 (CL App. 1994); Carol S.
Bruch & Janet M Bowemaster, The Relocation of Childrenand CustodialParents:
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Commentators, noting the unpredictability of these cases, have developed
proposals to bring more consistency to this area.6' Courts have responded by
establishing analytical frameworks and presumptions to aid in the resolution of
these cases. In undertaking these efforts, courts have recognized the difficulty of
formulating bright-line rules in an area of law punctuated by hard choices at every
turn.63 Some commentators have concluded that the trend in the courts is to
recognize the custodial parents' right to relocate through favorable standards,
presumptions, andburdens ofproof.631 Others claimthe cases reinforce traditional
marital roles by vesting decision-making authority in fathers rather than in
mothers.632 Whatever the disparate motives for and different approaches to
granting or refusing these requests, it would appear that all courts inquire, at some
point in their analysis, into what is in the best interests of the child.633 Moreover,
what is not difficult to discern is that permission to relocate is easy to obtain when
the purpose for the move is marriage or remarriage.634

PublicPolicy,PastandPresent,30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 260 (1996) C'The Constitution does

not permit a court to restrict the custodial parent's travel." (citing Inre Fingert, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 389 (Ct. App. 1990))). The right to travel, like the right of access to contraceptives,
is a right whose source in the Constitution has not been specifically located. See Saenz
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969);
Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A ConstitutionalPerspective, 34
U. LouisvLE J. FAzvL L. 1, 67-80 (1995-96); Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody andthe
Right to Travel: Legal and PsychologicalImplications, 24 J. FAM. L. 625, 630-38
(1985-86); Tabitha Sample & Teresa Reiger, RelocationStandardsand Constitutional
Considerations,10 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM LAW. 229, 237 (1998).
629. See Janet LeachRichards, Children'sRights v. Parents'Rights:A Proposed
Solution to the CustodialRelocationConundrum, 29 N.M. L. REv. 245, 281-85 (1999)
(proposing a model statute).
630. See Domningues v. Johnson, 593 A-2d 1133, 1140 (Md. Ct. App. 1991).
631. See Kathryn E.Abare, Note, Protectingthe New Family: Ireland v. Ireland
Law, 32 CONN.L.REV. 307,315 (1999).
andConnecticut'sCustodialParentRelocation
632. See Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizingwith Solomon: ChoosingBetween
Parentsin aMobile Society, 31 J. FAML L. 791, 846 (1992-93).
633. See Richards, supra note 629, at 246-50 (synthesizing the various
approaches).
634. See, e.g.,In re Edlund, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671,674 (Ct. App. 1998) (regarding

permission to move with her daughter from California to Indiana to be with her new
husband); In re Biallas, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 717 (Ct. App. 1998) (regarding the mother's
relocation to Nebraska to be with her new husband); Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676,
677 (Conn. 1998) (regarding the new husband's relocation to California);
Fridley v. Fridley, 748 N.E.2d 939, 940, 943 (Ind.Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the denial
of a father's petition for change of custody where the mother wished to move to Arizona
with her boyfriend); In re Thielges, 623 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Iowa Ct. App, 2000)
(relocation requested for purposes of a "fresh start" in a new area); Rosenthal v. Maney,
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New York attempted to bring consistency to its approach to relocation cases
by consolidating two cases in Tropeav. Tropea.l In Tropea,Tammy Tropea, a
custodial mother of two, planning to remarry and already pregnant with her
fianc6's child, petitioned for amodificationofcustodyin order that she be allowed
to move to anotherpart ofthe state.6 6 The trial court denied this request based on
its assessment that the move would pose undue disruption or substantial

745 N.E.2d 350, 358-59 (Mass. Ct App. 2001) (reversing the denial of a petition to
relocate where the mother's new husband lived in another state); Romanetto v. Weirich,
48 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Mo. Ct.App. 2001) (regarding the new husband's relocation to
Ohio); In re S.E.P., 35 S.W.3d 862, 867, 869 (Mo. Ct.App. 2001) (affirming the grant
of a petition to relocate where the mother's new husband took ajob in Florida); Weaver
v. Kelling, 18 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct App. 2000) (regarding the new husband's
relocation to Texas); Lavalle v. Lavalle, 11 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
(regarding the new husband's relocation to Maryland); Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 597
N.W.2d 592, 596, 601 (Neb. 1999) (reversing a denial ofpermission to relocate where
the relocating custodial mother had a boyfriend in a new area); Hayes v. Gallacher, 972
P.2d 1138, 1142 (Nev. 1999) (granting permission to relocate from Nevada to Japanto
join new husband and deeming it "particularly unacceptable" to force a choice between
children and husband); Tibor v. Tibor, 598 N.W.2d 480, 482, 483, 488 (N.D. 1999)
(reversing an order refusing permission to relocate where the mother's new husband
moved to take a new job and the noncustodial parent also had remarried); State ec reL
Melling v. Ness, 592 N.W.2d 565, 568 (N.D. 1999) (regarding an unwed mother's
relocation to be with her boyfriend); Hawkinson v. Hawkinson, 591 N.W.2d 144, 145
(N.D. 1999) (granting a relocation request where both parties had remarried); In re
B.E.M., 566 N.W.2d 414,417 (N.D. 1997) (permitting an unwed mother to relocate in
orderto remarry, stating: "It is axiomatic that a newly-wed couple wants to live together
and that the child is benefited [sic] by the satisfaction the custodial parent derives from
residing with her spouse."); Zoccole v. Zoccole, 751 A.2d 248, 251 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(holding that relocation within same county with a new husband does not trigger more
rigorous analysis than best interests); Thomas v.Thomas, 739 A.2d 206,214 (Pa. Super.
1999) (Ford, J., concurring) C'[W]e consider the children's well-being and best interests
inextricably joined to the health and happiness of the custodial parent.'); Mealy v.
Arnold, 733 A.2d 652, 655,656 (Pa. Super. 1999) (granting anunwed motherpermission
to relocate to North Carolina in order to many, although the child's friends and the
extended family of bothparents lived inPennsylvania);In re Marriage ofFlynn, 972 P.2d
500,503 (Wash. Ct.App. 1999) ("The orderpreemptively and impermissiblyforces Ms.
Manis into the quandary of choosing between her freedom to reside with her present
husband at a place of her choice or leaving without her children.").
635. 665N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). Itshouldbenotedthatpriorto these cases, New
York was considered the most difficult jurisdiction in which to obtain permission to
relocate. Therequirementwas thattheparentshowexceptional circumstances supporting
the decision to relocate. This high standard was based on the policy of protecting the
noncustodial parent's rights. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supranote 24, at 909.
636. See Tropea,665 N.E.2d at 146.
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impairment of the father's right of access to the children and that there was no
showing of exceptional circumstances supporting a grant of the motion. This
decision was reversed at the appellate level, based on a determination that
relocation would be in the children's best interests.63 The father appealed.63
Meanwhile, in Browner v. Kenward,639 Jacqueline Browner petitioned to move
with her son to live with her parents in a different state 130 miles away." °
Andrew Kenward, the boy's father and Jacqueline's ex-husband, unsuccessfully
opposed the petition at both the trial court and appellate levels." 1 Those courts
concluded that the move would not interfere with Andrew's meaningful access to
his son and that, in any event, the move was in the boy's best interests. 2
Affirming both decisions, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the rigid
three-step analytical approach developed by lower courts in favor of a case-bycase determination of the best interests of the child in all relocation cases.643 The
court commented that any rights of the parents, however significant, would be
appropriately subordinated to considerations ofthe child's well-being. 1 4 Applying
this new approach to Browner, the court expressed its agreement with the lower
courts that Kenward had not successfully rebutted the finding that Browner's
relocation was in their son's best interests." 5 The court's approach to Tropeawas
slightly different. In reaching its decision, the court explicitly disapproved of
decisions from lower courts that deemed remarriage insufficient justification for
a distant moves" and held, instead, that "the demands of a second marriage" may
be in a child's best interests due to "the value for the children that strengthening
and stabilizing the new, postdivorce family unit can have in a particular case.' m7
In affirming Tropea,the court was, in essence, approving of the new family unit
that Tropea offered her sons."

637. See id. at 147.
638. See id.
639. The court consolidated the two separate matters, Tropea v. Tropea and
Browner v. Kenward, for its opinion. See id. at 146-49.
640. See id. at 147.
641. See id. at 148.
642. See id.
643. See id. at 150, 151-52.
644. See id.
645. See id.
646. See, e.g., Elkus v. Elkus, 588 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (App. Div. 1992) ("[The
mere fact ofremarriage, withoutmore, will not constitute an exceptional circumstance.').

647. Tropea,665 N.E.2d at 151.
648. See id. at 152.
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The same year Tropeawas decided, California tidied its "decade's worth of
progressively more contradictory appellate decisions" 9 by clarifying, in In re
Burgess,5 the standards to be employed in resolving relocation cases. In that
case, a custodial mother petitioned to relocate with her children forty miles from
the town in which her ex-husband, the father of her children, lived." The trial
court granted the request finding it to be in the best interests of the children.11
The court of appeals, however, reversed, articulating a three-tiered framework
similar to the one used by appellate courts in New York prior to Tropea.6
" The
California Supreme Court disapproved of the framework-in particular the
requirement that the relocating parent show that the relocation is
"necessary" 4-- andreinstated the trial court's decision." As amatter ofpolicy,
the court observed that the frequency of relocation due to remarriage and career
changes in today's society demands that courts deciding relocation cases focus
squarely on what custody arrangements serve the best interests of the children.'
Most recently, legislatures and courts have begun abandoning presumptions
that favor the relocation of custodial parents.' The trend in these cases is, thus,
moving away from presumptions and rights-based analyses and toward an
emphasis on the best interests of the child. This shift merits comparison with the
analytical approach mandated by the Supreme Court in resolving grandparental
visitation cases. Recall that in these cases, married biological parents'
constitutionalrightto exercise parental autonomyis paramount to anyinquiryinto
the bestinterests ofthe child.6 "3 Inmany states, though, where a parent's marriage
has been fractured, or where thatparenthas neverbeenmarried, grandparents may
petition forvisitation, and suchvisitationwillbe granted ifitis in the best interests
of the child.659 Such a petition must meet a higher standard in some states,
however, ifa parent "relocates" her child into a nuclear family through stepparent
adoption, as Tommie Granville Wynn did in TroxeL6' These principles mirror
649. In re Whealon, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559,563 (Ct. App. 1997).
650. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).

651. See id. at 477.
652. See id.
653. See id.at 477-78.
654. Id. at 480, 483 n.10.

655. See id.at484.
656. See id.at 480, 481-82.

657. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.61.13(2)(d) (West 1997) (abolishing ajudicially
created presumption in favor of relocation by the primary residential parent); Braun v.
Headley, 750 A.2d 624,635 (Md. Ct.App. 2000) (disapproving ofapresumption in favor
of either parent); JaramiUo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 304 (N.M. 1991).

658. See supranotes 153-68 and accompanying text.
659. See supra note 166.
660. See, e.g., Foor v.Foor, 727 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). But see
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those at work in the relocation context. A married couple has full constitutional
freedom to relocate at will, and such relocation will be presumed to be in the
child's best interests. As inthe grandparentalvisitation context, however, once the
marriage is fractured, the custodial parent retains the same freedom to travel only
to the extent that it is consistent with the child's best interests." 1 In both contexts,
once a marriage dissolves, decisions as to relocation and grandparental visitation
are "left to the states as a matter of policy, rather than imposed by a court under
the rubric of constitutional principle."' 2 The significance of this parallelism lies
inits demonstration that in the family context, privacy depends heavily upon the
existence of marriage. Where no marriage was ever entered into, or where it has
been dissolved, any constitutional dimension ofrelocation and visitation questions
falls away and is replaced by the more flexible, policy-based best-interests
analysis, which promotes marital families. It is hardly surprising, then, that courts
have rejected a rigid framework for analysis in relocation cases and, instead, have
embraced an inherently subjective approach that affords wide latitude to decide
relocation cases consistently with the policy ofpromoting marriage." 3 Nomatter
whether the analytical stance is based on constitutional principles or on policy, the
rationale driving these decisions remains the same. Courts freely grant
grandparents the right to visit fractured families because to do so has little impact
either one way or the other upon marital families; likewise, courts freely grant
relocation petitions where neither the custodial parent nor the noncustodial parent
has remarried."
Because compelling grandparental visitation within intact
nuclear families, however, may undermine the stability of such families, courts

statutes cited at note 168, supra.
661. Some courts, invoking state constitutional provisions, require a showing of
deleterious effects on the children before the custodial parent's right to relocate with them
may be infringed. See, e.g., Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 616-17 (Wyo. 1999) ("The
custodialparent's right to move withthe children is constitutionally protected, and a court
may not order a change in custody based upon that circumstance alone.").
662. See Rao, supra note 44, at 1101.
663. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This ChildDoes Have Two Mothers: Redefining
ParenthoodtoMeet the Needs ofChildreninLesbian-MotherandOtherNontraditional
Families, 78 GEO.L.J. 459,559-61 (1990) (showing how the best interests standard can
easily be used to promote ideology).
664. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner, 45 S.W.3d 852, 854-55 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001)
(higher paying job in Florida); Hass v. Hass, 44 S.W.3d 773, 775-76 (Ark. Ct. App.
2001) (new career opportunity); Boyerv. Boyer, 722 N.Y.S.2d 322, 323 (App. Div. 2001)
(enhanced financial situation promised with opportunities in new area); Olson v. Olson,
611 N.W.2d 892, 895 (N.D. 2000) (improved career opportunities); Goffv. Goff, 593
N.W.2d 768,771-72 (N.D. 1999) (higher paying job and extended family innew area);
Kaiserv. Kaiser, 23 P.3d 278,280,282 (Okla. 2001) (potential out-of-state employment
opportunities).
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either do not grant grandparents standing to petition for visitation, or the courts
require grandparents to prove the unfitness ofthe parents. Reflecting concern for
marital families in the relocation context, courts grant relocation petitions where
the custodial parent wishes to move for some reason related to her remarriage.
Although the general approach to these cases--to require a showing that "the
proposed relocation is made in good faith and is in the best interests of the
child"'6 -- might suggestthat the remarriage of the custodial parent is just one of
many factors militating in favor of relocation, in the rare case where a remarried
custodial spouse is denied her request to relocate, the noncustodial spouse
invariablybas remarried as well.' Thus, relocation disputes, little knownbefore
the explosion of the divorce rate in this country, reflect policies very similar to
those in existence before the divorce revolution. Policy reform in this area, like
policy reform in the areas of inheritance by nonmarital children and openness in
adoption, continues to alignitself withthe law's widespread promotion ofmarriage
and nuclear families.
In the hierarchy of family privacy protection, traditional, nuclear families
outflank all other forms of the family, nontraditional and nonmarital families have
little expectation of privacy. On the level of policy, marital families, as a
historicalmatter, also have beenprivileged-afactmade obvious by a studyofthe
role ofpolicy ininheritance law. Publicpolicyneednotremain stagnant, however.
Lawmakers and courts can, and often do, effect reforms to temper the
anachronistic treatment of nontraditional families. One valiant reform effort in
recent years has been in the area of the inheritance rights ofnonmarital children.
But the policy of according nonmarital children equal treatment inthe inheritance
context has done little to elevate nonmarital families to the status held by marital
families. Likewise, in the adoption context, many commentators, reacting to the

665. Weaver v. Kelling, 18 S.W.3d 525,528 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
666. See, e.g., Hughes v. Gentry, 443 S.E.2d 448, 452 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)
(transferring custody to the noncustodial parent where the noncustodial parent had
remarried); cf Lazier v. Gentes, 686 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808, 809 (App. Div. 1999)
(remanding approval ofrelocation of the custodial father where the noncustodial mother
was engaged to be married). But see Flannery v. Crowe, 720 So. 2d 308, 308 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1998) (rejecting the remarried custodial mother's relocation petition where the
legislaturerecentlyhad eliminated the presumption in favor ofrelocation); Franzv. Franz,
737 So. 2d 943, 944, 948 (La. CL App. 1999) (refusing relocation where the custodial

mother, who was "living in open concubinage with a married man," married one week
before the relocation hearing); Buschardt v. Jones, 998 S.W.2d 791, 798, 802 (Mo. CL
App. 1999) (reversing permissionto relocate in favor of the remarried mother,fatherwas
cohabiting with a new romantic interest, and the trial judge exhibited bias "against
persons of the opposite sex who choose to cohabitate").
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senselessness of biologism, have made proposals for openness that, while they
appear to effect reform of the sort urged by Professor Bartholet, have the effect of
widening the gulf between families that enjoy privacy protection and those that do
not. Finally, policies behind the resolution of relocation disputes, having
mushroomed in recent years in response to the rising divorce rate, the increased
mobility of families generally, and employment outside the home, betray a
solicitude-in the guise of the best interests of children-for parents who wish to
remarry.
Although a study of the underpinnings of other areas of family policy will
have to be pursued in another forum, this Article looks at three such areas that are
cause for concern. Reform efforts in furtherance of the interests of alternative
families, while undeniably valuable as a proposition, appear to go astray at the
stage of their implementation. Too often, what appears to dismantle the privileges
enjoyed by marital families under the law, and to place alternative families on a
par with them, in actuality advances the same policies embodied in the all-toofamiliar traditions and practices of the past. To ignore this effect of wellintentioned reform efforts further marginalizes alternative families and renders
their goal ofenjoying privacyprotection similar in scope to that enjoyed by nuclear
families more difficult to achieve.
VI. CONCLUSION: MARRYING POLICY AND PRIVACY
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, no study of family privacy is
complete absent consideration of the policy underlying it. By examining family
privacy through the lens of policy, one sees that recent understandings of privacy
demand reexamination and that, in particular, constitutional law scholars'
recognition of a trend in the courts away from conceptualizing family privacy as
a set of rights emanating from the marital unit to one grounded in liberty interests
retained by individuals is likely not complete. Although the equality language of
Eisenstadt and the individual autonomy language of Roe suggest such an account
of family privacy, a closer look at the language and context of these decisions, and
a consideration of more recent developments in the area of constitutional family
privacy jurisprudence, reveals that the right to privacy they recognize is
influenced, if not dictated, by a decided concern for promoting and maintaining the
integrity of the traditional nuclear family. Such emphasis on the marital unit in
family privacy cases is consistent with the Supreme Court's analytical approach
to announcing fundamental privacy rights. The approach focuses exclusively on
historical practices and traditions and ignores policies not in force at the time of
the enactment of the relevant constitutional provision. As such, constitutional
recognition offamilies notrecognized historically will come about onlyby changes
in contemporary policies.
In researching historical practices and traditions, the Supreme Court need not
look far to conclude that, as a matter of policy, the law, for a long time, has
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favored marital over nonmarital families. This bias has takenhold and continues
its workinthe law of succession, where rules governing intestate distribution, will
construction, and will contests, although declaring protection of testatorial
absolutism, contain the explicit message that the law must protect and sanctify
marriage. As the law applicable to intestacy, undue influence, and restraints on
marriage demonstrates, the paramount policy behind the law of
succession-freedom of testation-must yield to concerns that the will of
decedents not undermine marriage among the living.
Changes in the law not governed by privacy principles purport to frustrate
historical biases by recognizing changes in the composition of families. Recent
movement in the law toward dismantling barriers to inheritance by nonmarital
children and toward open adoption, for example, appears to question the primacy
of themarital family and suggests that expanded legalrecognition ofnontraditional
families maybe inthe off ng. In reality, though, these reforms advance restrictive
policies in favor of nuclear families. Examination of reform efforts in the areas
of inheritance by nonmarital children, of adoption, and of move-away custody
disputes reveals policies reflective ofthe Supreme Court's narrow definition ofthe
family. For this reason, reform efforts in these areas are unlikely to be useful as
a premise from which to argue for family privacy protection for alternative
families.
Until it is recognized that the vision of the family underlying family privacy
jurisprudence has been stunted by reliance on a restrictive and outdated
understanding of the family, the flowering of a new jurisprudence recognizing a
more expansive -view of the family will not take place. If the family's unique
character as a locus of constitutionally-based privacy rights is to be fully
recognized, the concept of family requires careful and principled definition
explicitly rejecting the notion that privacy belongs only to traditional, nuclear
families. Attempts to define the family in this way in Supreme Court precedent
and in scholarly literature, however, have been marked by a hesitancy and a
nebulousness unworthy of their importance in the context of forging a
constitutional family privacy doctrine of integrity. Given the Supreme Court's
current manner of articulating and defending family privacy, continued
jurisprudence inthis veinwill impoverishthis area with a growing dividebetween
family life and the rules developed to regulate it. Policy reforms, still heavily
influenced by views of the primacy of marriage and of consanguinity, will be
helpless to stem the tide unless an informed and principled definition of the family
emerges.

6V

667. In a forthcoming Article, the Author explains how regulation of assisted
reproduction, still in its developing stages, is an appropriate platform from which to
launch this redefinition. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthoodby Pure Intention:
Assisted Reproductionand the FunctionalApproachto Parentage(forthcoming).
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